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ABSTRACT 
 
Unsuccessful mergers are unfortunately the rule rather than the exception. 
Therefore it is necessary to gain an enhanced understanding of mergers 
and post-merger integrations (PMI) as well as learning more about how 
mergers and PMIs of information systems (IS) and people can be 
facilitated.  Studies on PMI of IS are scarce and public sector mergers are 
even less studied. There is nothing however to indicate that public sector 
mergers are any more successful than those in the private sector.  
This thesis covers five studies carried out between 2008 and 2011 in 
two organizations in higher education that merged in January 2010. The 
most recent study was carried out two years after the new university was 
established. The longitudinal case-study focused on the administrators 
and their opinions of the IS, the work situation and the merger in general. 
These issues were investigated before, during and after the merger.  Both 
surveys and interviews were used to collect data, to which were added 
documents that both describe and guide the merger process; in this way 
we aimed at a triangulation of findings.  
Administrators were chosen as the focus of the study since public 
organizations are highly dependent on this staff category, forming the 
backbone of the organization and whose performance is a key success 
factor for the organization. Reliable and effective IS are also critical for 
maintaining a functional and effective organization, and this makes 
administrators highly dependent on their organizations’ IS for the ability 
to carry out their duties as intended. The case-study has confirmed the 
administrators’ dependency on IS that work well. A merger is likely to 
lead to changes in the IS and the routines associated with the 
administrators’ work. Hence it was especially interesting to study how the 
administrators viewed the merger and its consequences for IS and the 
work situation. The overall research objective is to find key issues for 
successful mergers and PMIs. 
The first explorative study in 2008 showed that the administrators 
were confident of their skills and knowledge of IS and had no fear of 
having to learn new IS due to the merger. Most administrators had an 
academic background and were not anxious about whether IS training 
would be given or not. Before the merger the administrators were positive 
and enthusiastic towards the merger and also to the changes that they 
expected.  The studies carried out before the merger showed that these 
administrators were very satisfied with the information provided about 
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the merger. This information was disseminated through various channels 
and even negative information and postponed decisions were quickly 
distributed. The study conflicts with the theories that have found that 
resistance to change is inevitable in a merger.  
Shortly after the merger the (third) study showed disappointment with 
the fact that fewer changes than expected had been implemented even if 
the changes that actually were carried out sometimes led to a more 
problematic work situation. This was seen to be more prominent for 
routine changes than IS changes. Still the administrators showed a clear 
willingness to change and to share their knowledge with new colleagues. 
This knowledge sharing (also tacit) worked well in the merger and the 
PMI. The majority reported that the most common way to learn to use 
new ISs and to apply new routines was by asking help from colleagues. 
They also needed to take responsibility for their own training and 
development. 
Five months after the merger (the fourth study) the administrators had 
become worried about the changes in communication strategy that had 
been implemented in the new university. This was perceived as being 
more anonymous. Furthermore, it was harder to get to know what was 
happening and to contact the new decision makers. The administrators 
found that decisions, and the authority to make decisions, had been 
moved to a higher administrative level than they were accustomed to. A 
directive management style is recommended in mergers in order to 
achieve a quick transition without distracting from the core business. A 
merger process may be tiresome and require considerable effort from the 
participants. In addition, not everyone can make their voice heard during 
a merger and consensus is not possible in every question. It is important 
to find out what is best for the new organization instead of simply 
claiming that the tried and tested methods of doing things should be 
implemented.  
A major problem turned out to be the lack of management continuity 
during the merger process. Especially problematic was the situation in the 
IS-department with many substitute managers during the whole merger 
process (even after the merger was carried out). This meant that no one 
was in charge of IS-issues and the PMI of IS. Moreover, the top managers 
were appointed very late in the process; in some cases after the merger 
was carried out. This led to missed opportunities for building trust and 
management credibility was heavily affected. The administrators felt 
neglected and that their competences and knowledge no longer counted. 
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This, together with a reduced and altered information flow, led to 
rumours and distrust. Before the merger the administrators were 
convinced that their achievements contributed value to their organizations 
and that they worked effectively. After the merger they were less sure of 
their value contribution and effectiveness even if these factors were not 
totally discounted. The fifth study in November 2011 found that the 
administrators were still satisfied with their IS as they had been 
throughout the whole study. Furthermore, they believed that the IS 
department had done a good job despite challenging circumstances.  
Both the former organizations lacked IS strategies, which badly 
affected the IS strategizing during the merger and the PMI.  IS strategies 
deal with issues like system ownership; namely who should pay and who 
is responsible for maintenance and system development, for organizing 
system training for new IS, and for effectively run IS even during 
changing circumstances (e.g. more users).  A proactive approach is 
recommended for IS strategizing to work. This is particularly true during 
a merger and PMI for handling issues about what ISs should be adopted 
and implemented in the new organization, issues of integration and 
reengineering of IS-related processes. In the new university an IT-
strategy had still not been decided 26 months after the new university was 
established. 
The study shows the importance of the decisive management of IS in 
a merger requiring that IS issues are addressed in the merger process and 
that IS decisions are made early. Moreover, the new management needs 
to be appointed early in order to work actively with the IS-strategizing. It 
is also necessary to build trust and to plan and make decisions about 
integration of IS and people. 
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SAMMANFATTNING 
 
Misslyckade fusioner är dessvärre mer en regel än undantag och så 
mycket som mellan 50-80 % når inte målen. Därför finns det anledning 
att undersöka hur problem och misslyckanden kan undvikas, och hur 
fusioner samt efterföljande integration av informationssystem (IS) och 
människor kan underlättas. Fusioner i offentlig sektor utgör inget 
undantag från svårigheterna att nå lyckade fusioner; dessutom är den 
sortens fusioner ännu mer sällan undersökta än i privata sektorn.  
Avhandlingen omfattar fem delstudier som har genomförts från 2008 
till 2011 i två organisationer inom högre utbildning där fusion till ett nytt 
universitet har genomförts. Den senaste undersökningen gjordes två år 
efter fusionen trätt i kraft. Den longitudinella case-studien har inriktats på 
administratörerna och deras uppfattningar om informationssystemen, 
arbetssituationen och fusionen i stort. Både enkäter (tre) och intervjuer 
(två) har använts för att samla in data om administratörernas 
uppfattningar före, under och efter fusionen. Enkäter och intervjuer har 
kompletterats med information från interna och offentliga dokument för 
att ytterligare säkerställa fynden.  
Att strålkastarljuset riktades på administratörerna hänger samman 
med deras synnerligen viktiga roll inom organisationerna; administratörer 
är organisationernas stomme, och utan deras insatser och kunskaper 
skulle mycket fallera. Detta gäller inte minst inom offentlig sektor, och 
som i denna studie, inom högre utbildning. Administratörerna å andra 
sidan är beroende av sina IS och måste kunna lita på att de fungerar väl – 
alltid. Studien har bekräftat administratörernas beroende av väl 
fungerande IS. I en fusion är det sannolikt att förändringar sker både av 
IS och av de rutiner, som finns knutna till arbetsuppgifterna. Därför var 
det speciellt intressant att ta reda på hur administratörerna uppfattade 
fusionen och dess konsekvenser för IS och arbetssituationen för att den 
vägen söka efter ytterligare nycklar till lyckade fusioner och 
integrationer.  
Den första kartläggande studien 2008 visade administratörer med gott 
självförtroende när det gällde deras kompetens och kunskaper inom IS, 
och det fanns inte någon rädsla för att lära sig använda nya IS med 
anledning av fusionen. Majoriteten av administratörerna hade någon form 
av akademisk utbildning och visade inte oro även om det var oklart 
huruvida utbildning i nya IS skulle erbjudas eller inte. Administratörerna 
var före fusionen mycket positiva till de kommande förändringarna och 
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såg fram emot fusionen med tillförsikt och entusiasm. Undersökningarna 
före fusionen visade att administratörerna var mycket tillfreds med 
informationsstrategierna, och ansåg att de fick fyllig information genom 
många kanaler, och att även uppskjutna beslut och problem meddelades 
snabbt. Studien motbevisar således att motstånd mot förändringar skulle 
vara oundvikligt vid fusioner.  
Kort efter fusionen (tredje studien) fanns en besvikelse över att det 
blev färre förändringar än man förväntat (och hoppats) även om de 
ändringar, som de facto hade gjorts, i vissa fall hade gett en besvärligare 
arbetssituation. Detta uppgavs gälla rutinändringar i högre utsträckning 
än IS-ändringar. Dock är man fortfarande villig att förändra och att dela 
kunskaper med nya kollegor. Kunskapsdelande (även av tysta kunskaper) 
fungerade väl i fusionen och en majoritet ansåg att man främst lärt sig 
nya IS och rutiner genom att kollegor hjälpt varandra och genom egna 
ansträngningar.   
Fem månader efter fusionen (fjärde studien) var administratörerna 
bekymrade över att kommunikationen ändrats; den uppfattades som mer 
anonym och att det var svårare att få veta vad som hände samt att komma 
i kontakt med beslutsfattare. Administratörerna uppfattade att makten 
hade flyttats uppåt i en växande hierarki, som de var ovana vid. 
Toppstyrning anses visserligen vara nödvändig i fusioner så att saker 
händer snabbt; det finns inte tid att ständigt nå konsensus, och alla kan 
inte alltid få igenom sina krav. Det är viktigt att hitta vad som är bäst för 
den nya organisationen och inte hänga kvar vid tidigare rutiner och IS 
bara för att de fungerade tidigare. Dessutom tar förändringarna under en 
fusion mycket tid och kraft, vilket riskerar att fokus flyttas från 
kärnverksamheten i alltför hög grad. 
Ett stort problem visade sig vara den bristande kontinuiteten i 
ledningen under fusionen. Speciellt besvärlig var situationen inom IS-
avdelningen där det var många tillfälliga chefer under hela processen 
(även efter att fusionen genomförts). Detta ledde till att ingen specifikt 
kunde driva frågorna rörande IS, och integrationen av IS efter fusionen, 
med kontinuitet och kraft. Dessutom tillsattes de högsta cheferna mycket 
sent; till och med efter att fusionen trätt i kraft. Möjligheter att bygga upp 
en förtroendefull relation med administratörerna omöjliggjordes i och 
med detta, och undersökningen fem månader efter fusionen visade att 
tilliten till ledningen hade minskat betydligt. Administratörerna kände sig 
överkörda och att deras kompetenser inte räknades längre. Detta i 
samverkan med mindre information ledde till ryktesspridning och 
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misstro. Administratörerna har annars varit övertygande om att deras 
insatser var värdefulla och att de arbetade på ett effektivt sätt. Efter 
fusionen noterades en nedgång i dessa övertygelser men de fanns 
fortfarande. Den femte undersökningen i november 2011 visade att 
administratörerna var fortsatt nöjda med informationssystemen, vilket i 
övrigt gäller hela studien, och man ansåg att IS-avdelningen gjort ett 
mycket bra jobb utifrån de förutsättningar som funnits.  
I båda de tidigare organisationerna saknades IS-strategier, och därmed 
blev det IS-strategiska arbetet lidande. IS-strategier behandlar exempelvis 
frågor om systemägande som berör vem som betalar och ansvarar för 
underhåll och löpande vidareutveckling, utbildningsinsatser vid 
uppgraderade/nya IS och handlingsplaner för att kunna säkerställa att 
informationssystemen fungerar väl även om kraven (t.ex. antal 
användare) ändras. Ett proaktivt förhållningssätt är viktigt i ett IS-
strategiarbete; inte minst i en fusion där man måste hantera frågor om 
bland annat systemval, integration och omorganisering av processerna, 
där IS är en viktig komponent. I den nya organisationen bildades efter 
knappt ett år ett strategiskt råd som fick i uppdrag av högsta ledningen att 
utforma en IS-strategi; 26 månader efter att fusionen genomförts hade 
ännu inte någon IS-strategi beslutats.  
Studien visar vikten av ett kraftfullt IS-strategiarbete i en fusion, 
vilket kräver att IS involveras tidigt i fusionsprocessen och att beslut om 
IS fattas tidigt. Dessutom behöver den nya ledningen tillsättas tidigt för 
att ha möjlighet att arbeta aktivt med IS-strategin, planera och fatta beslut 
avseende integrationen av IS och människor samt bygga förtroende i 
organisationen.  
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1 Introduction  
Mergers are commonplace organizational events in the 21th century, but 
unfortunately they more often fail than they succeed (e.g. Alaranta 2008; 
Tarplett 2009). According to the Institute of Government (2010) the 
majority of failures occur during the integration phases. Hence there is a 
need for enhanced understanding of mergers and post-merger integrations 
(abbreviated hereafter as PMI), and of learning more about how mergers 
and PMIs could be facilitated. Research has been carried out in the field 
of mergers during the last decades but there are still missing keys that 
could increase the success rate. In the literature there is a perceived lack 
of research about PMI of IS (e.g. Alaranta 2008), and longitudinal in-
depth case-studies are especially requested (e.g. Meglio & Risberg 2010; 
Wijnhoven et al. 2006).  
It is much easier to make a merger decision and to have high hopes 
for the outcome, than it is to practically carry out mergers that fulfil the 
initial objectives.  The importance of carefully planned and thoroughly 
realized IS’ integration for a successful PMI is often argued in the 
literature (e.g. Apnovich 2002; Robbins & Stylianou 1999; Sirkin et al. 
2005). The necessity of pre-merger planning and early decisions about 
the IS strategies are also stressed (e.g. Bashein & Markus 1994; Mehta & 
Hirschheim 2007). Another angle that is often focused upon in the 
literature is the need for acknowledging human factors in mergers and 
PMI’s since they can either promote or hinder a successful PMI (e.g. 
Alaranta &Viljanen 2004; Cartwright & Cooper 1995).  
Mergers are basically about the opportunities for organizations to 
achieve better results together than otherwise. Some general proposed 
arguments, and drivers for mergers are i) the opportunity of improving 
performance, ii) increasing competitive advance, iii) achieving synergy 
effects, iv) reducing costs, and v) improving research and development 
(e.g. Appelbaum et al. 2000a, 2000b; Olie 1994; Pritchard 1993). 
Mergers are usually connected to various negative manifestations of 
employee reactions, e.g. lowered productivity, absenteeism, voluntary 
turnover and power struggles, because people are known to be inherently 
sceptical to changes that affect their daily life and work situation. Hence 
employee resistance to change in a merger is to be expected (e.g. Blake & 
Mouton 1984; Bradt 2008; DiFonzo & Bordia 2000; Epstein 2004; Lewis 
et al. 2010; Michelman 2007; Strebel 1996). A great deal of advice on 
how to counter and prevent resistance to change is available in the 
literature (e.g. Collins 2001; Bradt 2008; Empson 2000a, 2000b; 
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Schweiger et al. 1987). Some advice stresses the importance of managers 
regarding resistance to change as basically positive expressions of 
employee interest in the matters that surround a merger (e.g. Ford & Ford 
2009). A basic facilitator for preventing resistance to change is to 
acknowledge the employees’ needs and opinions (e.g. Ford et al. 2008; 
Michelman 2007; Nyberg & Mueller 2009; Tetenbaum 1999). Other 
common examples of recommendations are: i) to give information on a 
continuous basis, ii) to invite the employees to participate actively in the 
merger processes, iii) to acknowledge the importance of trust-building, 
and vi) to provide training opportunities in case of new IS and routines 
(e.g. Bashein & Markus 1994; Ford & Ford 2009; Shrivastava 2007; 
Smith 2005; Zmud & Cox 1979).  
Regardless of whether the managers follow the advice or not, there 
could still be employees who are unsatisfied with a new situation, and 
some could even be dismissed due to a merger. Hence it is even more 
important to achieve smooth communication and to provide information – 
even if there is little to relate. Trust in management is crucial in a merger, 
and the mere announcement of a merger could be enough to start the 
rumour mill because of the insecurity that is usually connected to 
mergers.  Once a rumour is formulated it is hard to dismiss, thus there is 
no such thing as too much information in a merger. If the employees do 
not get the information they require – the rumours will flourish instead 
(e.g. Appelbaum et al. 2000a, 2000b).  
Public sector mergers, which today increasingly often are realized in 
municipalities, universities, police and county councils, have many 
similarities to those in the private sector. The employees’ concerns and 
worries about the changes that necessarily will follow a merger are 
practically of the same kind. In addition to an increased risk for layoffs, 
changes should be expected regarding routines, IS, place of work and 
even colleagues. Sometimes individuals are concerned that their current 
knowledge will be insufficient if there are changes in their ordinary 
routines and IS. In the public sector there are no longer any guarantees 
that employees’ duties will remain unaffected, and that their services will 
even be needed after a merger is carried out. Organizational needs will 
determine staffing even if the merger is between regulated public sector 
organizations. Despite the old, but today outdated, saying that public 
sector employment lasts forever, even though the salary will be low, 
public sector employment is just as vulnerable as in the private sector.   
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A main driver for mergers in the public sector is deficit reduction, 
which is often given top priority in public organizations according to 
Grant Thornton (2010a, 2010b) and a related article in the Guardian 
(George 2010). Potential benefits of mergers are claimed to be 
simplification of administrative processes and systems.  
The failure rate of public sector mergers is not known to be lower 
than between private sector organizations (Tarplett 2009) and the studies 
on PMI of IS are scarce (e.g. Alaranta 2008). Studies about public sector 
mergers are even more seldom carried out and reported according to 
Tarplett (ibid.), who argues that the lack of case-studies of public sector 
mergers is one important reason for merger failure. There is a need for 
more “lessons learned” that could support mergers and PMI processes.  
To sum up, the problems that are known to occur during mergers are 
often connected to a lack of understanding of the human issues that could 
either hinder or promote merger success, and that highlights the 
importance of the managers’ active participation. Efficient 
communication strategies are necessary for building trust in management 
and for down-playing feelings of uncertainty and anxiety that otherwise 
could result in rumour spreading and other negative attitudes towards a 
merger and a PMI. How the IS related questions are handled is important 
for the prospect of a successful PMI because public organizations depend 
on their administrators’ achievements (e.g. Simon 1971) and the 
administrators in turn depend on their IS (e.g. Langefors 1995).  
The rest of chapter 1 is organized as follows. Firstly, there is a brief 
introduction to IS, some general merger definitions (e.g. merger types, 
merger motivation) as well as some examples of merger successes and 
pitfalls are presented.  Secondly, background information will be 
presented on the case-study, and the administrators’ context in a public 
sector merger will be briefly introduced. After that the research 
objectives, the research questions and the research project will be 
presented. Finally, an overview of the thesis’ key themes, research papers 
and structure is outlined.  
1.1 Information systems (IS)  
Information systems have no ends in themselves and should always 
support and give service to the underlying object system as Langefors 
(1973, 1995) argued. Langefors is known as the founder of the so-called 
Scandinavian school of information systems in the 1960s. Distinctive 
features of this school are an anti-positivistic and action-oriented research 
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approach, focusing on user-participation and IS evolution as well as a 
search for varying, innovative theoretical foundations (Iivari & Lyytinen 
1998). The object system could be roughly described as a certain form of 
activity in an organization. Over the years, the early thoughts of 
Langefors (1973, 1995) and his companions in the Scandinavian systems 
development discipline have gone through many phases, but the initial, 
fundamental criterion from the sixties still holds. No system would exist 
if not needed. Despite this, there have been variations in the fundamental 
issues in the Scandinavian school of IS: e.g. the socio-cybernetic 
approach (e.g. Iivari & Koskela1987), and the language action 
approaches (e.g. Lyytinen 1985). The socio-cybernetic approach is 
represented by Iivari & Koskela (ibid.), and the PIOCO model for IS 
design (Pragmatic, Input/Output, Constructive and Operative) which 
handles an environmental (pragmatic) element, acknowledging its 
purpose and impact as well as its structure and internal behaviour. 
Important ideas of the model is that no single IS design method is best in 
all situations, and that the technical aspects of an IS are not the only 
important factors to consider. On the contrary, the IS specification should 
preferably be independent of the technical implementation. The language 
action approaches are represented by Lyytinen (1985), who proposes five 
language views (or linguistic phenomena) that should be used as a means 
for filtering and sense making the IS development approaches, 
characterized by the language views that the system design builds on. The 
core meaning is that the IS are a means and an environment for human 
communication (on a linguistic basis). The implementation of the IS is 
made possible by technology. Langefors’ (e.g. 1973) systems view is by 
some regarded (e.g. Bansler 1989) as Tayloristic, i.e. mechanistic, and 
mainly aimed at profit maximisation. Furthermore, Langerfors’ systems 
view contrasts socio-technical and critical approaches in that humans 
could be compared to machines. The socio-technical models are mainly 
interested in the interactions in systems development and design, and in 
the problems that are caused by the neglect of human needs. The critical 
models, such as the trade unionist approach, emerged in the seventies 
when the union’s attitudes changed regarding new technology. From 
being sympathetic towards technology (because they thought that 
everyone, including workers, should gain from it) the trade unions shifted 
to a more negative view based on more shift work, and various rate 
systems that led to health problems, and an increased risk for injuries. 
The critical approaches were in opposition to the harmonious models of 
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systems development and saw organizations as places for conflict. This 
was mainly due to different interest groups’ unequal terms and power 
(Bansler 1989). 
Examples of other interesting system thoughts outside Scandinavia 
are provided by Simon (1979, 1993), Checkland (2000) and Churchman 
(1968). Simon (ibid.), who gave much attention to decision making in 
organizations, claimed the importance of acknowledging the fact that 
humans are incapable of making rational decisions (i.e. bounded 
rationality), no matter what information there is available. Hence it is 
necessary to accept decisions that are satisfactory. However, co-operation 
between individuals, who support each other in the decision making 
process, increases the likelihood of optimal decisions. Langefors (e.g. 
1973) considered executive optimal decisions to be satisfactory and to be 
preferred over scientifically proven decisions, because they could be 
carried out in shorter time and with fewer resources, which in turn would 
compensate for a less scientifically based decision. Nevertheless, 
Langefors’ optimal executive decisions and Simon’s satisfactory 
decisions are not fully compatible even if they both raise the human 
problems of coping with complex issues. Simon (1979, 1993) relied more 
on intuition when it came to making satisfying decisions while Langefors 
(1973, 1995) had a more mechanistic view. Nevertheless, in a comparison 
between Langefors’ (ibid.) ideas about the need for systems partitioning 
(subsection 2.1.3) and Churchman’s (1968) view of the total system (that 
also needs to be dissected) Churchman’s proposal is more technical and 
Langefors’ more practical (from a human perspective). Checkland (2011) 
also points out the importance of the human perspective, and the fact that 
people usually perceive a situation (or the real world) differently 
compared to others. This implies that there will always be different 
world-views, and different mental structures involved in basically the 
same situation. Soft Systems Methodology (in short SSM) is a 
methodology for handling the real-world complexity with different 
world-views, changing world-views, and would-be purposeful actions 
since it is also a human characteristic to act purposefully.  
One of the tricky parts could be about matching the system’s 
technical features with organizational and the human needs (Iivari & 
Koskela 1987; Langefors 1977; Lyytinen 1985) and furthermore with 
user opinions of how the systems should be in order to be useful and easy 
to use (e.g. Davis 1989, Davis et al. 1989). If the systems and the 
technical solutions behind them are not accepted by the users they will 
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probably not be used as they were intended. Perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use are therefore important factors to consider about a 
system – preferably before the system is purchased, or developed, and 
implemented. Davis (1989) developed the Technological Acceptance 
Model (TAM) which could be helpful when decisions about a new IS are 
to be taken. TAM could be used for predictions about whether a certain 
IS would be appreciated by the users, who in that case not only intend to 
use it but actually also will use the system (Davis et al. 1989). Other 
factors that could hamper the correct use of IS are connected to the users’ 
knowledge (i.e. the individual’s education, training and willingness to 
share tacit knowledge) and furthermore connected to the way knowledge 
is managed in the organization (Mathieson 1991; Sveiby & Simons 2002; 
Venkatesh et al. 2003).                                                                                                         
The use of information technology (in the following IT for short) and 
the IS for strategic purposes are important for business and organizations 
that aim to be at the cutting edge of their fields. Hence the management 
information systems (in the following MIS for short) must be prioritized 
in organizations, because information systems are no longer simply 
means for supporting actual business operations, collaboration and 
decision-making. Moreover, they are important means for competition 
and creating a strategic advantage and should therefore not only be 
measured by efficiency: how they succeed in minimizing costs, time and 
other resources (O’Brien & Marakas 2009; Galliers & Leidner 2009; 
Galliers 2011). Nevertheless, the idea exists that IT is no longer a 
commodity that enhances the competitive force of organizations (Carr 
2004). The reason behind Carr’s statement is that IT is commonplace 
today and therefore does not really matter. It should be said that Carr has 
been both heavily criticized and honoured for his opinion (e.g. Brown & 
Hagel III 2003; McFarlan & Nolan 2003).  Galliers (2011) argues that 
Carr does not acknowledge the fact that the critical point is how ICT 
(Information and Communications Technology) is used to foster 
competitiveness. 
Irrespective of this, when organizations are changing, for example 
due to mergers, their IS also need to be changed. As a minimum the IS 
changes would imply necessary steps to achieve system integration, but it 
could also mean that all IS of the merging organizations will be totally 
replaced. In any case, it is important to apply an approach from a holistic 
perspective to the IS integration, and to the possible reengineering 
processes of the IS.  Post-merger integrations (PMI) are important to 
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investigate, in order to better understand how to facilitate them, because 
of the high failure rate of mergers (e.g. Alaranta & Martela 2010). 
The concepts of IS and IT are sometimes differently described and 
understood. This could cause misunderstanding and uncertainty of what 
the various concepts cover if they are not accurately defined. In some 
contexts there is a sharper distinction between the systems and the 
technology that renders the use of the systems possible, and the IS could 
be regarded a subset of the IT. In other contexts the technology is a subset 
of the IS and the IT refers to the opportunities that are available by use of 
computer technology and telecommunication. The extended synonym 
ICT (Information and Communications Technology) is often used in 
order to highlight the role of communication. In this thesis the author has 
adopted the latter view of IT as a subset of IS. The users are not 
concerned with how their IS work from a more technical perspective, 
they just presume that they will work well. In this thesis the concept of IS 
refers to an information system’s technological specifications as well as 
to human activities and routines that surround it (e.g. Marcusson 2008). 
Consequently the term IS will be used even if the organizations that are 
studied use the term IT and thus the IT-department will here be called the 
IS-department. Exceptions are made for quotations of interviewees’ and 
respondents’ statements (chapters 4 and 5). 
1.2 Organizational merger processes – successes and 
pitfalls 
1.2.1 Merger types 
Organizational mergers could be described by their type; if the merger is 
horizontal/lateral or vertical (whether the organizations are in the same 
field of business or not), and if the involved units are in successive stages 
of production. For example, a vertical merger involves units in the same 
business but one is at an earlier stage of development/production (e.g. a 
farm that grows vegetables and a restaurant that cooks them). A lateral 
merger is between two businesses that produce similar products or 
services (e.g. restaurants, universities). Harman and Harman (2003) 
exemplify horizontal and vertical mergers by mergers among universities 
or other educational institutions. A horizontal/lateral merger between 
universities with complementary missions and cultures and a vertical (or 
cross-sectional) merger is between a university and a college at different 
education levels. The latter is argued to require much more careful 
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management to be successful compared to the horizontal merger type 
(Harman & Harman 2003). An example of an unsuccessful vertical 
merger is the 1989-90 merger between University of New England and 
three colleges in northern New South Wales (Harman 1993). The new 
university split into two universities in 1994. Even though many factors 
were identified as grounds for the break up there were three of particular 
weight: i) unsuitable partners that did not share commitment to the 
maintenance of the new organization/university, ii) a forced structure that 
did not fit for partners without mutual commitment for the merger, and 
iii) personality clashes (conflicts not further described) (Harman 1993).  
An example of a successful horizontal/lateral merger is between Pfizer 
and Warner Lambert in 1999. The companies were already before the 
merger co-promoting a successful cholesterol-lowering drug (Turner 
2001). 
A conglomerate merger is an amalgamation of organizations that are 
specialized in different sectors, and that produce different products. 
However, they do not have the same buyer, seller or distributional 
relations, and therefore the merger broadens the organizations’ scope 
(e.g. a restaurant and a taxi company). The merging units are often in 
completely different businesses in order to avoid putting all eggs in one 
basket – even called diversification.  An example of an unsuccessful 
conglomerate was between Mattel (toys) and The Learning Co. 
(educational software) in 1999. It turned out badly because Mattel was 
not familiar enough with the software business, and the two parted after 
only some months resulting in a huge decline of Mattel’s stock (Turner 
2001). Mergers could also be hybrids, e.g. vertical-conglomerates as the 
merger between London College of Furniture and the City of London 
Polytechnic in 1990 (Pritchard 1993).  
Another way to describe a merger is by its degree of freedom of 
choice, and whether the merger is between (relative) equals or not. A 
currently ongoing merger deal “of equals” is between Xstrata and 
Glencore, (mining companies). The companies seem to have come to an 
understanding about an “all-share merger of equals”, which when the deal 
is closed will result in a merger giant (the Economist 2012). However, 
according to Pritchard (1993), most mergers are on unequal terms with 
one participant as the “acquirer” and the other/-s the “victim”. So, one 
unit in a merger can be perceived as a takeover (like in acquisitions) by 
the other one (Locke 2007). When the organizations involved in a merger 
share the same picture of opportunities and threats it is more likely that 
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the merger will be successful (Harman & Harman 2003). An example of 
a merger with a mutual understanding of the objectives is the merger 
between HP and Compaq as the two companies set out to take mutual 
advantage of each others’ strengths and capabilities, e.g. a strong 
distribution network on the East and the West coast of USA respectively 
(de Camara & Renjen 2004). A major reason for HP and Compaq’s 
merger success was that a detailed integration plan was ready long before 
the merger was carried out. Also the top manager structure was 
extensively discussed, and agreed on, before the merger. Moreover, plans 
for the integration were followed rigorously in the PMI phases. Another 
issue that was cited as important in the HP/Compaq merger was that 
employees from both companies cooperated closely on the integration 
planning and willingly shared confidential information. Another factor 
that was considered to speed up the merger was the fact that the senior 
managers actively participated in the processes. Furthermore, the 
managers were allowed to focus on the merger, and the integration, 
instead of their ordinary duties (de Camara & Renjen ibid.). 
A merger could be politically promoted or decided (e.g. mergers in 
governmental organizations such as universities), and the organizations 
could contribute willingly or more reluctantly. The Finnish municipal 
mergers were investigated by Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2010), who found 
that the local political environment is highly influential on mergers, 
which could be both promoted or hindered, i.e. sensible mergers could be 
hindered and suboptimal mergers could be promoted. Furthermore, a 
central government merger subsidy was shown to influence the merger 
decisions. An example of the rationale behind a merger decision is that 
“the council members want to guarantee their and possibly their voters’ 
municipal jobs for the next five years or that they anticipate better career 
opportunities in the new and larger municipality” (Saarimaa & Tukiainen 
2010, p. 36). Mergers in the Swedish public sector (Bringselius 2010a, 
2010b) have become increasingly common in recent years. According to 
Bringselius (ibid.) the research on mergers in public sector is scarce and 
therefore it is difficult to compare them with private sector mergers, 
which are more frequently studied. International research on public sector 
mergers is relatively under-represented because of the different contexts 
of public sector organizations in different countries. Another reason is 
that acquisitions have earned more interest than mergers, and acquisitions 
are seldom applied in the public sector (Bringselius ibid.). 
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The terms mergers and acquisitions are often used interchangeably 
even though they have basically different origin; acquisitions have their 
emphasis on the takeover of other companies/firms and the takeover 
could be either friendly or hostile. Mergers are about combining 
companies/organizations and at least two units decide to join together as a 
new entity. Despite this, a purchase of another firm could also be called a 
merger – especially if it is positively regarded by the units involved. 
Otherwise if the purchased firm is reluctant to the deal the actually more 
correct term acquisition should be used. This thesis focuses on mergers 
and therefore the concept of acquisitions will be excluded from further 
analysis and discussion. 
1.2.2 Merger motivation 
One common motive for realizing a merger is the prospect of becoming 
more successful together by broadening the field of competence, 
improving research and development as well as cutting costs due to 
rationalizing opportunities. However, according to Harari (1998, p. 21) 
the image of “post-merger giants poised to dominate the world” could as 
easily turn out to be “slow-footed beasts” and merger-giants become 
more like clumsy and hyper-bureaucratic monsters that can hardly move.  
Pritchard (1993) suggests that financial motives for mergers in higher 
education should be treated with suspicion since there is insufficient 
evidence of cost-saving. She also found that other cooperative structures 
are becoming more popular than mergers, at least in British higher 
education. The flexibility in other forms of cooperation makes it easier to 
adapt and change in the rather unpredictable field of business that is 
higher education. Olie (1994, p. 386) argues that effective merger 
integration could be defined as: “the combination of firms into a single 
unity or group, generating joint efforts to fulfil the goals of the new 
organization”. Nevertheless, the motives behind mergers vary and 
therefore they need to be dealt with differently (Shrivastava 2007). There 
are for example different issues that are recognized as important, and 
even critical for the merger decisions (and for the motives behind them), 
depending on whether the merger is in the private or in the public sector.  
According to Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2010) public mergers could be 
motivated by a government merger subsidy scheme, as in the Finnish 
municipal mergers. Nevertheless, their study shows that the monetary 
motive is often countered by local politicians, who are more concerned 
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with saving their own employment (by re-election), but also other 
municipal employees’ (e.g. teachers, nurses) future employment.  
Choi and Brommels (2009) studied the merger of the Swedish 
Karolinska University Hospital (carried out between two teaching 
hospitals - the Huddinge University Hospital and the Karolinska Hospital 
in 2004). They found the two dominant merger motivations to be research 
excellence and financial efficiency.  In this case there was a strong 
political will to carry out the merger. The political socialist bloc strongly 
advocated the merger together with representatives from medical 
research. This led to the merger decision being made solely in the 
political arena (Choi & Brommels 2009). The prospect of a merger had 
been discussed and investigated for several years, and assumed to be 
impossible until just three months before the merger decision was 
actually made. The two university hospitals involved had a mutual history 
of fierce competition, and had never carried out co-operative research 
projects before the merger. The financial crisis was regarded as an 
important factor for the merger to becoming reality (Choi & Brommels 
ibid.). 
Public sector mergers are not exactly like private sector mergers and 
among the factors that differ are, for example, that politically based 
decisions are likely to occur, and that staff in public sector organizations 
are more likely to make their voice heard. It is often even expected that 
public sector employees will react when public resources are being 
wasted, or when the public organizations do not carry out their 
responsibilities. There are many examples of malpractice in the care of 
the elderly that have received much attention by the Swedish media 
during recent years that were leaked to the media by whistle blowers.  
1.2.3 Evaluation and determinants of merger success 
One problem related to the evaluation of a merger’s success is the time-
perspective. If a merger is evaluated too early its long-term value 
prospect, which often is the main driver of a merger, could be difficult to 
calculate. Epstein (2004) formulates five drivers for facilitating merger 
integration: i) coherent integration strategy, ii) strong integration team, 
iii) communication, iv) speed in implementation, and v) aligned 
measurements. Success in reaching all five drivers is critical for 
successful PMI. According to Epstein (ibid.) it starts with distinguishing 
a merger of equals from an acquisition, which is important because it 
articulates how the integration should be carried out. Making decisions 
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about integration actually starts the implementation of the integration 
strategy. An important factor is to avoid consideration of how the “old” 
organizations were structured, and what systems and routines they used 
before the merger. Also Apnovich (2002) argues IT integration to be a 
key to achieving merger success. Epstein (2004) proposes that the “new” 
organization should be given a fresh start, without considering how things 
were carried out before, and what IS were used. These thoughts should 
also be considered in questions about how staff and customers are 
handled. Commitment for the merger should be reflected in how the 
integration team is put together. It is strongly recommended that the team 
members work full-time with the merger, and to take care of the 
customers, who preferably should not even notice the ongoing merger. 
The merger should be seamlessly carried out from the customers’ 
perspective. Another important factor to consider is the merging 
organizations’ different cultures (Epstein 2004). 
 In the Daimler-Chrysler merger the different cultures were not 
handled properly. That neglect led to financial loss and many employees 
were laid off as a result. Staff quarrelled over minor issues like smoking 
at work, a problem that should have been easily solved (Nguyen & 
Kleiner 2003). Also Calipha et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of 
acknowledging different cultures in mergers, and argue that a large body 
of research points to four factors that are often related to merger success: 
i) culture, ii) organizational structural issues, iii) the relative size of 
partners, and iv) managerial involvement. Epstein’s (2004) third driver, 
communication, emphasizes the need for continuous communication. The 
top management should participate, the stakeholders should be involved 
and their needs should be taken into account. This is especially important 
in the early stages of a PMI. Pritchard (1993) agrees with the importance 
of top management involvement, and advocates good top management as 
the most important factor for successful mergers.  For the employees it is 
very important to receive information about their individual situation 
after the merger. Otherwise there is a clear risk of the voluntary turnover 
of those who are most vital to retain in the new organization (Epstein 
2004). 
Speedy implementation of post-merger integration (PMI) is 
important. It is essential that integration plans are ready and carried out as 
quickly as possible. Slow integration risks sending signals of uncertainty 
to the employees and customers could in turn sense instability and look 
for other suppliers. The measures of the PMI must be well aligned with 
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the merger strategy and with the merger vision. If targets covering all 
areas are not clearly formulated it will be difficult to follow up on 
progress. A good example is the merger between PepsiCo Inc. and The 
Quaker Oats Co. where the measures were formulated in a way that made 
it obvious to the stakeholders, and to the personnel, what could be 
expected throughout the processes (Epstein 2004). 
Furthermore, Epstein (2005) formulated six determinants of merger 
success, which were expected to override common obstacles in mergers. 
These determinants have much in common with Epstein’s (2004) five 
drivers, but are formulated somewhat differently. They are clearer in 
terms of the importance of acknowledging and implementing them for 
successful PMI.  It should be noted that every one of the determinants 
must be successfully dealt with in order to minimize the risk of merger 
failure. The six determinants are: i) strategic vision and fit, ii) deal 
structure, iii) due diligence, iv) pre-merger planning, v) post-merger 
integration, and vi) external factors (influencing in a long-term 
perspective).  
Strategic vision and fit is about the clear articulation of the merger 
objectives, and should be created with a focus on long-term success 
before short-term measures of success. As mentioned above (the five 
drivers) it is highly important that the leaders of the merging 
organizations carefully formulate the strategic goals, and the vision for 
the merger.  An example of this is the Daimler-Chrysler merger; on one 
hand the increase in market share based on geographical fit was 
promising, and on the other hand the different cultures in the two 
companies made it hard to achieve the expected merger benefits (Epstein 
2005). 
The deal structure of a merger needs attention, and is mainly about 
the price premium. If a too high a price is paid the new organization 
could suffer from the consequences. Another financial risk is that a 
company’s stock could be overvalued (or undervalued) at the time for the 
merger. In the merger of Federated and Fingerhut the latter’s price was 
raised disproportionately before the merger and led to Federated paying a 
too high a premium. Hence Federated shut down Fingerhut at a high 
financial loss (Epstein 2005). 
A due diligence team must be formed, responsible for implementing 
the strategic vision. Such a team must include representatives of all the 
merging units in order to gain the personnel’s trust. A thorough merging 
of cultures and of human resources (e.g. leadership styles) is important. 
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The work practices of the merging organizations should be investigated 
as well as technical and financial factors (Epstein 2005). 
The pre-merger planning is crucial and critical issues are to form the 
new leadership team as well as choosing the new top manager. The latter 
is pointed out as especially difficult in a merger of equals. Epstein (2005) 
recommends that a totally new organization is created and emphasize that 
it is crucial to decide on the new management, and organization before 
the merger is even announced.  
The post- merger integration is highly important, and if other 
determinants are successfully carried out it could facilitate the PMI. 
However, if the PMI fails potential benefits from the merger could be 
more or less destroyed. Epstein (2005) claims the importance of good 
pre-merger planning in order to achieve a good PMI. The most suitable IS 
solutions must be chosen for the new organization, no matter what 
applications were applied in the former organizations. Hence, good 
technical management is important in order to understand how to counter 
the risks of system integration. Even if there are many factors that are 
controlled by the companies involved in a merger there are also external 
factors, which are beyond their control. Nevertheless, these factors 
should not be neglected or forgotten. The economic climate at the time of 
the merger is an example of external factor that is almost impossible to 
plan for. According to Epstein (2005) it would be more likely in a strong 
economy, for a poor merger to be mistaken for a good one and vice versa. 
It is highly important to take the long-term values into consideration 
before the more short-term values such as temporary stock declines 
(Epstein 2005). The six determinants show that both strategy and process 
are important for successful merger processes. Epstein (2005) proposes 
that although mergers have a high failure rate, it is not impossible to 
succeed with mergers, if only the six determinants are properly executed.  
Tetenbaum’s (1999) advice for preventing post-merger drift, that is to 
say the productivity drop of between 25 – 50 % when staff is subject to 
major changes, is that the transition should be carried out quickly. 
Otherwise, the merger distracts both the managers and the employees. 
Fast transition pace includes making decisions about individuals’ 
situation after a merger as well as informing about how the merger will 
affect the staff on an individual level.  Preferably this should be done 
within days after the decisions are made and the deals signed. 
Productivity drops in public sector mergers could be related to the role of 
political decisions and a changing political (local or central) environment 
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that could prolong necessary merger decisions. As shown in Saarimaa 
and Tukiainen’s (2010) studies of Finnish municipal mergers, the local 
politicians have a great impact on the merger decisions. However, it 
usually took a long time to agree on whether a merger should be carried 
out or not, and meanwhile the personnel involved had to face uncertainty 
regarding their work situation and employment. This is often related to 
the prospect of cost savings, often highly prioritized in public sector 
mergers that led to staff cuts.  
Bringselius’(2010b) studies of Swedish public sector mergers 
(National Social Insurance Board, Southern Sweden University Hospital 
and National Audit Office), showed that the personnel’s objections were 
ignored, and that the merger processes were characterized by conflicts. 
The uncertainty among the personnel was large and therefore a source of 
drops in productivity.  
Olie (1994) gives some examples of how a merger success could be 
hampered: i) conflicts of interest; the merger is not supported by the 
managers in charge of the operating companies, ii) a lack of legal 
substance (i.e. no overlap between legal and organizational structures) 
and strategic fit, iii) different managerial ideologies, and iv) failure to 
shape common identity. Frommer (2001) suggests that expectations of a 
merger that are not fulfilled could hinder successful mergers and post-
merger integrations. Other IS and differences in practice between the 
merging units are often unexpected as are different leadership styles. 
Unfulfilled expectations could change positive views of a merger and of 
the new organization.  
1.2.4 Examples of successes 
Epstein (2005) suggests that a merger could be successful, even if the 
short-term financial indicators are less satisfying, and exemplifies with 
the merger between Chase Manhattan Bank and J.P. Morgan. External 
factors had to be considered and the economic downturn at the time of the 
merger would probably have hurt the organizations worse on a separate 
basis. The six determinants of success (subsection 1.2.3) were executed 
well in the JPMorganChase (JPMC) resulting in a successful merger. A 
merger that aims at a long-term relationship should not be evaluated 
mainly by short-term measures such as a rise in stock value. The 
JPMorganChase merger was a necessity with the background of the rapid 
consolidation of the banking sector (Epstein 2005).  Bank clients wanted 
integrated solutions and multiple products, which opened up for building 
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closer relationships. Although the merger was planned with high secrecy, 
decisions about the personnel were made quickly, as well as financial 
analyses and decisions. According to Tetenbaum (1999) a fast pace in a 
merger is important as are early decisions about the individuals’ post-
merger situation. The top management teams (the JPMC merger) were 
appointed before the merger was even announced, and in order to 
emphasize that it was a merger of equals, the former banks’ names were 
visible in the new name. The merger team members worked full-time 
with the merger and the merger was carried out quickly; less than four 
months after the announcement. The communication processes were 
well-coordinated and worked well. The measurements of the merger 
success were grouped in four categories: financial, technical, client and 
people. The sixth determinant of merger success (subsection 1.2.3): the 
external factors were the most problematic in the JPMC merger because 
they could not be controlled by the bank management. Examples of 
external factors, which influenced the JPMC merger, are the economic 
downturn and the September 11 attacks.  
Marks and Mirvis (1992) describe a merger where the management 
dealt successfully with the rebuilding phase after the merger.  The focus 
was on acknowledging the personnel, who remained in the organization 
after a downsizing. Leadership issues were crucial because the employees 
tend to “... mythologize their old jobs” (Marks & Mirvis 1992, p. 21), 
they grieve the past and miss their former colleagues and assignments. 
Sometimes those who remain after layoffs are ashamed over their 
survival in the organization, which is what Marks and Mirvis (ibid., p. 
18) allude to by the concepts: “survivor sickness” and “survivors guilt” 
(ibid., p. 21).  Battles at the top are always reflected in the lower levels of 
an organization.  Marks and Mirvis (ibid.) suggest activities that are 
directly addressed to the managers as a feasible option for playing down 
merger quarrels, insecurity and fear. An internal merger of the 
Communications and Information Systems divisions at AT&T caused 
strong divergence, and disagreement between the former departments. 
The managers had no experience of dealing with mergers, and both sides 
were unwilling to adapt to new routines and practices. Solving these 
problems was crucial for the new division’s ability to succeed. First, the 
differences were mapped, and then a three-day meeting was arranged for 
the managers. During the meeting they went from revealing and 
discussing their objections and fears, and describing how they have 
worked before, to a “letting-go process” (Marks & Mirvis 1992, p. 26) in 
19 
 
which they were more or less forced to come together as a group in a 
scenario building on unity towards a mutual enemy (in that case a 100-
ton paver rolling towards the group). The lesson learned from the article 
(Marks & Mirvis, 1992, p. 31- 32) is that “Managers can ‘pay now’, by 
investing time in systematic post-merger team building, or they can ‘pay 
later’ through the loss of key talent and disappointing results”. Engaging 
in arising problems is a key to successful merger integration (ibid.). 
Epstein (2004) claims that a merged organization should not primarily try 
to apply the routines and systems that were used in the former 
organizations; it is better to base such decisions on what the new 
organization’s needs are. 
IT planning could serve as a facilitator for building partnership in a 
merger according to Main and Short’s (1989) findings from a study of IT 
planning at New Baxter. Two planning behaviours are pointed out for 
their contribution to the successful development of effective partnerships: 
i) dual purpose executive interviews, and ii) micro and macro analysis 
templates. These behaviours (techniques) promoted shared knowledge, 
shared commitment and shared decision making. The interviews had 
several objectives: i) eliciting information, ii) providing basic 
understanding of the planning alternatives, which iii) promoted 
participation and iv) resulted in better communication between the 
business and the IS management. The intention of separating the micro 
and the macro analyses was intended as a means of involving the 
executives in the planning. This was made by showing the executives that 
their level of business was separately dealt with during the analysis, and 
also that shared decision making was promoted in the merger. Lewis et 
al. (2010) argue that people in general have a natural resistance to 
change, and therefore it is important to counter resistance. The 
individuals who are part of an organizational change need to be supported 
through the change processes.  In order to succeed with merger projects 
the managers need to acknowledge, and to act upon the often hesitant or 
reluctant reactions to change. Hence, in a merger process the focus should 
be on influencing new behaviours, not on influencing (i.e. changing) 
attitudes to the change (Lewis et al. 2010).  
1.2.5 Examples of pitfalls 
During three longitudinal case-studies of mergers (Amazon + Nile, 
Mekong + Indus, Seine + Lena), Mehta and Hirschheim (2007) found 
that it took a surprisingly long time before questions and issues related to 
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the IS alignment came up during the post-merger integration. It should be 
noted that those three mergers were considered successful from a Wall 
Street perspective. So, in that respect the mergers were not examples of 
pitfalls. However, the IS alignment issues could have been handled 
differently, as mentioned earlier.  Examples of what went wrong from an 
IS perspective are: i) the IS transition teams were not formed until the 
merger was announced, and only a few persons were appointed to the 
teams; ii) one of the old systems was chosen because the time to carry out 
an analysis of the available solutions was not available (i.e. not 
prioritized); iii) none of the CIOs were involved in the due diligence 
process regarding IS alignment,  and iv) the IS integration choices were 
not based on a wish to realize business IS alignment. The systems did not 
get the attention they would have required until much later (when the 
expected merger synergies were already delivered). Then the systems 
were then often re-programmed after analysis of how they could best be 
aligned with business needs.   Hence Mehta and Hirschheim (2007) argue 
the need for attending to IS alignment issues early in a merger process, 
and for building the IS’ infrastructure around business needs right from 
the start.  
 Harman (1993) describes, from the insider’s standpoint, an early 
1990s merger in British higher education that failed. There were many 
factors named as contributing to the conflict and breakup – further 
described in subsection 1.2.1. Three factors were considered to be crucial 
in this case: i) the mismatch of partners ii) the adoption of an unsuitable 
structure for the campuses, and iii) personalities. Harman (1993) argues 
the importance of describing merger failure and not simply focusing on 
the success stories. In the University of New England case the merger 
started to fail soon after it was carried out. Different campuses quarrelled 
openly about new rules for staff promotion and student load between 
campuses. Furthermore, there were problems with the location of the 
campuses, regarding distance and transport, which was an impediment to 
the integration (Harman 1993).  
Tetenbaum (1999) refers to the merger of Boeing and McDonnel 
Douglas that was less successful than expected. The merger integration 
had distracted the management because merger questions became a key 
focus at the expense of the business. A productivity drop caused by a 
post-merger drift is problematic in several aspects: i) employees are 
distracted by merger issues at the expense of their ordinary duties, ii) 
merger related problems take the focus from the competitors’ 
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achievements, and iii) cost-savings could end up in an increase in costs if 
customer needs and competitor  advancements are neglected (Tetenbaum 
1999).  
The longitudinal case-study presented below is an example of a 
merger in the public sector.  
1.3 Background to the longitudinal case-study 
1.3.1 A merger of two universities 
The general background information was mainly collected from 
documents, some of them internal and some official. Information was 
also gathered from informants, and acquired by internal access to the 
research objects (chapter 3 - method). In order not to reveal the real 
names of the universities the references to the documents are not 
provided. The pseudonyms of the universities involved are Org D and 
Org E; the new organization is called University DE, and the merger is 
referred to as the DE-merger.  
Before the DE-merger Org D and Org E had a three-year (2006-2008) 
agreement for a strategic co-operation with a third university (Org F). 
There were far-reaching plans for a merger between those three 
universities. These plans were valid until immediately before the DE-
merger process started. The main reasons for Org F withdrawing from the 
merger were partly a fear of the considerable administrative upheaval 
(that was not considered to counterbalance the gain in quality and 
effectiveness) and partly a conviction that the university (Org F) would 
be better off on its own. Org F had already a large proportion of 
international students and research partners and regarded their research 
environment as satisfactory. The plans for a merger between Org D, Org 
E, and Org F were reminiscent of the research triangle in North Carolina, 
where three universities (Duke University, North Carolina State 
University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) formed a 
successful research co-operation. In the case of Org D, Org E and Org F 
they were also located as points in a triangle. When Org F announced 
their withdrawal, early in 2008, Org D and Org E continued with the 
merger planning on their own. 
Public sector mergers do not only have financial motives and could 
stem from a political initiative (Choi & Brommels 2009; Saarimaa & 
Tukiainen 2010). The DE-merger was carried through as a politically 
promoted, voluntary merger, and was based on a wish to utilize the two 
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universities’ resources more effectively, to exploit the opportunities of 
further organizational development and of rationalization. The merger 
was expected to result in improved quality in both education and 
research. It also aimed at attracting more new students and reputable 
research partners. This in turn would lead to increased competitiveness, 
both nationally and internationally. It was an important factor for the DE-
merger’s approval that the fulfilment of the merger should create better 
opportunities in order to meet future challenges.  The ambition level was 
high for University DE and the DE-merger aimed at creating a totally 
new organization with new visions and goals.  
The merger type was horizontal and the two universities were 
relatively equal, even if Org D was regarded to have a higher academic 
status, more students (≈ 15 000) than Org E (≈10 000), and more staff. 
Before the merger Org D employed about 1 200 people and Org E about 
800. Org D carried out research in three areas: human sciences, social 
sciences and technology; Org E carried out research in natural sciences.  
The universities in the DE-merger were located in two different cities, 
at a distance of about 100 kilometres, a situation that would remain 
unchanged after the merger. The managers of the new organization were 
expected to commute between sites in order to be available for both sites’ 
personnel. Likewise, the administrators would have to travel between the 
campuses in order to co-operate, and meet with colleagues since the 
departments would be located on both campuses. In order to minimize the 
travelling, groupware for co-operation online and e-meeting tools would 
be available. However, face-to-face meetings were regarded as important; 
especially before the administrators got to know their new colleagues.  
1.3.2 The administrations and information systems  
The organization of the administration was different in the two 
universities. A couple of years before the decision to carry out the DE-
merger, Org E had gone through an administrative reorganization that 
resulted in the appointment of administrative managers for each 
department. The administrative managers reported to the head of each 
department; the organization of Org D administration was more 
centralized.  
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There were also differences between the IS1-departments regarding 
their financing policy and their role specifications. In Org E the IS-
department charged the users (on a departmental level) monthly for IS-
related services such as infrastructure, telephony, support and technical 
operations. In Org D a similar financing policy was not applied, and the 
departments were not charged for IS services. The differences in the 
financing policy affected both the routines and the demands for reporting.  
The IS-department in Org E was inspired by ITIL (Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library), which is a so called best practice of 
IT service management that provides a framework for identifying, 
planning, delivering and supporting IT services (Cartlidge & Lillycrop 
2007). Org E’s organizing in 1st, 2nd, and 3rd line was in accordance with 
ITIL’s guidelines regarding the handling of incidents and tasks, and the 
roles were well-defined for all three lines. In Org D the roles were not 
specified for the 2nd line that primarily dealt with support and training of 
teachers and students. All Org E’s IS-personnel belonged (on an 
organizational level) to the IS-department even if individuals were 
physically located in another of the university’s departments. Org D’s IS-
personnel could either be employed by the IS-department or by other 
departments. In Org E the IS-department was responsible for the purchase 
of hardware, IT-services and software in order to ensure technical 
compatibility and to avoid users or departments having to monitor 
updates and licence agreements. In Org E the departments only owned 
their printers (with one exception; one department also owned its 
servers). Org D had the ambition that the IS-department would handle all 
IS-related purchases but was not quite there yet. In Org D it was common 
that the departments owned their computers and their local technicians 
were responsible for the related services. 
Something that Org D and Org E actually shared was a lack of IS-
strategy.   
1.3.3 The organizing of the DE-merger 
An organization committee was appointed to oversee the DE-merger. A 
top manager for the organization committee, who came from outside Org 
D and Org E, was appointed early in the merger process. That person had 
previously been employed at Org F. The top managers of Org D and Org 
                                                            
1 The term IT was applied in the organizations, but in this thesis IS is used in 
accordance with the definition in section 1.1, i.e. the technology is a subset of IS. 
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E were expected to carry out their duties as usual until the DE-merger 
was carried out, and the former organizations could be closed down. Until 
then Org D and Org E should function wholly, i.e. continue normal 
operations, and after the merger the University DE should take over 
seamlessly (cf. fig. 1). Figure 1 will be further referred to in chapter 5 and 
6; dotted lines mark substitutes or preliminary appointments). 
Figure 1: The timeline of the DE-merger.  
The DE-merger carried an extensive workload that required an 
exceptional effort from the administrators, because the merger related 
assignments would mainly be carried out by the ordinary staff. Hence the 
administrators were important participants in the DE-merger. 
1.3.4 Administrators in the DE-merger 
In both Org D and Org E, the administrators’ tasks embraced a variety of 
duties in the spheres of finance, personnel administration and production 
planning. The latter include several student related tasks as well as 
resource planning/management, public relations and marketing. Those 
tasks should be handled at both locations before and during the DE-
merger, and after it was carried out by the University DE. The 
administrators were expected to collaborate with colleagues from both 
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campuses, which would require travelling, as well as establishing new 
ways of co-operating online.  
All organizations are highly dependent on their administrators who 
form the backbone of the organization, because their performance is 
fundamental for the organization’s success. Reliable and effective IS are 
also critical for maintaining a functional and effective organization 
(Andersen 1994; Langefors 1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009) and 
organizations depend on their systems’ support capabilities, not least for 
assuring that the right person gets the right information and support at the 
right time (SIG Security 1997). This makes the administrators highly 
dependent on the organizations’ IS for the ability to carry out their duties 
properly. Hence it is important that administrators learn to operate and 
manage their IS (Hoffer et al. 2002; Mathieson 1991). In order to 
maintain an organization that performs as intended, both during and after 
a merger, it is important to make sure that the IS are handled as intended 
in a PMI. Hence the administrators in the DE-merger were expected to 
participate in the change processes concerning their IS and routines. The 
administrators are skilled in monitoring the IS, they understand the 
routines thoroughly, and they carried out their duties diligently.  
The objectives of public sector administrative processes sometimes 
differ from those in the private sector. In public organizations the 
foremost objective is not to make more money for the owner (or those 
risking their money). Nevertheless, the focus is still on keeping costs 
down since resources are limited (Simon, 1971). The tasks that the public 
organizations handle are often mandatory and regulated by law or 
regulations and therefore they need to be performed as effectively as 
possible. Most of the duties that the administrators in the DE-merger 
were assigned to handle were controlled and regulated by higher 
authorities. They needed be dealt with in the right way, which does not 
imply that they could not be handled in different ways and with more or 
less flexibility and efficiency.  
Katz (1974) stated that the effective administrator has three basic 
skills: i) technical, ii) human, and iii) conceptual. Conceptual skill was 
seen as the most familiar and concrete, and also the skill that would be 
most required because of the need for specialization. Hence it was 
indispensable to efficient operations. As regards the DE-merger’s 
administrators they were likely to need all three skills that Katz (1974) 
pointed out as fundamental to being effective. Technical skills were 
required in order to master (and understand) the organization’s IS and to 
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participate in the reengineering of the new organization’s 
routines/processes. The processes applied in Org D and Org E needed to 
be scrutinized in order to differentiate between the essential and central 
processes and those that needed to be further developed or even removed. 
Totally new procedures could be necessary because of merger related 
issues, and different external factors that could emerge due to the merger. 
Human skills would be needed for the ability to co-operate with their 
“counterparts” (hopefully positively perceived), and for applying the 
concept of knowledge sharing. Conceptual skills would most likely be 
needed in order to cope with the organizational changes due to the merger 
and the PMI. Conceptual skills would also be important for the ability to 
participate in the reengineering process whilst understanding the whole – 
not only the technical and the human issues, but the wider perspective of 
the merger’s consequences. Such an understanding of the wider 
perspective would be a basis for acting in a proactive manner for solving 
merger related problems and for being prepared for the potential 
challenges of post-merger integration.  Administrators who have these 
three basic skills are likely to be important participants in a merger (Katz 
1974). 
Sometimes the concept administrator relates to an executive 
assignment, to someone in a leading position in an organization. 
However, in this thesis and its related research papers, a more general 
meaning of the word is applied, and administrators are administrative 
staff. Some of them could be executives or managers but the majority was 
not. The administrators’ opinions were followed throughout the 
longitudinal case study much because of their importance for a smoothly 
working organization, because of their dependency on efficient IS, and 
because of their knowledge about the IS and routines that were likely to 
be changed during the merger. 
1.4 Research objectives and research questions  
Post-merger integrations are known to frequently fail (e.g. Alaranta 
2008), making it particularly interesting to gain a deeper understanding of 
what could be done to increase the success rate of PMI. The literature 
about post-merger integration of IS is scarce, something that several 
authors in the field of post-merger integration have noticed (e.g. Alaranta 
2008). In the literature, longitudinal in-depth case-studies of mergers are 
proposed for future studies (e.g. Cartwright & Cooper 1990; Meglio & 
Risberg 2010; Olie 1994; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). There are examples of 
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such studies available, even if they are proportionally few. Some 
examples: Empson (2000a, 2000b), who carried out longitudinal case-
studies, and Mehta and Hirschheim (2007), who followed mergers from 
the pre-phases of the merger to post-merger integration, three to four 
years after announcement of the merger. Choi and Brommels (2009) 
propose longitudinal merger studies that would link pre-merger decision-
making to post-merger integration. PMIs in the public sector are 
particularly seldom studied (Bringselius 2010a, 2010b; Tarplett 2009). 
 Research objective 1: To carry out a longitudinal case-study of a 
merger in the public sector; from the pre-merger phases to the 
PMI. 
 
The use of IS for strategic purposes is important not least since IS 
nowadays also are means for competition and creation of strategic 
advantage (e.g. Galliers 2011; Galliers 2009; O’Brien & Marakas 2009). 
In a merger it is likely that the organizations’ IS need to be changed, 
which puts light on how IS is managed. 
 Research objective 2: To study strategic management of IS in the 
public sector merger between OrgD and Org E. 
 
The administrators’ efforts are important for an organization’s 
performance and effectiveness; a fact that is making the administrators 
dependent on reliable and effective IS (e.g. Andersen 1994; Langefors 
1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009).  
 Research objective 3: To study the administrators’ opinions 
about IS and routines before and during the DE-merger and the 
PMI. 
 
Since the administrators play an important role in the running of an 
organization it is important to understand what they consider to be 
essential and high priority performance criteria for their work (i.e. 
effectiveness and contribution of value).  The feeling of being useful and 
effective at work is stated to be fundamental for employees’ job 
satisfaction and therefore these matters are interesting to consider during 
the reengineering of the administrative processes (e.g. Bashein & Markus 
1994; Xun 2009). The importance of employee participation and clear 
information about the current situation are other issues that are often 
emphasized in the change management literature (e.g. Bashein & Markus 
1994; Ford & Ford 2009; Hallier 2000; Napier et al. 1989; Shivastava 
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2007). Furthermore, the personnel’s opportunities, willingness and ability 
to share their (often tacit) knowledge in a merger are likely to influence 
the outcome and success of the merger and PMI (e.g. Alaranta & Martela 
2010; Yoo et al. 2007).   
 Research objective 4: To find out if administrator participation in 
the DE-merger can facilitate the PMI.  
 
Prior merger cases (cf. sections 1.2.4, 1.2.5) have shown that the 
managers are important for mergers and PMIs.  
 Research objective 5: To find out how management influences 
the public sector merger between Org D and Org E. 
 
It is a widespread opinion that human (soft) factors are neglected in PMIs 
(e.g. Epstein 2004), but the opposite view also occurs, i.e. that the hard 
(technical) side of change management is sometimes downplayed or 
ignored (e.g. Sirkin et al 2005). To consider both hard and soft factors in 
post-merger integrations is recommended in the PMI literature (e.g. 
Alaranta 2008; Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Bashein & Markus 1994; 
Harmon 2007, Vakola & Rezgui 2000; Xun 2009). 
 Research objective 6: To find and describe important factors, 
both hard and soft, which influence PMI in the public sector 
merger between Org D and Org E. 
 
The research questions below are formulated with a standpoint in the 
research objectives and aim at finding key-issues for facilitating mergers 
and post-merger integrations.  
The research project was guided by the search for answers to the 
following research questions (RQs):  
 RQ 1: Should strategic management of information systems be a 
decisive factor in a public sector merger? 
 RQ 2: How can administrator participation facilitate post-merger 
integration? 
 RQ 3: How can management facilitate a public sector merger? 
 RQ 4: What factors of importance influence post-merger 
integration in a public sector merger? 
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Finding answers to these research questions has also influenced both the 
structure of the research project and of the thesis. 
1.5 Overview of the research project 
This research project was started with the intention of gaining a deeper 
understanding of how mergers and PMI’s could be facilitated. As the 
research questions show the PMI of IS and humans were of particular 
interest. A merger between two universities, Org D and Org E, was about 
to start, and gave an opportunity for the research project to follow the 
DE-merger with internal access to the merger. Research objective 1 was 
to carry out a longitudinal case study of a merger in public sector, which 
could be done by following the DE-merger. The research objectives 2 – 6 
were also considered achievable by following the DE-merger. Thus, the 
administrators seemed to be the perfect group of employees to study; 
mainly because of an expectation that they had high competence in IS 
and also a dependency on their IS in order to carry out their duties. To 
record the administrators’ opinions and expectations it was necessary to 
ask them while the merger proceeded. Hence the majority of data was 
collected by surveys and interviews with the administrators. Internal and 
official documents were important source for facts. The document 
reading was furthermore a way of triangulating the findings throughout 
the case-study (e.g. Yin 2003, 2007). Information about the merger 
processes was available in various forms, e.g. websites, newsletters, 
reports, discussion forums, e-mails and face-to-face meetings. Internal 
documents made it possible to follow the processes for the appointment 
of new managers, discussions about the new university’s IS, and they 
were also helpful in pointing out subjects that were of special interest to 
the administrators. Those subjects were followed up in the studies. The 
administrators’ opinions and expectations of their information systems 
(IS), their job situation and the merger in general were collected. The 
studies were carried out before, during and after the merger was realized 
in January 2010.   
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Figure 2: The timeline for the longitudinal case-study and the empirical 
studies’ connection to the research papers.   
1.5.1 The first study 
An explorative survey was carried out in the autumn 2008, before the 
merger process actually involved the administrators on a more practical 
level. However decisions were taken about the merger’s implementation 
and there had been information available about the ongoing process for 
some time.   
Research paper no. 1 was written as a contribution to the IRIS32 
conference in Norway, August 2009 and discusses the role of IS in a 
public sector merger (Lundqvist 2009). Paper no. 2 was written as a 
research report (no. 1/2010), IAMSR, Åbo Akademi University, and 
provides a more detailed specification of the findings from the first study 
(Lundqvist 2010a). Those findings needed to be followed up by 
interviews and document reading in order to verify them further. 
1.5.2 The second study 
The second study was carried out by interviews and the questions built on 
the findings from the first explorative study and the documents available. 
The findings were presented partly in a contribution to the IRIS33 
conference in Denmark in 2010 (paper no. 3, Lundqvist 2010b), partly in 
research report no. 2/2010, IAMSR, Åbo Akademi University (paper no. 
4, Lundqvist 2010c).  
1.5.3 The third study 
The third study was carried out about two months after the new 
organization was established.  The reason for realizing a study after such 
a short time was to get an on-the-spot account of the administrators 
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‘opinions at a time when it was almost inevitable that their emotional 
reactions to the DE-merger would influence the findings. This was 
considered to be an important phase of the DE-merger seen from a 
longitudinal perspective.  
Two research papers were written about the findings; paper no. 6 was 
written as a conference contribution to IRIS34, Finland in 
2011(Lundqvist 2011b) and was also published in: IRIS – Selected 
Papers of the Information Systems Research Seminar in Scandinavia (nr 
2, 2011). The findings point out that advice on how to hinder resistance to 
change should be followed. 
In autumn 2012 paper no. 7 was accepted to the Electronic Journal of 
Knowledge Management (Lundqvist 2011c). Paper no. 7 highlights the 
importance of acceptance of technology and of promoting knowledge 
sharing during mergers and PMIs. 
The findings needed to be followed up with interviews after a further 
period of time in view of the fact that the third study took place so soon 
after the merger. Document reading continued simultaneously with the 
case-studies. 
1.5.4 The fourth study 
The fourth study was yet another follow-up with interviews, which were 
carried out in May 2010, nearly half a year after the DE-merger. The 
findings from the survey carried out shortly after the merger gave input to 
the interviews together with documents about the PMI processes, e.g. 
about how the appointment of the new managers was realized.  
Two research papers were written – both published in a journal that is 
mainly concerned with management issues: Problems of Management in 
the 21th Century, vol. 1 and vol. 3 (papers no. 5 and no. 8, Lundqvist 
2011a, 2012).  
The findings that indicated dissatisfaction among administrators 
concerning the new leadership style and the loss of trust for management 
should be further investigated. However, this was not possible until the 
PMI-processes in University DE had become everyday practice and the 
administrators were less preoccupied by changes due to the merger. In the 
meantime further documents were read and the PMI was followed from 
inside the organization.  
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1.5.5 The fifth study 
The fifth study was carried out in November 2011, nearly two years after 
University DE was established. Since the third survey had been carried 
out so close to the date of the DE-merger, and the fourth study was 
carried out about five months after the merger, here was a need for 
further investigation. A survey was regarded as most suitable for the 
follow-up, because it hopefully would need less time from the 
respondents than interviews, and the administrators would probably be 
very involved in PMI-related issues at that time. Furthermore, both 
internal and official documents were read and discussions in various 
channels were followed, partly for reaching a deeper understanding of the 
merger context and the administrators’ work situation and partly for 
triangulation of the findings. The findings are presented in this thesis 
(section 4.5 and chapter 5). Suggestions for future studies are given in 
chapter 6.  
1.6 Overview of key themes of the thesis and research 
papers 
The key themes of the thesis, which were realized during the longitudinal 
case-study, are listed without any ranking of importance for the study, the 
merger or the PMI processes:  
 Strategic management of IS (e.g. sections 2.1, 2.2, 5.2) 
 Post-merger integration of humans and IS (e.g. sections 2.2, 2.3, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.7) 
 Administrator participation in reengineering for PMI (e.g. 
subsections 2.2.2, 2.3.3, 5.4.5; section 5.7) 
 Knowledge sharing between administrators in a public sector 
merger (e.g. subsection 2.3.4, 5.4.4; section 5.7) 
 Management in organizational change (e.g. subsections 2.1.6, 
2.1.7, 2.1.9, 2.3.2; sections 5.5, 5.6, 5,7) 
 
The theories about IS (chapter 2.1 – fundamental IS-issues) should be 
seen as a foundation for all the key themes of the thesis.  
 
1.6.1 Research paper 1 
[Addresses RQ2, RQ3, RQ4] 
Presented at the IRIS32 conference in Norway, August 2009 (peer-
reviewed). 
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The first paper reports on the explorative survey that was the starting 
point of the longitudinal case-study.  Because a merger in the public 
sector can severely disruptive for the administrators, their opinions were 
interesting and important to follow throughout the merger and PMI. In a 
merger the organizations’ IS are of special interest, because of their 
importance for the employee’s performance (e.g. Andersen 1994; 
Langefors 1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009).  
The study was mainly accomplished in order to investigate the 
administrators’ opinions about their information systems before a merger, 
but also in order to find out their opinions regarding their ability to 
influence work-related changes due to the merger. Other purposes were to 
record the administrators’ opinions about the approaching merger, of 
their IS-skills, and of training opportunities because of merger related 
changes.  
Important findings were: i) a confirmation of the administrators’ good 
knowledge of their IS, ii) the administrators’ high level of confidence in 
their IS, iii) a satisfaction with the communication process, iv) the 
administrators’ conviction about their ability to learn new IS, and v) their 
positive expectations of the merger in general.  
The findings were mainly useful as an explorative starting point for 
the longitudinal case-study. Additionally they pointed to the importance 
of good communication in a merger in order to prevent resistance to 
change (Lundqvist 2009). 
 
1.6.2 Research paper 2 
[Addresses RQ1, RQ2, RQ4] 
Published in Research Report no. 1/2010, IAMSR, Åbo Akademi 
University. 
Paper 2 also reports on the first study, and provides a more detailed 
specification of the findings from the first study. The administrators’ 
performance is a vital factor for the effectiveness of an organization (e.g. 
Andersen 1994; Hoffer et al. 2002; Langefors 1995; Mathieson 1991; 
O’Brien & Marakas 2009; SIG Security 1997; Willoch 1994). The IS are 
bound to undergo changes in a merger and that is why it is vital to 
investigate the administrators’ opinions about their IS in the process.  
Key findings presented in paper 2: i) a majority were satisfied with 
their IS, ii) most of the IS were found to be easy to learn, iii) most IS 
were found to facilitate the administrators’ work, iv) a confirmation of 
the dependency on efficient IS in order to work effectively, and v) a 
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conviction that the administrators’ work contributed value to their 
organizations.  
Important implications of the findings are i) an understanding of the 
importance of efficient IS for administrators’ performance, and ii) 
therefore a need for organizations to realize the importance of a carefully 
planned IS implementation in a change process, and last but not least, iii) 
the need for organizations to invest in IS (Lundqvist 2010a). 
 
1.6.3 Research paper 3 
[Addresses RQ2, RQ3, RQ4] 
Presented at the IRIS33 conference in Denmark, August 2010 (peer-
reviewed). 
The third paper reports on findings from a study that investigated the 
administrators’ opinions about the merger information, their attitudes 
towards IS, and additionally about whether their competences were 
utilized in the merger or not. In organizational change easily accessible, 
reliable information and the opportunity for the personnel to participate 
are often mentioned as effective tools against rumours and resistance to 
change (e.g. Empson 2000a, 2000b; Spector 1978; Strebel 1996; 
Washington & Hacker 2005; Zmud and Cox 1979).  
Key findings were: i) the administrators received plenty information 
but still a third of them lacked the individual information they considered 
most crucial, ii) there was a lack of information about what would happen 
to the IS after the merger, iii) a majority found their present IS to be 
supportive, and iv) their competences as utilized.  
The implications of the key findings are: i) an abundance of 
information is important during a merger, and ii) the employees’ 
competences should be used as much as possible (Lundqvist 2010b). 
 
1.6.4 Research paper 4 
[Addresses RQ1, RQ3, RQ4] 
Published in Research Report no. 2/2010, IAMSR, Åbo Akademi 
University. 
Administrators rely on their IS to perform, and they need training to 
utilize them properly. A merger brings matters to a head since it usually 
affects the organizations’ IS and changes ingrained routines. This can 
cause damage to the organizations’ performance if not handled properly. 
When an organization is changing it also provides an opportunity to 
examine reengineering options. Hence training in new IS and routines 
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were interesting – as were the administrators’ opinions about 
reengineering (if they were willing to change the way they did things), 
(e.g. Hammer 1990, 2003; Hammer & Champy 1995, 2003; Hoffer et al. 
2002; Mathieson 1991; Sveiby 1996; Venkatesh et al. 2002; Willoch 
1994; Zmud & Cox 1979). 
Important findings were: i) the administrators were explicitly open-
minded to the reengineering of their tasks, even though there was ii) a 
lack of information about the IS after the merger, and iii) a lack of 
information about the training. 
The main implications of the findings are i) an understanding of the 
importance of managers dealing with questions about IS and system 
training as soon as possible when an organizational change is imminent, 
and ii) to take the opportunity to reengineer the administrative processes 
(Lundqvist 2010c). 
 
1.6.5 Research paper 5 
[Addresses RQ2, RQ3, RQ4] 
Published in Problems of Management in the 21th Century (peer-
reviewed). 
This paper reports on the fourth study (the order could be confusing but 
this is how the data was analyzed and written). In order to understand 
more about how to prevent post-merger implementation from failing, it is 
important to understand what issues could be helpful for keeping 
administrators positive about the merger, even after implementation (e.g. 
Alaranta & Martela 2010; Blake & Mouton 1984; Epstein 2004; Marks & 
Cutcliffe 1988). The aim and focus of this article was to point out issues 
that management need to know in order to maintain employee enthusiasm 
also after the new organization is established. 
The main findings that were reported: i) a disappointment that 
management did not exploit the opportunities for further organizational 
development, ii) the administrators experienced a more complex work 
situation, iii) lower productivity, and iv) less involvement after the 
merger, furthermore v) they found it harder to tell whether they created 
value or not.  
The most important result is that the findings add to the knowledge on 
facilitation of PMI (Lundqvist 2011a). 
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1.6.6 Research paper 6 
[Addresses RQ2, RQ3, RQ4] 
Presented at the IRIS34 conference in Finland, August 2011 (peer-
reviewed) and published in IRIS – Selected Papers of the Information 
Systems Research Seminar in Scandinavia. 
There are many studies of organizational changes and mergers, focusing 
on expected resistance to change and offering advice on how to prevent it 
(e.g. Kotter & Schlesinger 2008). The topic is important mainly since 
post-merger integrations (PMI) are known to fail more than they succeed 
(e.g. Blake & Mouton 1984; Epstein 2004; Marks & Cutcliffe 1988). 
When IS are subject to changes in a merger the employees, who are 
discontented with the new situation, could blame the IS instead of 
searching for the underlying reason (e.g. Kotter & Schlesinger ibid.). 
Hence, to acknowledge the human factor is critical, i.e. how people are 
thinking and acting. 
The key findings show the importance of embracing administrator 
openness to change. It is also shown that the means necessary for 
adopting new IS should be provided by the management. The 
administrators’ contribution to new routines should also be supported 
from the managers. The resistance to change that is often referred to in 
the literature can be countered if a merger is handled well.  
The main findings confirm the importance of applying various types 
of advice on how to prevent resistance to change, which includes 
embracing openness to change, the necessity to provide means for 
adapting to new systems, and for contributing to new routines (Lundqvist 
2011b). 
 
1.6.7 Research paper 7 
[Addresses RQ2, RQ3, RQ4] 
Accepted to the Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 2012 
(peer-reviewed). 
The key findings of this paper show the necessity to carry out careful 
knowledge management during mergers since they could easily hinder 
knowledge sharing (e.g. Alaranta & Martela 2010; Epstein 2004; Hislop 
2005; Ruggles 1998; Sveiby & Simons 2002; Szulanski 1996).  
Major findings were: i) the administrators found their knowledge to 
be used, ii) considered that they worked effectively, and iii) found that 
they contributed value to their organization, furthermore iv) the 
uncertainties about training did not worry them.  
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Important findings are an understanding of how important it is i) to 
acknowledge and to make use of the personnel’s knowledge (e.g. to 
involve them in a merger process, ii) to provide training,  iii) to activate 
knowledge sharing activities, and iv) to communicate continuously 
(Lundqvist 2011c). 
 
1.6.8 Research paper 8 
[Addresses RQ1, RQ3, RQ4] 
Published in Problems of Management in the 21th Century (peer-
reviewed). 
According to the Institute of Government (2010) the majority of 
merger failures occur during the PMI phases. Hence, there is a need for 
enhanced understanding of mergers and PMI, especially for managers 
(e.g. Alaranta 2008; Caudron 1996; Cooper & Markus 1995; Ford & Ford 
2009; Marks & Mirvis 1992; Olie 1994; Podsakoff et al.1996; Sehoole 
2005; Tetenbaum 1999).  
Research has been carried out in the field of mergers during recent 
decades but still there still seems to be important insights missing, which 
could increase the success rate. That is why longitudinal in-depth case 
studies are recommended (e.g. Meglio & Risberg 2010; Wijnhoven et al. 
2006). 
The most important findings were: i) a loss of trust in management, ii) 
that was appointed very late in the PMI, and iii) that applied a more 
authoritative leadership style, iv) changed, less appreciated, 
communication strategies, v) which started the rumour mill, and vi) 
postponed decisions about IS-related issues.  
The implication for practice is that the managers should be appointed 
in good time before or during a merger to get a realistic opportunity to 
influence the merger processes. The implication for research is that a 
successful PMI is more likely if the new management/new managers are 
available throughout the merger processes, and could take an active part 
in decision-making and trust-building (Lundqvist 2012). 
1.6.9 The structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a brief 
presentation of fundamental IS-issues, presents the theoretical framework 
for the thesis’s five key concepts and preliminary answers to the research 
questions. Chapter 3 handles methods and methodology issues, describes 
the data collection procedures, and the analysis. Chapter 4 presents main 
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findings from the empirical studies and partial answers to the research 
questions. In chapter 5 there is a discussion and synthesis drawing on the 
findings; limitations with a single case-study are dealt with. Chapter 6 
gives answers to the research questions, presents lessons learned, 
concluding remarks and implications of the findings. Finally, proposals 
for future research are given in chapter 7. Part II is the collection of 
original publications. 
 
 
2.  Theory: Organizational change – challenges 
and opportunities 
The chapter starts with a summary of fundamental IS-issues followed by 
a presentation of the remaining key themes of the thesis. Surveys have 
been carried out from the existing literature and contributions from some 
theoretical studies are summarized.  
 
2.1 Fundamental IS-issues  
Before discussing IS in relation to the thesis research questions and 
findings there are some basic issues about IS that will be presented, as a 
foundation for further reflections about IS in a public sector merger. The 
main objective of viewing IS from this holistic perspective is to 
emphasize the comprehensive view that is worth applying in any 
discussion concerning IS. Another reason is to present the author’s pre-
understanding and understanding of the IS field; the focus in this thesis. 
Research is seldom neutral and the researcher’s perception of the problem 
area is reflected in the choice of research method (e.g. Gummesson 
2000). Section 2.1 aims at setting the scene as regards fundamental IS-
issues in this thesis. Hence this chapter is somewhat more comprehensive 
than the research questions actually call for. 
2.1.1 Information systems (IS) 
The classical definition of an IS is that it should be able to collect, 
process, store and distribute data/information. Another definition of IS is 
that they have three basic functions: input, processing and output and that 
an IS could also be defined as “a set of interrelated components, with a 
clearly defined boundary, working together to achieve a common set of 
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objectives by accepting inputs and producing outputs in an organized 
transformation process” (O´Brien & Marakas 2009, p. 24). There are two 
additional elements that would make the system concept even more 
useful: feedback and control. Feedback can be positive or negative and 
for example used for control functions; classic examples are James 
Watt’s speed controlling centrifugal regulator and a common thermostat. 
Control is about monitoring and evaluating feedback to see if the system 
is moving toward fulfilling its goals or not (Skyttner 2001). Other 
characteristics of IS are that they exist and function in an environment of 
other systems. An IS could for example be a subsystem of a larger system 
and if that is the case the larger system is the environment for the 
subsystem. Systems could share environment and be connected or linked 
to each other by the same interface. It could be an open IS that interacts 
with other systems and could be an adaptive system that has the ability to 
change itself in order to survive in a specific environment (O´Brien & 
Marakas 2009). A common problem connected to design of IS is to 
describe/consider the boundaries for the system. Every system acts like a 
subsystem in other system/-s. It is therefore problematic to decide what is 
regarded to be the whole system that should be designed. The boundary of 
the whole system is named the outer boundary in Langefors’s (1973) 
description. The inner boundary is the set of subsystems that are parts of 
the whole system, i.e. building blocks for the whole system and 
boundaries to other subsystems are called intermediate boundaries 
(ibid.).  
People, hardware, software, data and networks that are interrelated are 
the five basic components of an IS and could be seen as the resources of 
the IS. The components have well-defined boundaries and work together 
in order to reach a common goal. This includes inputs of data resources 
being accepted, data being processed into information and transformed to 
outputs of information products to the system environment. Feedback and 
control are used to improve the IS effectiveness and are sometimes 
designed to change in order to be adaptive to environment needs and 
demands. The ability to store data is a basic component of an IS because 
data usually need to be retained for use later on (O´Brien & Marakas 
2009). 
2.1.2 Data vs. information  
As mentioned above a classic criterion of an IS is the capacity to collect, 
process, store and distribute data. According to Langefors (1986, p. 137) 
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“data are intended as means for informing, thus, as knowledge 
representation”; basically information systems are providers of 
information and data systems are subsystems of information systems.  
Langefors (ibid.) formulated the infological equation in order to show 
the relationship between data and information as a proof of data being 
signs used to provide knowledge, which is synonymous with information 
by Langefors’s definition. The infological equation:  
 
“ I=i(D,S,t), I = the information conveyed, i = the information 
process (or interpretation process), D = the data (or any 
perceived configuration), S = the preknowledge or frame 
reference of the information receiver 
t = the time required or available for the process. Because I is 
a piece of knowledge, it will become added to S so that after 
the process i we have S + I. For instance, if the subject would 
perceive the same data D a second time, he will obtain the 
information I = i(D,S + I,t). Further t = T (D,S) that is the 
time required, depends on the data to be interpreted as well as 
on the pre-knowledge of the receiver“ (Langefors 1986, p. 
139).  
 
According to Langefors (1986) the insight from the infological equation 
is that designing data to inform properly i) is problematic and difficult; ii) 
does not depend on the computer technology, and iii) the users’ 
participation is needed. The last point is valid because there is no method 
available for knowing the individual’s S, namely the information 
receiver’s pre-knowledge and frame of reference. Langefors (1973, 1995) 
proposes that the infological equation should be solved before the 
technical problems and that people (users) should participate in the 
system development processes. Langefors’s infological equation is 
referred to by Hirschheim and Klein (2011) as insightful even if it has 
been criticized as too mechanic. Also Bansler (1989) finds Langefors 
(1973) to be mechanistic and even Tayloristic. However, compared to 
Churchman (1968) Langefors (e.g. 1973, 1995) could be considered as 
more human oriented than Churchman, who represents an even more 
technical approach when it comes to dealing with the system’s 
partitioning. 
There have been, and still are, contrasting views of data/information 
(however still with focus on the individual’s interpretation and 
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understanding of the data with a standpoint in individual knowledge) and 
IS (as represented by Simon 1979, 1993), which rely on the individuals’ 
intuition and ability to make satisfactory decisions. The decisions could 
only be satisfactory from a rational point of view because of the bounded 
rationality of humans. No matter what data are provided by the IS in the 
future the IS would still be dependent on the people who develop them 
and thereby affected by the bounded rationality (e.g. Simon 1993). 
Galliers (2011) views IS as a socio-technical infrastructure, e.g. shown in 
the revised information systems strategizing framework (further worked 
out in subsection 2.1.8), that “... comprises human beings who can make 
sense of data provided by both formal and informal systems via the 
application of their situated knowledge. In doing so, they turn data into 
purposeful information.” (Galliers, ibid. p. 330).  
2.1.3 System partitioning – an example of system analysis 
In systems analysis it is important to partition a system in 
subsystems/blocks from which the system could be constructed – 
especially because people generally tend to ignore things that they cannot 
actually see (Langefors 1973, 1995). The method for analyzing and 
designing systems needs to overcome human cognition limits, i.e. 
perception, conception, and reasoning (Langefors 1995).  
Complex things can be more easily understood piecewise by humans. 
Hence a complex concept will gain from being analyzed as a system that 
is partitioned into subsystems. Hence designing a system requires 
subsystems to be identified and their external properties defined. 
Sometimes the system’s external properties have to be inferred from 
internal properties – i.e. from subsystems and their interrelations. In order 
to partition a system it is necessary to have a rough understanding of the 
external properties of the system (that are impossible to fully grasp 
directly). Therefore the system needs to be partitioned into subsystems 
and those subsystems might need further partitioning into smaller 
subsystems. The smallest subsystem is often called an elementary system 
and is not further divided. The external properties of a system are roughly 
those that will fulfil the expectations of the system, i.e. they are built on 
the user needs.  
Langefors (1973) suggests that “The only possibility of designing a 
system so that it will have specified properties is by combining a set of 
subsystems which have necessary properties and interconnecting them in 
such a way that the resulting system contains the specified properties” 
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(ibid, p. 72).  There are no exact rules of how a system should be 
partitioned but Langefors (1973, p. 84) states that in a subsystem 
structure the number of subsystems should be “not more than 10 - and not 
less than 4”. 
2.1.4 The system development life cycle 
Basically, a system development process starts with an idea that is 
initiated from a need (underlying cause) that is considered to be solved by 
an information system. Despite the different versions available for the 
system development life cycle model there are some common features 
that are usually included in the model. Figure 3 shows a classic version 
inspired by Andersen (1994) and Hoffer et al. (2002). There are usually 
iterations between the different phases and sometimes phases can overlap 
each other to some extent depending on the actual IS development project 
and what model that is applied. 
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Figure 3: An example of a system development life cycle. 
2.1.5 Models for system development – some examples 
There are several models for systems development and the waterfall 
model is a traditional model that is occasionally used, despite several 
competing newer models.  The waterfall model is rather simple and easy 
to grasp with its sequential stages (phases) where each stage is finished 
before the next starts. However, there are modified waterfall models that 
apply iterations between the stages (Hoffer et al. 2002).  An example of a 
waterfall model is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4: A waterfall model of system development – with inspiration 
from McManus and Wood-Harper (2003). 
The benefit of the waterfall model is its structure, that allows the 
complexity and problems of an IS project to be divided into separate 
stages, which coincide with the planning and control phases. One 
problem with the model is that requirements that are formulated early in 
the process could be difficult to change later on – even if needed. 
Therefore the waterfall model seems to be more suitable for IS projects if 
the needs and requirements are well understood and the business 
processes rather mature. In those cases it would most likely be possible to 
predict the requirements early – even if it is inherent in IS projects that 
conditions change during the project (McManus &Wood-Harper 2003). 
Other models are for example the spiral model that focuses on 
reducing and handling risks throughout the project and therefore 
preferably could be applied to other models since the approach is iterative 
and non-linear. Prototyping is a way to let coding take place earlier in the 
project, and also the testing can be carried out earlier. The purpose is to 
have a closer interaction with the customers/users throughout the project 
in order to better understand what the customer wants/needs while 
showing what is feasible to achieve. However, a problem with 
prototyping is to make the customer understand that a lot of work still 
remains when the prototype is ready.  
Feasibility study 
Analysis 
Coding 
Handover 
Design 
Implementation 
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Rapid Application Development (RAD) has outmanoeuvred the 
waterfall model when the project has to deliver quickly because of 
business needs. The model first produces visualization, then a prototype 
is demonstrated and feedback given rapidly (several iterations are applied 
in interaction with the customers) so the product with the “right” 
functionality could then be delivered as quickly as possible. RAD 
requires specific modelling tools and techniques that are collected in a 
resource toolbox; something that is inherent in RAD. RAD is for quick 
solutions in a changing environment.  
Joint Applications Development (JAD) builds on that developers, 
managers and customers/users working closely together in something that 
is much like a RAD project. The JAD model puts a stronger emphasis on 
the interactions and co-operation between all actors involved in the 
project (Andersen 1994; McManus & Wood-Harper 2003).  
Some agile models like for example SCRUM build on very fast and 
overlapping development phases and self-organizing project teams; the 
team members are those that best know how to solve the specific 
problems throughout the project. A SCRUM project proceeds with a 
series of iterations that are called sprints. The underlying ideas for the 
SCRUM system development model come from Takeuchi and Nonaka’s 
(1986) article that compared product development with rugby.  
Soft Systems Methodology (in short SSM) highlights the need for 
acknowledging and considering the real world in which the system 
should operate (Checkland 2000; 2011). The benefit of applying SSM for 
an IS development project is the opportunity to learn more about the 
system and to get a deeper understanding of the system’s specific and 
complex problems. One way to gain understanding is the use of so called 
rich pictures; pictures usually say more than words. The conceptual 
models that emerge during the process should always be compared with 
the real world.  Hence SSM is helpful for the work of designing and 
implementing information systems.  Checkland (ibid.) states the need for 
prioritizing the real-world purposeful action that the IS concerned will 
support; instead of starting out by considering data, information and IT.  
In the former organizations, Org D and Org E, more traditional 
system development models (like the waterfall model) had been used. 
There had not been much system development before 2008 when the 
merger intentions were announced and the preliminary work started. 
During the DE-merger the agile SCRUM model was used for the web-site 
for the new organization. After the merger, a mix of the waterfall model 
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and agile models has been proposed for University DE. It is considered 
too demanding for the human resources to apply a strict agile model.  
2.1.6 IS and change 
For IS it is a fundamental truth that the environment will change and the 
system would most likely be forced to adapt to the new situation (e.g. 
Langefors 1995). Otherwise the system could be outmanoeuvred by 
another system that could fulfil the requirements. As stated above, in the 
very first lines of this chapter, no IS should exist if it does not fill its 
purpose – that is to fulfil someone’s, e.g. user’s, business’s, needs.  What 
those needs are must be specified by the actual user and/or by business 
demands and requirements. A new IS could be developed because 
someone (business) has identified a need on the market where that could 
be offered. Nevertheless, it is costly to develop and/or purchase a new IS 
making it important that an existing IS is used as long as possible, as long 
as the user/business needs are met. Therefore further development of an 
existing IS is often a choice. Whether or not that is the best way of 
solving a problem depends on the specific situation and context so there 
is no clear answer to what would be the best way to meet a changing 
environment. However it is not only the organization/business that has to 
react to environmental changes/demands which would demand changes 
in the IS. Sometimes processes in a system change placing demands on 
business/users to change their behaviour (Langefors 1995).  
Davenport (2000) argues that an organization, in order to be 
successful, must be prepared to continuously carry out changes in its 
business processes and strategy as well as its IS. For example after an 
Enterprise System (ES) is implemented and the configuration is finished 
many organizations think that the process is completed but Davenport 
(ibid.) emphasizes the need to continuously tune the configuration and to 
carry out changes in the system in case of mergers or other events that 
may call for adjustments or radical change. The system will also change 
as new versions of the software are released. This does not mean that 
every new version must be implemented if there is no business need for it 
– “In short, fitting your systems to your processes is a matter of business-
driven continuous improvement” (ibid., p. 159). 
The DE-merger meant that two organizations needed to agree on what 
IS should be used in the new organization. Org D and Org E had in some 
cases used the same IS and in other cases different ones. Even when they 
had applied the same IS the applications were implemented differently 
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and the configurations varied; as was the case with the financial system. 
The first issue was to decide what IS to use and the second in what way 
they should be implemented and integrated. According to both Langefors 
(1995) and Davenport (2000) it is crucial that the business needs should 
govern the choice and the use of the systems. Hence the technical 
management is important to judge the risks involved in the system 
integration (e.g. Epstein 2004, 2005; Mehta & Hirschheim 2007). 
Therefore, it is important to choose the most suitable IS for University 
DE regardless of which applications were used in the former Org D and 
Org E. 
The strategy for choosing the IS for University DE followed the 
principle that the choice should be between (only) the systems that were 
already in use in either of the organizations. Other criteria were 
scalability (i.e. the IS must work just as well with a lot more users) and 
that the systems worked satisfactorily. The principles were explained by 
the fact that there were scarce resources (time, money, personnel) 
available for obtaining working IS-solutions. The were a lot of systems 
and applications in use in Org D and Org E,  and considering the lack of a 
comprehensive IS-strategy, this was a complex situation to deal with.  
It is important to balance the level of strategic planning, which 
according to Newkirk et al. (2003) risks being either too much or too 
little. Additionally, the lack of formalized IS-strategies made system 
maintenance more problematic, not least the long-term planning. 
2.1.7 System maintenance 
When an IS project is finished and the system handed over (cf. fig. 4) to 
the project sponsor’s organization the system still has to be maintained 
throughout its lifecycle. System maintenance is not only about correcting 
problems but also includes the further development of the IS. According 
to Révay (1992) systems maintenance is responsible for 60 – 75 % of the 
systems costs during its lifecycle; which makes it crucial to acknowledge 
the maintenance processes as facilitators, and providers of enhanced IS 
value. Bergvall and Welander (1996) claim that an IS spends much more 
time in the maintenance phase than in the development phase. That is to 
say that the system maintenance requires more resources than the system 
development (ibid.). The continuous changes of IS that Davenport (2000) 
proposes are sometimes part of the maintenance processes. 
A careful pre-merger planning is important for a successful IS 
alignment as mentioned above (subsection 2.1.6) and for a successful 
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PMI. The post-merger activities are also highly important for continuing 
the system’s life cycle and the maintenance. Hence system maintenance 
should be activated immediately when a new organization is established, 
and that requires good and early planning. There are always some 
activities that need to be planned in advance even when an IS is newly 
implemented. 
 Again, it must be pointed out that the fundamental problem of the 
lack of IS-strategies in Org D and Org E combined with the lack of a 
mutual understanding of who the system owners were, severely 
complicated the situation. In particular the long-term planning involving 
issues such as system development and staff training were affected. The 
problem was (section 1.3) apparent especially during the late pre-merger 
phases, and hired consultants suggested that an IS maintenance model 
should be implemented as soon as possible. Even though the problem was 
identified as urgent in the autumn 2009 it took about two years until there 
was a proposal available for an IS-strategy. Twenty-six months after the 
DE-merger the IS-strategy was not yet decided, but the process of 
building an IS-strategy was in its final phase.   
2.1.8 IS strategy 
Galliers (2011) emphasizes the need for continuous learning and review 
in IS strategizing, which is an iterative process. Hence, he recommends 
the implementation of an IS change management strategy that leads to 
informed decisions and further development.  
“... the process of strategizing is one of visioning, planning, 
taking action, and assessing outcomes, all with an eye to 
changing circumstance and imperatives, and the actions of 
individuals and groups outside of, or irrespective of, any 
formal strategy process” (ibid., p 337).  
 
Galliers (2011, p. 338) presents a framework basically to serve as an 
“aide-memoire” and a learning tool and not as a prescriptive tool or the 
solution. The framework (that addresses IS as a socio-technical construct) 
contains the components: 
 Exploitation strategy (deliberate and formal)  
 Exploration strategy (emergent and informal) 
 Change management and implementation strategy (incorporation 
ongoing learning and review) 
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 Knowledge creation and infrastructure sharing (dynamic, ongoing 
and iterative process).  
 
The strategizing environment seen from the internal perspective is a 
question of balancing formal and informal – the deliberate with the 
emergent. The external environment includes socio-political and 
regulatory issues, which put emphasis on the contextual influence of the 
IS-strategizing process.  
To work out the framework further (but still on a general level) the 
two contrasting perspectives, the internal (balancing the formal and 
informal) and the external (context and culture, such as trust issues) both 
need to be involved in the strategizing environment. These two 
perspectives create the strategizing environment for an organizational IS.  
Here also a change management perspective is needed and according to 
Galliers (2011) integration of IS after a merger has to include 
considerations about the IS alignment. Should it be complete or 
coexistent? A fundamental criterion for a successful IS-strategy is that its 
infrastructure facilitates the knowledge creation and knowledge sharing 
in the organization. For this to become a reality there is a need for trust 
between the participants in the knowledge sharing environment.  The DE-
merger aimed at rationalization and effectiveness, which opened up 
speculations about possible staff cuts. The administrators had to prepare 
for sharing knowledge with new colleagues who could possibly take over 
their jobs.  
The exploitation and the exploration strategies raise the importance 
of balancing between the standardized/codified and controlled procedures 
and systems (e.g. routines, policies, enterprise systems, information 
services) that are connected to the exploitation strategy. The exploration 
strategy puts a stronger emphasis on learning in the context of 
communities of practice, cross-project learning and knowledge brokers. 
In the DE-merger the administrators participated in a lot of projects 
(some of them were IS-projects), which gave learning opportunities for 
the participants; some administrators took on the role of knowledge 
brokers. As mentioned above the framework shows the variables that 
would be helpful for IS-strategizing processes. According to Galliers 
(2011) the framework used “... as a sense-making device should continue 
with a view to improving organizational performance, exploiting 
organizational and technological capabilities, exploring new 
opportunities, with a view to continuous innovation” (ibid., p. 338-339). 
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After the DE-merger the IS-strategy group has worked with the 
formulation of an IS-strategy for the new organization in a process that is 
somewhat similar to the Galliers’ framework.   
Galliers (2009) suggests that IS strategizing has gone through four 
phases: isolated, reactive, prospective and proactive. The strategizing has 
shifted from ICT (information, communication and technology), away 
from ICT and back to ICT again; i.e. from being technology-driven to 
business-driven and back to technology-driven. Today’s IS strategizing 
are coloured by each of these four phases:  
 isolated (technology-driven, problem solving - efficiency) 
 reactive (business-driven, problem solving – current 
effectiveness) 
 prospective (business-driven, goal-seeking – future effectiveness)  
 proactive (technology-driven, goal-seeing – competitiveness)  
 
Galliers (2009) wants to recall the basic understanding of data, 
information and knowledge and outlines the differences between them 
(cf. Langefors 1973, 1986, 1995). An IS (e.g. knowledge management 
system, KMS) processes data; information is context dependent, and 
knowledge is tacit and resides in people. That is why IS need “... to 
include human beings and the act of interpretation for the term to be at all 
meaningful” (Galliers 2009, p. 24).  
It was a fundamental problem in the DE-merger that there was no 
explicit and formalised IS strategy. Hence there was a rather urgent need, 
pointed out by the external consultants, to develop an IS-strategy for the 
new University DE; a strategy that should be well aligned with the 
visions, the goals and the needs of the new organization. In the literature 
(e.g. Alaranta 2008; Epstein 2005; Mehta & Hirschheim 2007) it is found 
that the IS issues should be part of the merger discussions and the merger 
planning from the early pre-merger phases. As mentioned (section 1.3) 
this was not the case in the DE-merger, but the need for an IS-strategy 
became obvious during the late pre-merger phase (in the autumn/winter 
2009).  
2.1.9 Management of IS vs. management information 
systems (MIS) 
In short, the management of an organization’s information systems is a 
question of making the most out of the organization’s information, to be 
precise, the organization’s information systems by properly executed 
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management processes. However, this is easier said than done and there 
are a lot of factors to acknowledge and follow up on in order to succeed. 
Sometimes there is confusion about the management of IS or 
management information system (MIS). The MIS, is an information 
system that monitors and analyzes other IS in order to handle 
organizational tasks effectively and efficiently. O’Brien and Marakas 
(2009) show that a MIS “Provide information in the form of pre-specified 
reports and displays to support business decision making" (ibid., p. 14). 
Examples of this are sales analysis, production performance, and cost 
trend reporting systems.   
Management of information systems originate from the early days of 
information systems when organizations had to take care of their own IS 
without any specific help from IS-expertise. The organizations had to 
figure out how to best manage an IS that had probably involved a 
significant investment (Markus 2011). The professionalization of 
management and information management is one of the recent trends in 
the practice of information management. Other trends are the 
externalization of IT work and the transformation of in-house IT services 
(ibid.). Already in the 1960s the use of computers for executing 
organizational tasks motivated new management practices. The 
externalization of IT work – “the movement of IT professionals out of IT-
using organizations and into organizations that specialize in the provision 
of IT services” (Markus, 2011, p. 5) has been facilitated by the 
professionalization of IS. The technical activities could be down-played 
and the strategic considerations more focused. 
In the former organizations in the DE-merger there were some local 
IT-policies, but there were no agreed administrative procedures for IS 
ownership (together Org D and Org E used nearly one hundred systems). 
In the new University DE there is a central IS-department that handles 
some issues and furthermore there are IS-personnel employed in the 
various departments. Consequently those individuals are often organised 
under a manager who lacks explicit IS-competence. Together with the 
lack of IS-strategy and unclear system ownership it has been difficult to 
plan maintenance (e.g. further system development, replacement of 
applications), and user training activities. An organization’s IS-strategy 
should be the basis for an effectively executed MIS. 
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2.1.10 Acceptance of technology, diffusion of innovations 
and IS success 
Recent developments in IT/IS has been focused on devices for facilitating 
mobile IT (Sørensen 2011) and various e-phenomena, such as e-
marketing, e-business and e-meeting tools (Turban et al. 2006). There is 
an abundance of wireless solutions and cloud computing options that 
enhance the usefulness/usability of for example smart phones, mobile 
applications, touch pads and smart-TVs.  A smart-TV could easily be 
used for surfing if a TV-computer and a wireless keyboard is connected 
to it. Cloud computing implies the use of external disks for storage and 
program access, so the users would not be forced to invest in hardware or 
software. Cloud computing solutions contribute to lower costs for 
utilizing IS/IT solutions which could be a way to further spread the use of 
information systems and the technology that supports them. Hence new 
technological solutions continuously and rapidly develop the need for 
users/business to adopt new innovations, especially for those who want to 
be at the leading edge of technology.  
The diffusion of innovations theory shows five crucial factors for 
technology adoption: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability and observability (Rogers 2003). Context-related factors such 
as location, user mobility, physical, and social context also influence the 
acceptance of technology, and the diffusion of innovations (Bouwman at 
el. 2012).  Davidson (1991) shows that mergers could trigger innovations 
because a merger provides new means, such as another types of 
competence/knowledge or a new contextual situation, but also a need to 
survive (or at least learn to cope with the new situation due to cultural 
differences, loss of independence, and change).  
The acceptance of technology has been extensively researched by, for 
example, various TAM (technology acceptance model) studies (e.g. 
Davis 1989), which build on TRA (Theory of Reasoned Action) such as 
research about how to predict human behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980). 
TRA is a model dealing with the relations between beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviour. Ajzen and Fishbein (ibid.) argue that behaviour 
is rather easy to predict on the basis that people tend to consider the 
implications of their actions before they decide how to act. A person’s 
intention is a function of two basic determinants: attitude toward the 
behaviour and subjective norm. TAM (Davis 1986) aimed at improving 
the understanding of the users’ acceptance process in order to develop a 
theoretical foundation that could be used for testing new systems before 
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implementation or even before purchase of a system. The method could 
also be used in prototyping and for continuous evaluation and testing 
during system development. Davis (ibid.) proposed that adoption is a 
function of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. Davis found 
(1993) that perceived usefulness proved to be 50 % more influential than 
perceived ease of use when the actual usage should be determined. Park 
et al. (2008) carried out a study that confirmed Davis’ (1986) findings 
and additionally showed that motivation to use a system influences the 
perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness and the intention to keep 
using a (new) system.  
Objections to TAM have been raised because TAM presupposes the 
IS usage to be voluntary while Hodgson and Aiken (1998) argue that 
mandated systems use requires other measures. Anyhow, the TAM puts 
emphasis on the importance of acknowledging a system’s functionality; 
Mahmood et al. (2001) show that IT-support is a top-priority when it 
comes to influencing IT use. Venkatesh et al. (2002) propose that it is 
crucial for user acceptance, and extended the TAM with User Acceptance 
Enablers (UAEs).  
Hodgson and Aiken (1998) propose an extended TAM to explore the 
determinants of attitude toward new IS implementation and toward 
organizational change, which is facilitated by a new IS. Their study 
considers user acceptance attitudes to be more relevant than usage. At 
least when the IS change is mandated and not an individual, voluntary 
choice for the users.  
In the DE-merger the administrators’ system use is mandated and 
connected to their duties – both in the former organizations and in 
University DE. Hence the administrators could not choose whether they 
wanted to use an IS or not, making the TAM less interesting (Hodgson & 
Aiken 1998). However, there are other variables in both TAM (e.g. Davis 
1986) and its forerunner TRA (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) that make the 
models interesting. For example TRA and TAM emphasize the 
importance of predicting user behaviour and this is still important even if 
the use of IS is not voluntary.  
Innovation could be triggered (Davidson 1991) in University DE 
because of the need to quickly adapt to changed IS and routines, and in 
order to cope with the new situation. The new organization must take 
over seamlessly from the former ones. IS-support is likely to be needed 
(and highly prioritized) in the new University DE.  
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DeLone and McLean (1992) have developed a descriptive model for 
IS success that is further developed with a focus on e-commerce (ibid. 
2003). The model has points in common with the TAM (e.g. Davis 1986) 
as regards an interest in use and user satisfaction. Their first model 
(DeLone & McLean 1992) aimed at producing a manageable taxonomy 
of the great number of different dependent variables used to measure MIS 
success; or rather to reduce the large number of variables. Their model 
also aims at providing consensus on the various measures of IS success. 
DeLone and McLean (ibid.) also aim to measure IS impact on the 
performance of an organization. They (ibid.) argue that MIS success is a 
multidimensional construct, which makes it even more important to find a 
model that combines measures of different dimensions in an 
understandable way. The Langefors (e.g. 1973) system partitioning is a 
way of grasping the whole concept in stages because humans often have 
difficulty handling several (more than ten) elements at the same time. 
This could be compared with the problem of handling too many variables 
of IS success at the same time. Hence several individual dimensions of IS 
success are collected in the IS success model. The categorization of IS 
success measures resulted in the following six interrelated and 
interdependent categories:  
 system quality  
 information quality 
 information use 
 user satisfaction 
 individual impact  
 organizational impact.  
 
These categories constitute the IS success model (DeLone & McLean 
1992) that is shown in figure 5.  
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Figure 5: DeLone and McLean’s IS Success model (ibid. 1992, p. 87).  
DeLone and McLean’s (2003) extended model emphasizes net benefits of 
e-commerce; they included service quality as a complement to 
information and system quality. The use is partitioned into intention to 
use and use that is interrelated to user satisfaction. Net benefits are 
influenced by the user satisfaction, intention to use and use (and behind 
those dimensions the quality aspects/dimensions exert influence).  
The IS success model (cf. fig. 5) has been frequently referred to 
throughout the years since it was published in 1992. Despite this, many 
who used the model have missed its core; its multidimensionality and 
interdependency (DeLone & McLean 2003). 
Halonen and Thomander (2008) applied DeLone and McLean’s 
(2003) extended model of IS success on knowledge transfer success; their 
research approach was qualitative and interpretative (cf. fig. 6).  Halonen 
and Thomander (ibid.) use the model differently from the original model; 
in Halonen and Thomander’s (ibid.) extended model system design 
covers system quality, information quality and service quality. Use and 
user satisfaction are included in system delivery and net benefits (from 
DeLone and McLean’s extended model, 2003) are divided in positive and 
negative aspects.  
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Figure 6: Modified evaluation model by Halonen and Thomander (2008, p. 7) 
The modified IS success model was applied as a tool/means for 
evaluating how knowledge transfer success was experienced from the 
customers’ point of view (i.e. the learners’ perspectives in a private 
educational institute).  
When the IS-strategy comes into play (which is work in progress 
about two years after the DE-merger) it probably would be easier to 
implement the IS success model (DeLone & McLean 1992, 2003) than it 
was in Org D and Org E. Another issue that is likely to influence the 
implementation of the IS success model is the IS governance. A 
governance model (pm3) that is often used in other public organizations 
was chosen (and partly implemented) with the purpose of bringing order 
to system ownership.  
This is crucial for planning IS maintenance, which the system owner 
has to pay for. The system quality, information quality and the service 
quality (Halonen &Thomander 2008) depend on a system owner with a 
budget to pursue these fundamental issues and to guarantee that the IS 
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work properly. When those basic needs are taken care of it is more likely 
that system delivery and system outcome will be successful. 
 
2.2 Post-merger integration of IS 
It is common that post-merger integrations fail more than they succeed 
and the failure rate is as high as 50 - 80 % (Alaranta 2008; Alaranta & 
Martela 2010). The potential risk for failure of PMI projects is 
continuously posed in the literature as the main reason for investigating 
this field. Another common motive for research into PMI is because the 
literature on IS integration is perceived as proportionately scarce. IT 
integration is seen as a key to successful mergers (Apnovich 2002) but 
the problems are even more important to acknowledge. Apnovich (ibid.) 
finds that organizations are aware of the integration problems that could 
arise with employees and organizational units. A common problem is that 
IS and IT are not involved in the decision making process until it is too 
late to discuss potential problems, i.e. when the deal is almost done. IT 
should be involved early in the business discussions the IT integration 
should be planned (in detail) in the pre-merger phase. An IS-integration 
team should handle the integration process and experienced people 
should monitor the processes (Apnovich 2002). 
 Alaranta and Henningsson (2008) claim that there is no single best 
way of planning a PMI of IS and they stress the importance of adapting 
the strategies to the actual merger context - which is a managerial 
problem for IS-professionals. The time spent, the resources used, and 
how the IS integration fits actual business needs are measures of success 
for the IS integration planning.  
McKiernan and Merali (1995) propose that the growing focus on 
human resource issues in mergers should not be carried out at the expense 
of thorough analysis and consideration of the merging units’ IS. Sirkin et 
al. (2005) agree with the need for management to give more attention to 
the hard side of mergers. If the managers do not acknowledge the hard 
side the change programs risk breaking down before the human issues 
even come into play. The hard factors have three distinct characteristics – 
i) they could be measured directly or indirectly, ii) their importance is 
easy to communicate, and iii) the business factors could influence them 
quickly. 
Empson (2000a) emphasizes the need for the technical staff to stay in 
the organization after a merger and to share their technical skills as well 
as their professional networks with their new colleagues. Shrivastava 
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(2007) points to the need of starting the integration before a merger is 
realized; this would focus on the intregration questions already in the pre-
merger phase. However, the major part of the integration has to be 
executed after the merger and will last for several years (Shrivastava 
2007).  
As Alaranta and Henningsson (2008) argue it is important to adapt the 
IS-strategies to the merger context – which was problematic in the DE-
merger when there were no IS-strategies in the first place. The pre-
merger planning of IS probably suffered from the lack of IS-strategies as 
well as from the lack of a governance model. The managers that should 
be responsible for the IS integration after the merger should participate 
early in the pre-merger phases and motivate the IT-staff (Empson 2000a; 
Shrivastava 2007). 
 
2.2.1 Challenges of IS-integration after a merger 
Alaranta’s (2008) study of post-merger integration focused on the 
integration of IS. The research resulted in ten recommendations for post-
merger integration of IS.  Those recommendations highlight the 
importance of understanding the post-merger situation, the need for 
making active and informed choices of IS integration strategy and the 
people that should be involved as well as the necessity of obtaining top 
management support and sufficient resources for the post-merger 
processes. The communication with the end-users is crucial and the 
managers in charge should also be prepared to solve power/political 
struggles. Finally, the progress and success of the IS integration should be 
tracked. (Alaranta 2008)  The recommendations point to the various 
problems that surround a post-merger integration of IS. There are other 
authors that have proposed what should be done in order to succeed with 
the post-merger integration and some examples are presented here.  
Which IS infrastructure model to choose is a critical question 
according to Alaranta and Viljanen (2004). Should a status quo be 
applied, should there be a total consolidation of the systems, or is there a 
middle way? The answer could stir up anxiety among the IS personnel if 
a total consolidation is chosen. The reason is that such a solution could 
result in staff reductions. If separate systems were maintained it would 
ease this anxiety. However, partial integration, for example by using a 
middleware, would create other problems such as a need for data analysis 
that is likely to increase the workload for the IS staff.  
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Giacomazzi et al. (1997) studied IS integration after mergers and 
point out the need for IS decision makers to consider the integration in 
terms of management needs. Both internal and external factors must be 
investigated and both technical and human/organizational factors 
acknowledged. Other factors of interest are the level of standardisation of 
operations and differences between the companies involved. The 
differences in management needs refer to the type of business that is 
involved and the need to integrate databases. IS integration strategy is for 
example a choice between total integration, partial or no integration.  
Wijnhoven et al. (2006) discuss how information, technology and 
organization should be integrated after a merger, and highlight the 
difficulties of interpreting a merger’s objectives into IS integration 
strategies. The problems are often related to a lack of understanding from 
both sides (IS and organization) and different IS policies could be an 
aggravating circumstance.  IS integration strategies are mainly politically 
determined which make socialisation an important factor for achieving 
the strategic objectives.  
According to McKiernan and Merali (1995) an unsuccessful 
formulation of IS strategy in a merger could ruin the new organization’s 
prospects of competitiveness and effectiveness as opportunities to 
develop sustainable IS infrastructures are missed. This could in turn cause 
IS professionals resign if they do not see any proof of future IS 
development. Furthermore, it could lead to problems in maintaining 
inefficient and redundant systems in the new organization.  
Stylianou et al. (1996) found IS participation in merger planning to be 
critical for the PMI success. Merger planning must foresee both problems 
and opportunities to be successful. Data sharing and different 
programming languages in the merging organization could be causes for 
careful analysis during the pre-merger planning. Robbins and Stylianou 
(1999) propose that a well-performed merger and IS integration planning 
is necessary for a successful PMI. The support from top management, 
user participation and good communication are pointed out as critical 
factors. Furthermore IS standardization is seen as a positive factor (ibid.).  
Shrivastava (2007) outlines different managerial motives behind a 
merger that complicate post-merger integration because every motive 
needs to be treated separately and requires different integration 
procedures. Three types of integration issues must be dealt with: 
procedural, physical and managerial/socio-cultural. The procedural 
integration involves IS and how the systems should be combined in the 
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new organization, requiring the homogenization and standardization of 
work procedures.   
The importance of a successful formulation of IS-strategies in a 
merger is shown (Alaranta 2008; Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Giacomazzi 
et al. 1997; McKiernan & Merali 1995; Wijnhoven et al.2006); as well as 
the need to involve IS in the merger management and PMI planning 
(Mehta & Hirschheim 2007; Robbins & Stylianou 1999; Shrivastava 
2007; Stylianou et al. 1996).The lack of an IS-strategy and of governance 
model have been impediments for the post-merger implementation of an 
IS integration in the DE-merger.   
2.2.2 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for PMI 
Successful PMI implies that the business processes (from the units 
involved in the merger) are investigated and presumably need to be 
changed and redesigned in order to fulfil the new organization’s business 
needs. BPR highlights the importance of investigating and understanding 
an organization’s business processes and recommends redesign of those 
processes if they are not found to be sufficiently effective (e.g. Hammer 
2003). Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) introduced the process concept using 
a pin factory as example and argued that division of labour would 
increase productivity. Henry Ford (1863 – 1947) applied and further 
developed Smith’s ideas for the automobile production and built 
assembly lines in the automobile factories. The objectives of BPR are to 
achieve effectiveness and to fulfil customer needs by using technology to 
enhance the business processes. Technology is often mentioned as a 
prerequisite for successful BPR initiatives (Hammer 2003; Hammer & 
Champy 2003; Willoch 1994). Ascari et al. (1995) emphasize the need 
for designing IS in a way that supports business and the organizational 
changes that are in progress. Marjanovic (2000) finds that IT can help 
reduce resistance to change thanks to the fact that groupware technology 
allows people to collaborate smoothly. However, Bashein and Markus 
(1994) argue that a BPR-project could be too technically focused in 
relation to the actual reengineering which could result in animosity 
toward IS.  
Hammer (2003) emphasizes the importance of applying a customer 
view to all business processes and to achieve business success by meeting 
customer needs and desires. He (ibid.) states that those who want 
business success need to resolve even the smallest details rigorously 
while integrating processes across corporate boundaries. Hammer (ibid.) 
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backs down from an earlier statement that put radical change as a core 
priority of BPR and now focuses on business processes as the essence for 
business reengineering.  
According to Hughes (2009) there are two problems with BPR: i) it 
can serve as a “self-fulfilling prophecy” for practice because “... if 
managers believed in radical change enough they would achieve radical 
change”, and ii) “…the ambiguities of reengineering may have helped to 
maintain its longevity as an organizational change initiative”.  
Business Process Management (BPM) is often treated as synonymous 
to BPR; the core interest of BPM is management of the business 
processes and their need for continuous quality improvement. Ko et al. 
(2009, p. 746) describe BPM as “... a cross-discipline ‘theory in practice’ 
subject with many views, definitions and perspectives” that is “more 
practical, iterative and incremental in fine-tuning business processes”. 
Some authors in the field of BPM (like with the BPR) focus mostly on 
the technical facilities; the information systems that help to track how the 
processes are analyzed, improved and automated. Other authors (e.g. 
Drucker 2008; Senge 1995) focus more on the so called human side of 
BPM (cf. subsection 2.3.3).  
Trkman (2010) expresses the need for an underlying BPM theoretical 
framework that could support organizations that face redesign. Trkman 
(ibid.) warns against using BPM as a comprehensive solution since it 
cannot by itself find the optimal matching between strategic programs 
and business. In the literature there are a lot of statements about how 
BPM using IS can be a fruitful approach for continuous improvement of 
business processes by understanding, analyzing, redesigning, 
implementing and maintaining them. Kovacic (2004) proposes the 
redesign of business processes and implementation of application 
programmes in order to keep pace with the challenges of today’s ever-
changing business environment. Those rapid changes do not only affect 
the business but also the applications that support it. That is why 
information systems need constant renovation and adaptation. Bashein 
and Markus (1994) warn against reengineering if the management have a 
cost-cutting focus for the BPR because in those cases the management is 
often unwilling to support investments, e.g. in new technology that could 
be critical for success. 
Willcocks et al. (1997) carried out a longitudinal case-study in public 
administration. The findings show that radical reengineering (cf. Hammer 
& Champy’s early work from 1995) was not that easy to apply and 
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suffered from many limitations. It was difficult to start anew in public 
settings where traditions influence and inhibit the reengineering 
initiatives. Willcocks et al. (ibid.) found that managers had to consider 
the political, cultural and human resource issues in order to succeed. 
Furthermore, they realized that it was more problematic to manage a 
fruitful BPR in the public sector (Willcocks et al. 1997). 
Bashein and Markus (1994) found that IS and human resources 
departments should be involved in the early phases of the reengineering 
because it could reduce animosity between management and the workers. 
Xun (2009) advocates the necessity of adroit BPR for enterprises in order 
to be successful. The main suggestions are that senior managers should 
directly lead the reengineering processes and the users of the latest 
processes should be closely participating as they are fully aware of how 
the processes work. Therefore it is vital that staff views are recognized 
and taken seriously. Furthermore, co-operation groups should be formed 
in advance (before the implementation) and the members should ensure 
further redesign and continuous development of the enterprises processes 
(Bashein & Markus 1994; Xun 2009).  
In the DE-merger it was almost inevitable that a reengineering of the 
organizational processes would be needed. Org D and Org E had in many 
cases applied different routines and/or IS for solving the same type of 
assignments/duties and this would require studies of which IS and 
routines should be adopted in University DE.  Hence it would be 
necessary to carefully investigate which processes were still needed, 
which processes needed further development, and which processes should 
be replaced.  
As Bashein and Markus (1994) show it is important that a BPR-
sponsor (in this case managers with the authority to make decisions about 
IS and routines in the merger and the PMI phases) is able to participate 
continuously in the reengineering processes throughout the change 
process. Also Xun (2009) found that senior managers should participate 
in the BPR. However, in the DE-merger there was a rather complicated 
management structure at the time of the merger processes (cf. fig. 1). 
Radical change is no longer a top priority of BPR (e.g. Hammer 2003) 
and in the DE-merger there was no clear need for it either even if there 
was a need to find the best routines and IS for the new organization. Ko 
et al. (2009) propose that process management is an effective means for 
iterative and incremental fine-tuning of the processes, which was 
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probably more likely to be needed (and suitable) in the DE-merger than 
radical change.  
 
2.3 Post-merger integration – the human side  
One perspective of PMI considers the human side of the post-merger 
integration and what impact the so called soft issues have on the level of 
success (Blake & Mouton 1984; Epstein 2004; Marks & Cutcliffe 1988). 
Both the personnel and the systems need to be integrated after a merger 
and the IS personnel is highly involved (Alaranta & Viljanen 2004). 
Because those who participate in a merger could either contribute to or 
hinder the processes it is important to acknowledge the so called human 
or soft side of the merger. Davidson (1991, p. 44) argues that “... 
integration is difficult to accomplish and frequently does not work at all”. 
It is well-known that changes per se can worry staff and make them 
anxious. Employee hesitance and distrust of mergers make no exceptions 
(Abrahamsson 2000;  Empson  2000a, 2000b; Gash & Orlikkowski 1991; 
Herron et al. 1999;  Kotter & Schlesinger  2008; Lawrence  1969; 
Schweiger et al. 1987; Smith, 2005; Washington & Hacker 2005). 
However, there is considerable advice available for managers who 
want to be proactive and avoid employee resistance (e.g. Bradt 2008; 
Collins 2001; Empson 2000a, 2000b; Lewis et al. 2010).  Despite the 
various recommendations for how to prevent resistance to organizational 
change there are also examples that raise the need to listen to those who 
resist the changes. They could have a point in their critique (Michelman 
2007) and resistance and negative staff opinion could be a resource in the 
change process (Ford et al. 2008). Organizational change can be 
demanding for those who are affected and managers need to work with 
the employees in order to facilitate the change processes (Cooper & 
Markus 1995).  
A merger could require a more direct leadership style than otherwise, 
especially if the employees that are involved in a merger are highly 
educated and used to a high degree of participation (Harman & Harman 
2003; Pritchard 1993; Pritchard & Williamson 2008; Weddeburn 1991). 
Change processes need to move quickly in order to avoid productivity 
drops (cf. Tetenbaum 1999).  
Frommer (2001) studied the role of expectations in mergers and post-
merger integrations and claims that expectations of a merger and of the 
PMI will influence the attitudes and commitments to the merger, the PMI 
and also to the new organization.  Unfulfilled expectations could have 
63 
 
negative consequences which in turn could affect the merger, the PMI, 
and also the perceived success of the merger.  
2.3.1 Why resistance to change? 
A changed work situation, including the prospect of having to master new 
IS, and adapting to new routines can be intimidating, especially if you are 
not sure of your competence. The management has to be prepared for 
various manifestations of resistance and/or reactions in a merger: lowered 
productivity, motivation and performance, adherence to (old) routines, 
compulsive repetitive actions (e.g. sabotage), absenteeism, voluntary 
turnover, health problems and power struggles. This is partly because 
employee requirements are not always considered in the merger planning 
(Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Cartwright & Cooper 1995). Ford and Ford 
(2009) found that strong leaders do not look at resistance as a threat; they 
listen and learn from what is said even if it is critical. A main problem 
with managers that are offended by resistance is that they react in ways 
that are counterproductive. A more productive attitude to employee 
resistance is to see it as feedback and a resource. Neglecting the 
manifestations of resistance could be dangerous in that useful information 
may be wasted (Ford & Ford 2009). As Nyberg and Mueller (2009) point 
out, resistance to change could just be another way to coping with 
change. Lewis et al. (2010) emphasize the importance for management to 
understand that resistance to change is inevitable and that the individuals 
need to be supported by their leaders; their behaviour is what should be 
focused on, not their attitudes.  
Management should communicate the change so that the employees 
understand it and should also communicate the progress that has been 
made. The managers also need to understand that change must be 
ongoing. It is not a single event of change that does the trick. It is also 
important to be sensitive to how the employees react to the changes. 
Incremental changes are often more successful (Lewis et al. 2010). 
Bringselius (2008, p. 290) defines resistance to change in the following 
way: 
 
“Personnel resistance in M&A is the opposition of a 
substantial group of personnel against the combination or 
integration with a merger/acquisition partner, or against other 
management decisions and directives in relation to the 
merger/acquisition.”  
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The DE-merger was carried out in the public sector and it must be seen in 
the light of the differences between such mergers and those in the private 
sector. The administrators’ earlier experience of participation and a 
general awareness of the public use of resources make such a merger 
more challenging than one in the private sector. Hence, it is even more 
important that they continuously feel involved in the merger processes, 
and that they are well informed throughout the process. The managers in 
the DE-merger needed to be aware of the consequences of resistance to 
change (e.g. Cartwright & Cooper 1995) and to acknowledge the 
reasoning by Ford and Ford (2009), Nyberg and Mueller (2009), and 
Lewis at al. (2010) that resistance can be a positive manifestation of 
commitment. Hence managers should support their personnel throughout 
the merger processes. 
2.3.2 Management of change 
Managers face many challenges in an organizational change, irrespective 
of the origin and nature of the change. The various problems/matters that 
managers need to handle in a merger are examples of such demanding 
challenges. Schweiger and Goulet (2000) propose that organizational 
culture, the management of the integration process, and decisions have an 
impact on the outcome of the merger. Erkama’s (2010) study showed 
discursive struggles over organizational restructuring as regards the 
issues: relevant themes for negotiations, resources for financial 
arguments, identity constructions (of self and others) and organizational 
ideologies. An important conclusion of the findings is the need for 
managers to get involved in those discursive struggles in order to 
influence the discourse and counteract resistance to the organizational 
changes.  
Carlsson (1961) studied administrative succession (among school 
superintendents) and found that the successor’s origin (from inside or 
outside the organization) make them relate to the organization differently. 
Those who were recruited from the inside put their place of employment 
above their career and those who were recruited from the outside were 
more involved in their careers; outsiders were more often chosen when 
the employer wanted changes and insiders when the employer wanted 
stabilization. Furthermore, those who came from outside stayed for a 
shorter time than the insiders; the outsiders were more innovative and the 
insiders more adaptive according to Carlsson’s study (ibid.). 
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Shrivastata (2007) highlights the need to establish a new strategic 
leadership as soon as possible since top management usually changes 
after a merger. Often the new top management is not accepted by all 
parties and therefore it is even more critical that potential integration 
problems are solved immediately. A new strategic leadership needs to 
provide directions and purpose for the new organization and this involves 
the implementation of strategic control, design of structures and 
procedures as well as gaining political control through dominant 
coalitions and establishment of professional norms. It is important to 
establish well-defined authority lines because the managers from the 
merging units are unfamiliar with the other side, and do not understand 
the work culture; they lack information, or have not built trust 
relationships with the new subordinates yet. Therefore it could be 
tempting to postpone decisions, which could cause failure per se. There 
are two challenging factors for creating a new strategic leadership: i) it 
has to be immediately established, and ii) it has to take control over 
factors with an impact of performance (Shrivastata 2007). 
Collins (2001, 1 p. 181) argues that there is a risk connected with 
appointing new leaders since they could cause a “doom loop pattern”. 
This refers to the risk that they would stop a successfully “spinning 
flywheel” (i.e. successful business/processes). Epstein (2005) shows the 
importance of creating a new organization, and appointing the new 
management before the merger process starts.   
Empson (2000a, 2000b) found that managers were afraid of imposing 
organizational change because of the risk that their employees would 
react negatively if they did not like the prospect of change. They were 
also wary of disturbing their customers, which made them adopt a 
laissez-fair approach to change. Empson’s studies showed that the 
managers promised their customers that they would have at least the same 
service as before the merger integration and more if they wanted. 
Simultaneously they assured the staff that the integration would not 
increase their workload - a difficult equation to solve but the staff was 
encouraged to seek co-operation with their new colleagues. However, it 
was not possible to force the employees to share their knowledge or their 
customers. A reason for not sharing was that the employees were afraid 
of being made redundant and that they regarded their former organization 
as better than the merger partner’s.  Employees that were more in favour 
of the integration were frustrated by delays; those who were less willing 
to integrate were frustrated because they were uncertain about their own 
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situation. Empson’s (2000a, 2000b) conclusion was that the managers 
could not control the integration (only influence it) and suggests that 
managers should not force the pace too much. Shrivastata (2007) found 
that the merger units often have different opinions of the merger, and 
even conflicting frames of reference, which could cause problems if the 
need for socio-cultural integration is neglected. It is especially important 
that the managers are open to the other side’s perspective, and that they 
are successful in building trust between each other. 
In the DE-merger there were two organizations with different cultures 
even if they were public sector organizations (cf.  Schweiger & Goulet 
2000; Shrivastata 2007). It is often inevitable that a merger increases the 
workload (Empson 2000b). In the DE-merger the administrators 
generally had to both carry out their ordinary duties, and work in various 
merger groups. Collins (2001) warns against appointing new managers in 
a change process.  
In the DE-merger new managers including the top management were 
appointed late in the process.  The top management were externally 
recruited which we found to have negative consequences for the PMI (cf. 
Carlsson 1961).  
2.3.2.1 The importance of trust  
As the management icon Peter F. Drucker (1999, p. 72) put it: “Trust 
between people does not necessarily mean that they like one another. It 
means that they understand one another”. In an organizational change it is 
important that the employees trust their managers, and do not need to 
search for hidden agendas or proof of the management’s intent to deceive 
the personnel.  
Many issues are sensitive in a merger, in particular the appointment of 
new managers. If the new manager comes from one of the former 
organizations; the other party could be disappointed and fear a risk of 
bias (Epstein 2004). Bringselius (2010a) found a loss of confidence in the 
new management when employees suspected that new managers 
favoured the personnel from their former organization, especially when 
the former managers from (only) one of the organizations involved were 
appointed to lead the new organization.  
Bringselius (2010a) studies showed that the so called vertical 
resistance (i.e. between the management and their subordinates) to 
change is more obvious in public sector organizations. The employees 
experienced that they were not treated the way they were used to and 
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after the merger they felt a lack of respect and space for individual 
thinking, initiative and dialogue (Bringselius ibid.).  
Van Iterson and Clegg (2008) point out that executives should 
seriously look into organizational rumours if they insinuate wrongdoings. 
In mergers the involved organizations need to trust each other. Van 
Iterson and Clegg (2008) also found that organizational gossip is an 
important factor with an impact on the power structures in inter-
organizational relations. Spreading gossip about competitors often aim at 
undermining their actions.  
Whitener et al. (1998) investigated how managers could initiate a 
trustworthy behaviour and found the biggest challenge of trust initiation 
to be the necessity of managers making the first move, even before they 
are sure that their subordinates deserve to be trusted. It is often more 
tempting to apply control mechanisms in order to find out if the personnel 
is trustworthy (ibid.).  
Podsakoff et al. (1996) found that employees (i.e. subordinates) who 
consider their own knowledge, experience and ability to be high have 
more trust in their leaders than those who think they have less knowledge, 
are less experienced, and less able. The leaders’ ability to foster their 
subordinates’ acceptance of group goals and to give them individualized 
support was found to have a positive impact on trust.  
Trust is important in building alliances and Volery and Mensik (1998) 
characterize trust as superior prediction, authority, and bargaining when it 
comes to reducing uncertainty in complex situations. Cullen et al. (2000) 
agree with the need for trust in building alliances and call attention to the 
fact that it takes time to build trust. In a trust building scenario there are 
some general benefits (fair exchange of knowledge) and vulnerabilities 
(inequitable transfer of tacit knowledge) that the participants need to 
balance in order to find the right level of trust and commitment.  
If communication is insufficient it is likely that rumours will flourish 
especially if the management withholds information about issues that 
concern the employees (Mishra 1990). The informal organizational 
grapevine (the informal and unsanctioned information network within 
every organization) will always supplement formal communication 
channels when employees lack information (ibid.).  
 The managers that understand the great impact of the so called 
grapevine are better suited to deal with its consequences (Mishra 1990). 
There is a need for the managers (on all levels) to participate in trust 
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building/maintaining processes instead of leaving these important 
activities to the human resource department (Caudron 1996).  
DiFonzo and Bordia (2000) found that harmful rumours are frequent 
in times of organizational change. It is pointed out as important to 
monitor what effect potential rumours will have internally and externally. 
If organizational changes are approaching DiFonzo and Bordia (ibid.) 
recommend management to prepare for the changes by establishing 
committees to explore possible change alternatives, and to disclose the 
changes as early as possible.  
 
2.3.2.2 The importance of communication 
Bashein and Markus (1994) recommend good communication in change 
(BPR) projects as there is a need to share visions among both employees 
and management. Gaps of communication between organizational levels 
are a source of top management’s visions being misunderstood or 
misinterpreted. Extensive communication is recommended since too 
much communication is almost impossible to achieve. Despite this there 
could be delays in a reengineering project if the managers have a culture 
of consensus decision making. Communication about reengineering 
should focus on the opportunities (Bashein & Markus 1994). 
Communication in the merger process is often important means of 
countering resistance to change (e.g. Hallier 2000; Napier et al. 1989; 
Schweiger and Denisi 1991; Shrivastava 2007; Smith 2005). A varied 
communication that takes place through several channels is 
recommended by van Knippenberg et al. (2006) since it will increase the 
likelihood of meeting the employees’ information needs. 
It is important for managers not to withhold information that they feel 
can worry or upset their personnel – as Caudron (1996, p. 21) put it 
“Despite what managers think, people can handle enormous doses of bad 
news” and there can hardly be too much information. Honesty is a means 
of preventing employees from resisting organizational change (Schweiger 
et al. 1987). The recommendation is to communicate both good and bad 
news, if decisions are postponed and even if there is nothing new to say 
(Kets de Vries & Balazs 1997; Napier et al. 1989; Schweiger & Weber 
1989). Marks and Cutcliffe (1988) highlight the need to communicate 
with those who are uncertain about the merger consequences, as a means 
to keep their loyalty. Gall (1991) finds it important to carry out a 
proactive internal communication early when a merger is announced to 
prevent rumours. 
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2.3.2.3 The importance of employee participation 
Ford and Ford (2009) emphasize the idea of making the employees 
engaged participants in an organizational change by inviting them to 
discuss the situation and come up with suggestions to solve problems that 
they fear would come with the change implementation. Remembering 
earlier experience of unsuccessful change initiatives will reduce the 
employees’ motivation to contribute to the change. Hence managers need 
to allow their employees to tell their stories about old experiences; the 
management could be totally unaware of old problems and wrongs that 
should be cleared up and accounted for (ibid.).  Besides education and 
trust among participants, Zmud and Cox (1979) highlight the importance 
of user participation and giving employees their own responsibility in the 
change processes. Empson (2000a) argues that employee participation at 
all levels usually is a successful way of facilitating merger integration. 
Shrivastava (2007) found that the employees should be allowed to 
participate in the decision making on merger related questions. 
Committed and motivated personnel downplay the negative 
consequences that could otherwise emerge, causing anger, resentment 
and a drop of productivity.  
2.3.2.4 The importance of providing for training opportunities 
According to Drucker (1998) individuals should make it their own 
responsibility to acquire new knowledge and to stay updated in their 
specific field of expertise. The concept of lifelong learning emphasizes 
the individual’s personal responsibility to update her/his professional 
skills (Crowther 2004). Other opinions support and highlight the 
management’s responsibility to provide training opportunities for their 
staff – especially when organizational changes are imposed on the 
employees. Bashein and Markus (1994, p. 18) raise the importance of 
conducting personal transformation training in a reengineering project 
because people need to be informed and trained in “... the what and how 
of reengineering, redesigned jobs and teamwork”. Venkatesh et al. 
(2002) found training, provided by the employer, to be a very important 
means for achieving continued system usage when a new IS is 
implemented. Buck (1999) points out an important issue that it all starts 
with offering the instructors sufficient training that would be in 
accordance with the skills they are expected to pass on.  Zmud and Cox 
(1979) advocate training as a keystone for successful IS implementation. 
The organizations’ IS must be utilized properly by the employees 
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otherwise important benefits with the IS could be missed (Mathieson 
1991). A reason why employees do not use the IS as expected is a lack 
training opportunities in the new IS when it is implemented in the 
organization (Hoffer et al. 2002). This could lead to opportunities for cost 
reduction, such as rationalization, optimization of the existing 
administrative tasks and providing customer satisfaction.  
2.3.3 Reengineering from a human perspective 
BPR depends much on technology and IS for enhancing the processes 
that make a business more successful (e.g. Hammer & Champy 2003; 
Hammer 2003). Despite the technical perspective of reengineering 
(subsection 2.2.2) there are also significant human aspects that are 
important to consider and acknowledge.  
Harmon (2007) states that employees usually do not like changes 
which make it necessary to inform them about why a change (of the 
processes) is needed. Harmon (2007) distinguishes between the two main 
conceptions (IS and human approaches) of BPM and uses the acronym 
BPMS when referring to software tools for business process analysis and 
design. Redesign of processes can result in forcing some employees to 
learn to use new IS and some even have to resign. To prevent resistance 
to the changes and in order to work against backsliding the managers 
have to communicate the changes well and to evaluate the results in a 
way that controls that the new processes are accomplished as planned. 
According to Harmon (ibid.) it is crucial that the employees know whom 
(colleague/manager) to contact in case of problems concerning the 
changes. 
Harrington, et al. (1997) report on a case study using BPR in the 
public sector where they noticed that employees were happy about the 
new opportunities offered by using IT in a new (reengineered) way. The 
employees were also pleased with a flatter organization (less hierarchical) 
after changes were accomplished - but at the same time there were some 
contradictory problems with control, empowerment and commitment. 
Senge (1995) and Drucker (2008) highlight more common management 
approaches that include managing people involved in the processes. 
Drucker (2008) focuses on management by objectives and the need for 
knowledge workers to take responsibility (i.e. self-control) for becoming 
effective, in other words doing the right thing.  
The leadership style and the hierarchical structure changed after the 
DE-merger had been carried out and so did the communication strategies 
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(subsection 4.4.2). The need to reengineer the routines and the IS have 
consequences for the administrators in University DE; the management 
style is a factor that could either inspire or discourage the administrators. 
Communication is important even after a merger is carried out because 
much of the reengineering work still remains to be completed. Training 
activities, formal or informal (e.g. colleagues that teach each other) are 
usually needed when routines and IS are changed.  
According to Bashein and Markus (1994) unrealistic objectives and 
expectations are common in BPR-projects and this is problematic. Top 
management could have a false impression of the prospect of success and 
then it is important to disclose false expectations early in the process. 
Managers need to be involved and committed to the reengineering 
throughout the BPR, and encourage the employees to take their own 
responsibilities in the reengineering process. Better results are shown in 
settings where a collaborative culture of work is established before the 
reengineering. However, BPR resistance is found to be evident in the 
middle management layers because down-sizing has often affected these 
positions when BPR is carried out. Management workshops during the 
processes, including middle-managers, are means of creating positive 
preconditions for successful BPR. Vakola and Rezgui (2000) show a new 
methodology for BPR where the human and organizational issues are 
included in the reengineering. Issues that need to be further 
acknowledged are for organizational culture, human relationships, and 
resistance to change.  
Cooper and Markus (1995) refer to the so called Okuno’s five 
techniques for successfully carrying out organizational changes. These 
techniques are focused on human reengineering and the employees 
should participate in the change instead of being change objects. The five 
techniques is an integrated system for continuous innovation and 
improvement: i) group leader meetings, ii) price control system, iii) the 
tornado program, iv) the draft system and v) the hangen (cutting in half) 
game. Although the focus was on people and not on the business 
processes the human reengineering lead to improvements in the business 
processes.  
The hangen game focused on making change instead of just being 
changed, which required employees to use their creativity when they 
carried out their assignments. It is a form of reengineering because the 
workforce is decreased by half, putting emphasis on identifying the most 
necessary processes and leading to staff reductions.  
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The draft system (inspired by the Japanese professional baseball 
league’s draft system) is about job rotation but showed the downside for 
employees who work too hard (in order to adapt to the new work 
situation) and this results in health problems. However, the draft system 
was a better method for identifying the next generation of group leaders 
than the tornado (tatsumaki) program.  
The tornado program aimed at “... both to increase the group leaders’ 
management skills and to reduce the group members’ dependency on the 
leaders”. The subordinates had to, without warning, take on the 
manager’s responsibilities for three days; in the meantime the group 
leader had to find out how the group worked without his/her 
management.  
The price control system aimed at teaching the group leaders to be 
more aware of the money-making process (i.e. cost awareness). The 
groups should sell their “products” to other internal groups and buy what 
they needed to produce their part from other groups. The group leader 
meetings had the objective of developing the group leaders’ management 
skills.  
Sometimes BPR results in down-sizing even if that is not a goal in 
itself (Marjanovic 2000). Irrespective of this the concept has been 
criticized for its down-sizing risks and the potential increase in 
unemployment that it would bring on (Grey & Mitev 1995). Besides, 
down-sizing of the staff during BPR would challenge the employees who 
remain in the organization to accomplish more as well as having to face 
all the changes that the BPR brings on (ibid.).  Willoch (1994) found that 
the focus of reengineering is to design processes where fewer people 
contribute more value to the organization in an attempt to maximize the 
value added. This differs from rationalization since that is about fewer 
people doing the same work as more people did before. Mishra and 
Spreitzer (1998) highlight the importance of a good long-term 
relationship between the management and the employees when down-
sizing is implemented. The personnel need to trust that the down-sizing is 
carried out fairly; empowerment should not be restricted. Employees that 
survive a down-sizing are encouraged by the redesign of their duties if 
they are invited to participate in the process and if they can see that their 
jobs will become more meaningful after the down-sizing. A main reason 
for carrying out mergers in public sector is often the prospect of cost-
saving (Saarimaa & Tukiainen 2010). 
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In the DE-merger a reengineering was expected and the 
administrators already showed that they were aware of it (Lundqvist 
2009) and welcomed it (Lundqvist 2010c). There was a realistic risk of 
the need for down-sizing because the administrators in the two locations 
carried out basically the same duties and one justification for the merger 
was to use the opportunities for rationalization. The administrative 
routines and IS were likely to be reengineered. In the merger processes 
the administrators worked part-time with merger related projects and 
combined this with their regular duties. 
2.3.4 Knowledge sharing, knowledge gaps and PMI 
Drucker (1998) forecasted today’s evident need for employees to be 
skilled at checking and maintaining organizational knowledge. That is to 
say that the employees need to understand who depends on what 
information and where to find that information. There is also a need for 
employees to perceive how everyone, including themselves, can 
contribute to the organizations’ needs. Dixon (1999) finds it especially 
important in organizational change that the employees’ knowledge is 
used because everyone has valuable knowledge that is worth sharing and 
collecting. Because so much knowledge in practice is tacit, and therefore 
not supported by IS (Sveiby 1996) it is crucial that the employees are 
willing to share knowledge with their colleagues.   
Hislop (2005) notes that a general risk with knowledge sharing is that 
a person, who is willing to share knowledge might get nothing in return. 
Knowledge management systems (KMS) are also affected with the 
mistrust of putting knowledge in and maybe getting nothing in return 
(ibid.) Tissen et al. (1998) argue that people are usually more positive to 
using knowledge from a KMS than they are putting their own knowledge 
into such a system. Alavi and Leidner (2001) question the level of trust 
that would be needed in order to rely on knowledge obtained from a KMS 
especially when they do not know the person that the knowledge 
originates from. Hence they (ibid.) search for solutions to further develop 
peoples’ trust in information and knowledge that are available in KMS. 
Senge (1995) argues the importance for an organization to become a 
learning organization by utilizing the employee’s competences and 
participation and this requires managers/leaders to be visionaries and 
willing to share their ideas and knowledge with their employees. In 
contrast, Galliers (2009) emphasizes the importance of understanding that 
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data (only) is handled in a KMS; it is still the individuals that make 
knowledge out of it by making sense of the data they capture. 
When organizations merge there could be gaps in the knowledge 
sharing that would affect the merger negatively (Alaranta & Martela 
2010). Ruggles (1998) proposes that organizations appoint special 
knowledge managers (chief knowledge officer) who should leverage and 
enable knowledge and make knowledge visible in order to identify 
knowledge gaps. The biggest problem was (in a study from 1997) found 
to be changing people’s behaviour (56 %) and the biggest impediment to 
knowledge transfer was culture (54 %) (Ruggles 1998).  
Yoo et al. (2007) studied knowledge sharing in mergers and found 
five factors that contributed to the knowledge gap: i) the nature of the 
mergers, ii) the lack of shared context, iii) the incompatibility of 
knowledge systems, iv) tacit knowledge and v) time pressure. The short 
conclusion is that mergers disrupt knowledge sharing. In University DE 
the merger was voluntary and politically promoted between similar 
organizations in the public sector. The routines and the IS were different, 
as well as the knowledge systems, the contexts were not identical and 
knowledge gaps were likely as the new colleagues did not understand 
each other completely. The sharing of tacit knowledge was problematic in 
the new organization as the administrators were uncertain about their jobs 
after the merger. The time pressure was obvious because the 
administrators had to carry out both their ordinary duties and project tasks 
for the merger.  
Alaranta and Martela (2010) investigated methods for overcoming 
knowledge gaps during PMI and found incompatible knowledge systems, 
which together with time pressure led to insufficient knowledge sharing 
and missed opportunities to leverage new knowledge. Ford and Ford 
(2009) found that employees accepted the idea that in a merger, old and 
new colleagues should train each other in order to share knowledge. 
Szulanski (1996) discusses the problem of best practice that does not 
transfer and therefore results in a gap between what is known within the 
organization and the knowledge that is put into practice in the same 
organization. To solve this problem Szulanski (ibid.) suggests that the 
organization pays serious attention to the development of learning 
capacities between organizational units in order to make them work 
closer and communicate practices quicker and better.  
For reengineering initiatives to become successful employees with a 
good knowledge and understanding of their systems and routines are 
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better prepared to participate in the redesign of the IS and routines. 
Ruggles (1998) wants management to have good knowledge of the 
employees’ competences in order to use them properly and to find tacit 
knowledge that could be shared. A study of knowledge sharing in 
electronic networks of practice (McLure Wasko & Faraj 2005) found that 
people shared their knowledge without expecting to get something in 
return if they were embedded in the network, if they thought that their 
professional reputation could gain from it and if they found their 
experience to be worth sharing.   
Jones and George (1998) claim that unconditional trust is a basis or 
knowledge sharing. If there is a climate of unconditional trust, the 
participants do not need to fear being used or exploited. Instead they are 
convinced that their specialized knowledge will be used in a way that 
everyone and the organization will gain from.  
The openness to reengineering that the administrators in the DE-
merger showed was also a promising basis for knowledge sharing even 
though there were problems that needed to be handled (like uncertainty 
and time-pressure).  
2.4 Summary – preliminary answers to the research 
questions 
The DE-merger was politically promoted and carried out between relative 
equals (even if one unit had a somewhat higher status). There was a 
rather complicated management situation throughout the merger with 
many substitutes and temporary managers, for example the organization 
committee for the merger. There were late appointments and a lack of 
individual information about the administrators’ employment after the 
merger. IS-related issues seemed to have been given low priority in the 
merger, caused partly by the lack of IS-strategies for both the merging 
units and partly by the management situation where no one was in charge 
of the PMI of IS in the new organization throughout the merger.  
The starting point for the merger was promising as the administrators 
were positive to the merger and the reengineering initiatives. The 
administrators were well-educated and were confident that their IS-skills 
and knowledge would be sufficient to cope with the changes that were to 
come with the merger. The findings (chapter 4) will show that the picture 
changed (less satisfied and less enthusiastic administrators) after the DE-
merger had been carried out thus making it interesting to investigate what 
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happened, not least in order to search for keys that would facilitate the 
PMI after the merger.  
The study has so far been carried out with existing literature, and the 
insights collected offer some preliminary answers to the research 
questions:   
 
RQ1: Should strategic management of information systems be a decisive 
factor in a public sector merger? 
Strategic management of IS should be decisive because: 
 Strategic management of IS is a basis for decisions and 
management of IS-related issues. If these issues are not dealt with 
there could be serious consequences that influence almost every 
part of the organization (sections 2.1, 2.2). 
 Organizational change will influence the IS (sections 2.1, 2.2).  
 
RQ2: How can administrator participation facilitate post-merger 
integration? 
Administrator participation could facilitate a post-merger integration 
because: 
 Their knowledge (often tacit) is necessary in order to prevent 
knowledge gaps during mergers (section 2.3). 
 The administrators are well initiated into the organization’s IS and 
the routines, which are needed in order to fulfil their, and the 
organization’s, duties and assignments. It is costly to change IS 
making it important that new IS fulfil user and organizational 
needs so they can be used as long as possible (sections 2.1, 2.2). 
 If they are satisfied with the communication during the merger it 
is less likely that they will speculate and start the rumour mill 
(section 2.3). 
 Their acceptance of new IS (new technology) will positively 
influence the diffusion of innovations (section 2.1). 
 Participation in the ongoing processes is a means of preventing 
resistance to change (section 2.3). 
 The managers have the opportunity to win the administrator’s 
trust during the ongoing merger phases (section 2.3). 
 The administrators could both hinder or contribute to new 
routines. If they actively participate in the processes it is more 
likely that they will also contribute to them (section 2.3). 
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RQ3: How can management facilitate a public sector merger? 
The management could facilitate a public sector merger by: 
 Understanding that resistance is a natural human reaction to 
change and acting on that knowledge. Resistance is possible to 
predict and to meet; it is not only about preventing resistance. If it 
is understood it can be countered (section 2.3). 
 Applying communication strategies that provide plentiful and 
candid information about the merger/change processes, even 
when there is actually nothing new to tell or when the information 
carries bad news. Varied communication through various 
channels is more likely to be effective (section 2.3). 
 Involving the administrators in the merger processes (sections 2.2; 
2.3).  
 Understanding and acting on the fact that reengineering of the 
processes will be needed due to the merger (section 2.2). 
 Realizing that PMI planning could be more demanding than pre-
merger planning. This requires the full attention and participation 
of the top management, the IS-managers, and other managers. The 
IS-managers should be appointed as early as possible; to be able 
to deal with the IS-issues (sections 2.2; 2.3).  
 Being prepared for political/power struggles about IS in the PMI 
(sections 2.2; 2.3).  
 Motivating competence and knowledge sharing among colleagues 
(sections 2.2; 2.3).  
 
RQ4: What factors of importance influence the post-merger integration in 
a public sector merger?  
These are important factors that could influence the PMI in a public 
sector merger: 
 The diffusion of innovations and acceptance of technology 
become key issues when a merger calls for applying new 
technical solutions, routines and IS (section 2.1).  
 The IS success is dependent on the quality of the IS and 
information, the users’ experience, and the impact on individuals 
and organization (section 2.1). 
 The management (on all levels) need to understand that IS-issues 
must be given priority as they are the basis for the organization’s 
processes and activities. Otherwise the PMI could be 
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unsuccessful. The worst case scenario is that it could be ruined 
(sections 2.1, 2.2). 
 The IS need to support the administrators in their work as well as 
other categories of employees (section 2.2).  
 Reengineering is most likely be needed because different routines 
and/or IS are required even if the merging organizations basically 
carry out the same work programs (sections 2.2, 2.3). 
 The pre-merger planning is important in order to understand the 
many questions that need to be dealt with and that entail planning. 
Some examples are training activities because of changes as well 
as analysis of the new organization’s requirements and needs 
(sections 2.2, 2.3). 
 Good communication is important for trust-building, down-
playing fear of the approaching changes and for smoothing 
resistance to change (Section 2.3).  
 The need for training to cope with the changes should be studied 
and acted on (sections 2.2, 2.3).  
 The leadership style. A directive leadership style could be 
effective in order to get things done quickly (section 2.3). 
 Trust in management is important. Otherwise it is difficult for 
employees to believe what they are told and to feel that they are 
being fairly treated in a climate of downsizing and redefined roles. 
Trust may be jeopardized without effective communication. 
Leaders that foster the acceptance of group goals and provide 
individual support are more likely to be trusted (section 2.3). 
 An inspiring knowledge management (KM) program for sharing 
knowledge with colleagues is helpful in an organizational change 
(section 2.3). 
 Employee participation helps individuals feel useful and will 
convince them that their opinions count (section 2.3). 
 Co-operation in a merger between organizations at different 
locations will be more time-consuming (sections 2.2, 2.3). 
 Appointment of new managers late in a merger process is 
negative for the PMI. Externally recruited new managers lack the 
organizational history and culture that are vital to understand in 
the PMI (section 2.2). 
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3 Methods and methodology 
The chapter comprises a brief history of IS research and methodology. 
First, traditional IS research is discussed in section 3.1. A critical 
evaluation of possible research methods is carried out in section 3.2.  The 
design of the longitudinal case study is outlined in section 3.3. The data 
collection and the analysis are accounted for in section 3.4. Finally, this 
chapter is summarized in section 3.5.     
3.1 Information systems research 
Information systems research is a relatively recent academic discipline 
and to use Hirschheim and Klein’s (2011) division of IS history it 
actually comprises four eras: first era 1964-1974, second era 1975-1984, , 
third era 1985-1994 and the fourth era1995 – present. Before the first era 
the focus was on information technology (IT) and not on IS. The main 
topic for the research in the first era was to show how IS differs from 
other disciplines, something that went on even in the second era.  
According to Hirschheim and Klein (2011) it was in the mid 1980s 
that the researchers began to formulate their concerns about the lack of 
suitable IS research methods. The scientific methods that had been 
applied in other disciplines were questioned and there was a need to 
emphasize the inclusion of social needs and problems. In the third era the 
Harvard Business School organized a colloquium on IS methodologies, 
i.e. qualitative research, experimental research, survey research, 
mathematical methods and software systems demonstrations. Academics 
in the IS field needed to publish their research, but the major journals 
were not initially interested in IS research results. Hence Management 
Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ) was started, which was the first 
journal in the IS field that aimed at two fundamental target groups: 
academics and practitioners in the field of IS.   
The first conference covering IS issues was organized in 1978 – 
Information Systems Research in Scandinavia (IRIS). The IRIS 
conference started out as a Finnish event that included the rest of 
Scandinavia but started to attract more and more participants from 
outside Scandinavia as well. In the third era, also professional societies 
were also established, for example the International Association for IS 
Academics (AIS) and the European Conference on Information Systems 
(ECIS) were founded in 1993. In the fourth and present era the progress 
of alternative, more qualitatively oriented, research approaches has been 
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significant – at the expense of positivist research methods that dominate 
management science, computer aided intelligence, and other computer 
based research areas. IS research methods that were established included 
interpretive and critical research approaches (Hirschheim & Klein 2011). 
The research methods used in this thesis focus on both IS and 
organizations, which Orlikowski and Barley (2001) found to be a good 
combination: “Thus, greater interaction between the fields of information 
technology and organization studies should be viewed as more than a 
matter of enrichment. /…/ In the intellectual engagement of these two 
fields lies the important fusion of perspectives…” (Orlikowski & Barley 
2001, p. 145). The two fields, IS and organizational studies, are difficult 
to distinguish and IS researchers often come either from the field of 
organizational studies or have been influenced by organizational study 
literature (Orlikowski & Barley, ibid.).  
In the DE-merger the administrators sometimes had difficulties in 
distinguishing between IS changes and changes of existing routines. The 
“human agency” is embedded in the context as well as the technological 
constraints (Orlikowski & Barley, ibid, p. 158).  
The need to combine organizational and IS perspectives was 
considered as the methods were evaluated. The methods discussed below 
in section 3.2 were the initial candidates in the selection of research 
method. They are all methods that have been used extensively in IS 
research in recent years. As Hirschheim and Klein (2011, p. 45) found “... 
the IS field is now more receptive to interpretive, action and critical 
research”.  
3.2 A critical evaluation of candidate research methods 
Four methods were initially considered for the thesis project: design 
science, action research, ethnography and longitudinal case study. There 
are benefits and drawbacks with all these methods and this section 
summarizes the main reasons for the final choice.  
Ethnography: Hughes et al. (1994) suggest ethnography as a method 
for designing CSCW (Computer-Supported Cooperative Work) systems 
because it is a good method to inform designers about the social context 
where the system is to be applied and the collaborative (i.e. also social) 
type of work that should be carried out. Networking and distributed 
computing are cost-effective methods of collaboration that require new 
forms of analysis. However the use of ethnography has both positive and 
negative sides. Ethnography is not in itself a solution to problems in itself 
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and should not be looked upon as such. When using ethnography in 
systems design it is important to understand that the social organizing of 
the work setting is more focused that the systems design. Ethnography is 
a means of uncovering the “’real world’ character of work” (Hughes et al. 
1994, p. 436) since system design is work design were humans are 
important (Hughes et al. 1994).   
According to Andersson (1994) ethnography is a method that suffers 
from common misconceptions by the users, especially from those who 
find ethnography to be a sufficient method for system design (e.g. 
Hughes et al. 1994). Andersson (ibid.) argues that using ethnography to 
compile specifications of end-user requirements is just about data 
collection (without considering the social settings). There are some 
common misconceptions: every fieldwork is ethnography, social skills 
guarantee successful fieldwork and every story carries depth, interest and 
insight. Furthermore, the understanding of the ethnographer as a 
transducer is somewhat overrated because the dichotomy that lies in us 
vs. them is mostly present. Ethnography could even be an analytical 
approach: “Brokenness is in the eye of the beholder. If you cannot be sure 
that it is broken, think twice before setting out to mend it.” meaning that 
it could be useful to explore the possibility of a “play of rationalities” as a 
part of the problem-definition phase of the design (Andersson 1994, p. 
178). 
Ethnography was not chosen as method mainly because the research 
aims at finding keys to facilitating PMI in public sector mergers. Also the 
resources that would have been needed to carry out an ethnographical 
research process were not available.  
Action research: According to Gummesson (2000) action research is 
a very good method for research when applied properly, meaning that the 
researcher should gain internal access to the research area in order to get 
involved and informed. Pre-knowledge is important in order to carry out 
good research. In action research the researcher may even act as a 
consultant with his/her own agenda to the course of events and to the 
change processes. Walsham (2006) argues that action research is a 
method where close involvement by the researcher is needed in order to 
gain in-depth access to the data. Walsham (2006, p. 322) declares the 
action researcher to be “... trying consciously and explicitly to change 
things in the way that they feel best”. O’Brien (2001) claims action 
research to be about “learning by doing”.  The search for a solution to a 
certain problem is acted on and evaluated; if a satisfactory result does not 
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result from the trial a new trial is carried out. The procedure is much like 
a practitioner’s way of analysing and trying to find solutions to 
unidentified problems.  However, the difference is in the scientific 
approach taken by the researcher in order to find good solutions; the 
researcher has to make sure that the activities build on good theory and 
valid conceptual frameworks. An important factor in action research is 
that the problems dealt with come from real situations and not from 
simulated experiments. This is crucial because the methods aim to solve 
real problems, which does not prevent both practitioners and academics 
from gaining from the results (O’Brien 2001; Gummesson 2000).  
Schön (1983) states that it is important for a researcher to understand 
how professionals think in action, and how they reflect upon their actions. 
Besides, even professionals gain from understanding the factors involved 
in the organizational learning that Schön discusses. In Schön’s (ibid.) 
definition of the interplay between the professional and the researcher, 
reflective theory shows how the professional more actively contributes 
with his/her knowledge than just being a passive receiver of the research 
findings.  
Action research was not chosen as a method because the method 
would involve the researcher in the merger process as a change agent. In 
this case there was actually an opportunity to gain internal access to the 
merger process but the researcher decided on ethical grounds not to 
become actively involved in the merger process. In other words the 
research project was not carried out as a consultant project as this could 
have risked breeching the trust of the participants. It would also have 
been too large a task as the merger turned out to be very complex.  
Design science: Hevner et al. (2004) claim design science to be one 
of the dominant research paradigms of IS research. Design science deals 
with creating new artefacts and the artefacts should be evaluated. In order 
to get feasible artefacts with design science methods the problem domain 
and possible solutions need to be carefully understood by the researcher 
(ibid.). March and Smith (1995) list design science products as i) 
constructs, ii) models, iii) methods and iv) implementations. All of them 
are technology-oriented and evaluated against whether they work or not; 
as the method aims at creating things that will fulfil human needs. 
Markus et al. (2002) argue that design science is more and more 
applicable to various assignments even if IT was not the obvious choice 
for solving the problems in question.. However, the artefacts should be 
built and tested and this was not the objective of the DE-merger study. 
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The main reason for this is that the researcher did not set out to exercise 
any influence on the merger/post-merger processes. A design science 
approach to study the merger process would have required a group of at 
least 5-6 researchers in order to build and test IS artefacts that could 
support the PMI. 
Case-study – cross-sectional and longitudinal: The most common 
case-studies deal with a single case and study the complexity and nature 
of the specific case in question. Single could refer to a single 
organization, a single location, a single person or a single event. The DE-
merger is about a single merger (event) even if two former organizations 
are involved in the new organization.  It is about employees from a single 
category, administrators, even if the administrators could be divided into 
several types of assignments.  Case-studies could be either cross-sectional 
or longitudinal where the cross-sectional ones are carried out in different 
(preferably many but at least two) settings in order to get a “body of 
quantitative or quantifiable data in connection with two or more variables 
/…/ which are then examined to detect patterns of association” (Bryman 
& Bell 2007, p. 55).  Cross-sectional studies are carried out at a single 
point in time and the researcher is looking for variation and relationships 
between variables (that are not manipulated). A common problem with 
cross-sectional studies is to capture the directions of casual influence 
between the variables. Cross-sectional case-study mostly uses 
quantitative research methods but qualitative studies sometimes apply a 
cross-sectional design, e.g. by triangulation of the findings with both 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires.  Meglio and Risberg 
(2010) found that studies of mergers are often cross-sectional and based 
on secondary data or survey-based perception data. In our DE-merger 
research project it would be sufficient to triangulate the findings and 
make use of both qualitative and quantitative research. 
Longitudinal case-studies often follow a specific case in a specific 
context over time, and they are often used to map changes in business and 
management. In order to carry out a longitudinal study the data has to be 
collected on the same variables, with the same people, and/or 
organizations in at least two rounds (Bryman & Bell 2007). One problem 
is that people, participants in the study, could disappear between the data 
collection rounds which was a possibility in our DE-merger study. 
Longitudinal studies aim at understanding causal influence in a time 
perspective and are better equipped for dealing with the direction of 
causal influence than cross-sectional design.  Pettigrew (1990, p. 268) 
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found that longitudinal case-studies are valuable for investigating change 
by exploring “the context, content, and process of change together with 
their interconnections through time”. The longitudinal case-study 
provides an opportunity to a holistic in-depth understanding of real-life 
events (Yin 2003) which was an important objective for the study of the 
DE-merger and the PMI. Meglio and Risberg (2010) found longitudinal 
studies to be less common because they are time-consuming. 
Longitudinal approaches are often turned down in favour of cross-
sectional studies (Meglio & Risberg ibid.) as researchers need to publish 
their results and editorial boards seem to prefer cross-sectional studies 
(ibid.). Interpretative research can be carried out with a case-study 
method (Walsham 2006), which offers an opportunity to find keys to 
more successful mergers and PMI.  
The case-study method was found to be the most appropriate method 
of those that were evaluated for several reasons:  
 its focus on the triangulation of findings which could be helpful to 
prevent biased research findings 
 the opportunity of combining both quantitative and qualitative 
data collecting methods  
 the opportunity to gain a holistic in-depth understanding of the 
research problems and... 
 the longitudinal approach, that was found very useful for 
capturing the administrators’ opinion changes during the merger 
process.  
The longitudinal case-study method will be further presented and 
discussed below in section 3.3.  
 
3.3 Longitudinal case-studies 
The method chosen for the research project is a case-study that is much 
inspired by Yin’s work (Yin 2003; 2007) but also deeply influenced by 
Gummesson’s (2000) findings about the importance of pre-
understanding, understanding and internal access to the organizations that 
are studied.  Despite Gummesson (ibid.) advocating internal access and 
pre-understanding (i.e. pre-knowledge) of the research objects he is 
sceptical to case-studies in their traditional form (Gummesson 2007) 
since the development of case-studies as a research method seems to have 
stopped. The proposal is to combine case-study research with network 
theory in order to also obtain a combination also of quantitative and 
qualitative research; the latter more connected with case-studies and 
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social sciences research; the former with network theory applied in both 
social and natural sciences. However, the case-study approach by Yin 
(2003) proposes triangulation and the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative research.  Kaplan and Duchon (1988) emphasize the value of 
triangulation and the use of data from different sources, which they argue 
could bring out analytical mistakes and omissions. Because different 
research perspectives have their own limitations and possibilities a 
combination could make it possible to address a certain problem from 
more than one angle (ibid.). Longitudinal case-studies have been 
proposed for mergers in order to get a better theory base for decision 
making and IT integration (e.g.Wijnhoven et al. 2006).  However, 
Gummesson (2007, p. 232) warns for too much data, since “an abundance 
of data” could be mistaken for good quality of research. Gummesson 
(ibid.) refers to a discussion with Barney Glaser, co-creator of grounded 
theory, and argues that research should not be prolonged to the point that 
the productivity risks becoming diluted, which could happen if the 
research takes more than six months. Gummesson (2007) finds it 
counterproductive to divide research into natural and social sciences and 
considers qualitative and quantitative research to be just as important; 
there is no need to choose the winner or the winning concept. In the DE-
merger’s longitudinal case-study both quantitative and qualitative 
research were applied and found to be equally important. Gummesson 
(2007, p. 237) proposes that “quantitative elements” could be applied in 
case-studies – which they are in the longitudinal study carried out in this 
thesis.  
Cartwright and Cooper (1990) propose that research on the human side 
of mergers should start by collecting data from the start of a merger 
process, then continuing during the merger, and also after the merger 
has been completed. The fact that some studies need to be carried out in 
sensitive times during the merger could negatively affect gaining access 
to and being able to co-operate with the organizations involved.  
The target population of this study was administrators employed in 
either Org D or Org E. The administrators are key players in the two 
organizations and their achievements are crucial for the organizations’ 
performance. In the approaching merger the administrators were likely to 
experience changes in their terms of employment, in their IS, and in their 
current routines. Nevertheless, some administrators were omitted from 
the study; namely administrators employed at some central service 
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functions that were unlikely to be affected by IS changes during the 
merger process and the PMI.   
Weber and Camerer (2003) find a possible bias if studies of mergers 
are carried out in the merged organization only and showing the 
survivors’ opinions. This is a problematic issue and in the DE-merger 
there are a couple of interviewees that were leaving the organization. 
There was, however, no significant difference in how they expressed their 
opinions compared with the other administrators.  
The question of validity is as critical when case-studies are applied as 
in any other research; maybe even more so (Gummesson 2007). Was the 
research focused on obtaining answers to the research questions or was 
something else studied? Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that the 
credibility, transferability, dependability and comformability of research 
results should be evaluated in order to find out if the research is 
trustworthy or not. The likelyhood of other researchers repeating the 
studies and obtaining the same findings (e.g. Bell 2006) is low since the 
object of study is in a process of change. Nevertheless, it could be 
possible to get the same results in a similar organization in a similar 
context. As Gummesson (2007, p. 232) states on reliability: “This is 
usually not attainable when you study complex phenomena, especially 
when change is a major force”.  
Gummesson (2000) considers the researcher’s internal access to be 
important for case-studies; it should be possible to carry out data 
collection, to work out a relevant analysis, and to gain a deeper 
understanding of the research problem as time goes on. New 
understanding is input for more pre-knowledge and better opportunities to 
gain an even deeper, richer understanding, illustrating how the 
hermeneutic spiral works.  When the researcher has access within the 
organization and is allowed to participate in the ongoing discussions there 
is a better chance of finding out what is really taking place in the 
organization. Access to internal documents is also more probable in the 
case of internal access (Gummesson 2000). 
Also Pettigrew (1990) discusses the researcher’s involvement in the 
organizations that are studied and considers it to be a delicate and 
important problem to handle. There is a problem with researchers getting 
too involved: “Research is a social process not just a technical task. 
Equally well one should not get over-involved and ‘go native’.” 
(Pettigrew (ibid., p 278.). There was a clear risk in the DE-merger project 
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that the researcher would become over-involved. Hence it was important 
to triangulate the findings, and to keep away from the role of a consultant.   
The administrators that were included were hand-picked from 
information on the websites of Org D and Org E, and their participation 
was solicited through a direct e-mail to top managers and to the 
department chairs, as recommended by Bell and Opie (2002). The e-mail 
explained the objectives of the study and that the aim was to write a 
doctoral thesis. None of the managers objected to the longitudinal case-
study.  
It needs to be declared that the researcher has individual knowledge 
about the organizations in the DE-merger; knowledge that provides pre-
understanding of the problems studied and of the organizational culture. 
Full information on how/why is not revealed because some elements of 
the study need to be kept confidential. The researcher had a pre-
understanding/pre-knowledge of the research problems and the 
organizational culture present in the studied organizations. This was 
helpful during the construction of questionnaires and interview guides 
and the researcher also had access to internal documents and information 
about the merger. Some documents were official, but the pre-knowledge 
and understanding of the context made them easier to find. The 
administrators were fully aware of the author’s pre-knowledge (i.e. pre-
understanding) and made no negative remarks about it.  
Gummesson (2000) found the organizational culture to be difficult to 
understand for someone who only visits the organization because of a 
research project. Also Walsham (2006) argues that close involvement is 
good for in-depth access to data, to the organization including people and 
documents. This enables a level of participation beyond mere access to 
carry out interviews and questionnaires. Nevertheless, a researcher is 
always biased by background and frame of reference making it difficult 
to claim the role of neutral observers (Walsham 2006). There is a risk that 
insight into the studied organizations could lead to false assumptions and 
results if not handled properly; for example by triangulation of the 
findings (e.g. Yin 2003, 2007). It is also important that researchers 
“...engage others in the design and conduct of their studies” (Van de Ven 
2007, p. 193). 
Shotter’s (2006) withness-thinking in contrast to aboutness-thinking 
(a more traditional view of how empirical investigations should be 
performed) encouraged the use of existing pre-knowledge in support of 
Gummesson (2000). Withness-thinking deals with the procedures when 
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the researcher meets participants in a study and how the dialogue is 
actually carried out. An open-ended dialogue is suggested instead of a 
check-list for the interview; something which could “reduce and 
humiliate” the interviewee (Shotter 2006, p. 593). Data collection with 
questionnaires could be seen as totally contradictory to the interactivity 
that is implicit in the withness-thinking concept. Data collection with 
interviews proved the usefulness of withness-thinking. The interview 
guides took note of interviewees’ responses and they were able to 
develop the questions into themes they were especially interested in. 
Some of the findings on trust and rumours in research paper 8 are 
examples of this.    
In a longitudinal single-case study (Yin 2003) it is necessary to be 
careful about generalization (or external validity as it is sometimes 
called) of the findings. Bassey (1981) proposes that generalisation is 
possible even from single events and Gummesson (2000, pp. 97) argues 
that too much weight is given to generalization: 
“As long as you keep searching for new knowledge 
and do not believe that you have found the ultimate 
truth – rather the best available for the moment – the 
traditional demand for generalization becomes less 
urgent.”  
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
The data collection was carried out by reading documents, by using 
questionnaires, and by carrying out interviews (cf. fig. 7). Five empirical 
studies were accomplished; in three of them questionnaires were used for 
the data collection and two employed interviews.  
October2008
Starting point
Questionnaire
201 respondents
May 2009
30 Interviews
February 2010
Questionnaire
179 respondents
May 2010
29 Interviews
November 2011
Questionnaire
151 respondents
Documents  
Figure 7: An overview of the longitudinal case-study.  
In the following the data collection will be described, and the analysis 
will be briefly outlined. More information is available in the research 
papers no 1 – 8 (Part II). 
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3.4.1 Documents  
The access to the organizations described in section 3.3 allowed the 
researcher to study internal documents during the merger process. Some 
of the documents were official and available to the public; for example 
via the organizations’ web sites. Some documents were only internally 
distributed through e-mail, newsletters, and “house magazines”.  There 
was also a web forum that was available for all personnel, and 
information was distributed at several physical meetings during the 
merger process. The documents will not be listed in the reference list 
since it would reveal the real names of the organizations. There was a 
promise made about not revealing the names of the organizations when 
the case-study started and therefore this promise has to be kept. Pettigrew 
(1990) considers documents to be a source for facts, but warns against the 
danger of selective deposit and survival. Yin (2003, 2007) recommends 
reading documents as a means for triangulation. 
 3.4.2 Questionnaires 
Three studies used questionnaires for the data collection. The first of 
those was accomplished in autumn 2008, the second in winter 2010 and 
the third in winter 2011 as a follow-up study (c.f. fig. 8).  
 
October2008
Starting point
Questionnaire
201 respondents
February 2010
Questionnaire
179 respondents
November 2011
Questionnaire
151 respondents
The DE-merger is
carried out
2010-01-01
 
Figure 8: Three surveys using questionnaires for the data collection. 
The aim was to include all administrators in Org D and Org E. However, 
the information about the administrators was collected by the official 
websites’ contact information. In a few cases there was confusing 
information about employment and/or competences that led to a handful 
of individuals being contacted who were not actually administrators. The 
following rounds of questionnaires aimed at the same population, and no 
new members of the administrative staff were included for round two and 
three. Employees that objected to their participation, as they had moved 
to other types of work, were also removed from the original list of 
90 
 
administrators. Hence the administrators who were able to answer the 
questionnaires decreased throughout the studies. It is always problematic 
if individuals from a certain population leave during an ongoing case-
study and a main problem to consider is whether those leaving have had 
significantly different opinions.  
After the questionnaires were drafted they were pilot-tested by two 
persons within and two persons outside the relevant organisations. The 
pilot tests were conducted to improve the questions and to estimate the 
time required on the questionnaire. A web-based survey method was 
adopted for the questionnaires. The answers were given anonymously. 
Bell’s (2006) definition of anonymity was adopted and the researcher 
could not connect any answers to any respondent. Two reminders were 
sent during the 2-3 weeks that the questionnaires were available. The 
websurvey tool (Texttalk Websurvey) provided first analysis of the data, 
which was enhanced with SPSS. As recommended by Eliasson (2006) the 
correct coding of the data and entries in SPSS were carefully checked. 
3.4.2.1 The first survey – October 2008  
Because the first study was exploratory the questionnaire was extensive 
and maybe too ambitiously designed. All questions and the answering 
alternatives are available as an appendix in research paper 2 and a 
summary of how the questionnarie was designed is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1: The design of the questionnaire from the 2008 study. 
Opening part: Background information
Second part: About specific IS
Third part: About training/education, self-valued knowledge and competence,
opinions about the merger and the merger information received
Fourt part: More about specific IS
Final part: About what was regarded as important for working effectively, 
opinions about the respondents' contribution of value
Qustionnaire:
 
A total of 315 questionnaires were sent to the organisations (175 to Org 
D and 140 to Org E) with a covering letter. The questionnaire was 
available for a period of two weeks and two reminders were 
automatically sent by the websurvey system. 201 respondents filled in 
the questionnaires (102 from Org D and 99 from Org E). This gave a 
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preliminary response rate for Org D of 52 % and for Org E 72 % and a 
total response rate of 64 %. However, some web information was not 
updated and thus some received the questionnaire even though they had 
left their jobs or changed to another category of employment. With 
these persons excluded the definite response rate, and fall-offs are 
presented in table 2, and the gender distribution in table 3. 
 
Table 2: Response rate and fall-offs, survey 1. 
  Response rate   Fall-offs     
  Org D Org E  Total Org D Org E 
Total 
Survey 1 64% 73% 68% 36% 27% 32% 
The fall off is higher in Org D (36 %) than in Org E (27 %). There were 
differences in opinions about the merger depending on organization but 
it was not clear if this had any impact on the participation in the survey.  
 
Table 3: Gender distribution, survey 1. 
Respondents Fall-offs
Male Female Male Female
Survey 1 22% 78% 17% 83%
Gender distribution
Org D + Org E Org D + Org E
 
The gender distribution for the respondents and fall-offs is about the 
same. 
3.4.2.2 The second survey – February 2010 
This questionnaire was less extensive (appendix 2) based on the 
experience of analyzing the first one. This study was a follow-up after 
the merger and posed questions about changes of IS and routines, how 
those changes were perceived and how they influenced the work 
situation, the self-valued effectiveness and contribution of value, as 
well as training opportunities. The survey also asked for opinions about 
how the merged organization was perceived, development due to the 
merger, and if the respondents’ expectations were fulfilled or not.  
The distribution list was based on the administrator list from 2008. A 
total of 302 questionnaires were sent to the administrators employed in 
the former Org D and Org E. Before this the distribution list from the first 
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round was revised, and 13 administrators were removed who had left the 
new organization. As mentioned before, newly employed administrators 
were not included in the list because of the scope for the longitudinal case 
study.  
After the questionnaires were sent out, auto replies from the e-mail 
system provided information about 21 administrators that had left the 
organization thus the population was reduced to 281 administrators. A 
total of 179 respondents answered and submitted the questionnaires; see 
table 4 and 5 for the response rate, fall-off and gender distribution for 
both survey 1 and 2. As shown in the tables (4, 5) the two surveys gave 
similar response rates.   
 
 
Table 4: Response rate and fall-offs, survey 1 and 2. 
  Response rate   Fall-offs     
  Org D Org E  Total Org D Org E Total 
Survey 1 64% 73% 68% 36% 27% 32% 
Survey 2 60% 69% 64% 40% 31% 36% 
 
Table 5: Gender distribution, survey 1 and 2. 
Respondents Fall-offs
Male Female Male Female
Survey 1 22% 78% 17% 83%
Survey 2 21% 79% 15% 85%
Org D + Org E Org D + Org E
Gender distribution
 
 
The longitudinal case study followed the DE-merger process and, since 
the administrators were in the midst of this, it was likely to influence 
their opinions. Bell (2006) discusses the importance of acknowledging 
if there has been a particularly significant event just before a data 
collection that could influence the respondents’ answers. In University 
DE several administrators had recently been assigned IS and routines, 
which they had to learn to master. They were also expected to contibute 
to the development of work procedures together with new colleagues. 
Their work context had been changed and they had to find new ways of 
co-operating with colleagues on two campuses. They had high 
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expectations of the merger and the short time that had elapsed could 
make it difficult to answer the questionnaire.  The main reason for 
carrying out this study was to get an on-the-spot account of the 
administrators‘ opinions, especially in order to be able to compare with 
subsequent findings in the longitudinal perspective. No technical failure 
or any misunderstanding of the questionnaire was reported.  
3.4.2.3 The third survey – November 2011 
The third study that used questionnaires for data collection was carried 
out almost two years after the DE-merger. It was a short questionnaire, 
five questions in total (appendix 4). The questions concerned the 
administrators’ opinions of the work situation, about the support they got 
from their IS, and how the IS had been handled in the merger process. 
The participants had been informed of the ongoing longitudinal study 
and its aim in the autumn 2008. One respondent asked for an update of 
the research objectives but the other respondents seemed to remember the 
longitudinal case-study.  
The distribution list from round two was used without change; 
automatic reply mails showed some fall off and the websurvey system 
showed who had answered or who had not. It was possible to investigate 
the fall off and two strategies were applied. The names of those who had 
not answered were checked against the internal phone directory and on 
the web site for the new organization (University DE). There was still a 
possible source of error if people had changed their surnames. When the 
distribution list was updated in accordance with the auto replies, the 
phone list and web the response rate was calculated and the results are 
shown in tables 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6: Response rate and fall-offs, survey 1,2 and 3. 
  Response rate   Fall-offs     
  Org D Org E  Total Org D Org E Total 
Survey 1 64% 73% 68% 36% 27% 32% 
Survey 2 60% 69% 64% 40% 31% 36% 
Survey 3 60% 74% 67% 40% 26% 33% 
 
It is still not obvious what these figures actually tell, except that they 
are rather stable.  
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Table 7: Gender distribution, survey 1.2 and 3. 
Respondents Fall-offs
Male Female Male Female
Survey 1 22% 78% 17% 83%
Survey 2 21% 79% 15% 85%
Survey 3 20% 80% 16% 84%
Gender distribution
Org D + Org E Org D + Org E
 
 
It was necesseary to examine the group that did not respond. The 
gender distribution was the same as on the previous two surveys, and 
the distribution between the former Org D and Org E was about the 
same (table 7).  
There was a technical lapsus when the third questionnarie was sent 
out as the link to the questionnaire was missing (unintentionally 
removed). This was quickly noticed and a correct version was sent after a 
few minutes with an explanatory letter. A couple of people experienced 
problems with the send button that was placed below the comment field. 
These two incidents may have had a minor effect on the fall-off rate. 
3.4.3 Interviews 
During the research project there were two studies that used interviews 
for the data collection. The first was carried out in spring 2009 and the 
second in spring 2010 (cf. fig. 9).  
May 2009
30 Interviews
May 2010
29 Interviews
The DE-merger 
was
carried out
2010-01-01
 
Figure 9: Two studies that used interviews for the data collection. 
The procedures for those data collections are presented below. The main 
reason for employing interviews as a complement to the surveys was to 
combine various methods for a triangulation of the findings as 
recommended by Yin (2003). Another reason is that interviews allow for 
rephrasing to prevent misunderstanding and for follow-up questions when 
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relevant. The questions were open and semi-structured (appendix 1) and 
were possible to rephrase even if they were put in a pre-determined order 
(Andersson 1995). Lantz’s (1993) approach that interview questions can 
be analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively was followed.  
The measuring instruments need to be trusted to guarantee the 
consistency of repeat measures (Bell 2006; Trost 1994). In this case, the 
ongoing changes would probably influence the administrators’ opinoins 
throughout the case-study; they could change their opinions partly or 
totally. Hence, Yin (e.g. 2003) recommends that case-studies should be 
carefully documented; researchers could not expect surveys and 
interviews to give the same result if the studies are repeated. 
The interview questions were built on findings from earlier studies; 
the interviewees were familiar with the ongoing study and did not show 
any difficulties in understanding the questions (appendix 1 and 3) or 
putting them in relation to their own context. However, Gummesson 
(2000) claimed that interviewees are not always reliable since they could 
give what they believe is a appropriate answer for the situation, rather 
than their own opinion. Thång (1984) found that the interviewees often 
try to anticipate what answers the interviewer wants. Hence the two 
rounds of interviews were carried out in such a way that the interviewer 
was careful not to reveal thoughts, pre knowledge or expectations about 
the issues that were raised in the interviews. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. Kvale (2006) warns that transcriptions not 100 
% reliable because different transcribers can write/transcribe the same 
material in different ways, not using the same words. In order to minimize 
that risk the interviewer transcribed all interviews personally and the transcripts 
were compared with the recordings before they were deleted.  
 
3.4.3.1 The first interview round – May 2009 
The first study using interviews was realized in May 2009 as a follow-
up to the explorative study. The target population was administrators 
from Org D and Org E that had participated in the first study and 
answered positively to a question about their interest in participating in 
follow-up interviews. The procedure resulted in thirty administrators 
taking part in the first interview round; no one that had announced their 
interest for participation was rejected. The profiles of the interviewees 
are described in chapter 4.  
The interviewees were assured of confidentiality. Anonymity 
according to Bell (2006) is when not even the researcher can connect 
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answers to an indivitual, which is not feasible in a face-to-face interview 
situation. Hence the researcher gave the interviewees numbers referring 
to the order when they said yes to interview participation. This was a 
numbering that no one but the researcher could know, and it did not say 
anything about the interviewees’ positions or places of work. The 
ambition was that the interviewees should be able to feel confient and 
relaxed during the interview and they could choose location. Despite this, 
the interviewees usually chose their ordinary office. A few even said that 
they did not care if their participation was made official, but the 
researcher found it most important to treat all interviewees strictly 
confidentially. 
The NVIVO 8 software was utilized for the analysis. The software 
made it possible to store the interviews, to mark words/sentences and to 
create cases. The text was read several times (while considering the 
research questions) in order to fully understand the inherent meaning. 
During the reading interesting data was marked (i.e. coded) in NVIVO 8 
to facilitate the creation of categories for the qualitative analysis (cf. 
research papers no. 3 and no. 4).  
 
3.4.3.2 The second interview round – May 2010 
The second study was realized a year after the first round of interviews 
and about five months after the merger was carried out. The 
interviewees from the first round were contacted by email, and the 
second interview was arranged. The interviewees were already familiar 
with the procedure for the interview and with the researcher and were 
(as it seemed) confident of the confidential handling of their 
answers/opinions. The latter was a critical factor as the interviewees 
gave their opinions about the merger process and touched on sensitive 
issues. Without high confidence in the researcher’s integrity some 
information would probably have been withheld. The interviews were 
closed with a summary of the 2009 interview that offered the 
interviewees an option to object if they had conflicting opinions of what 
was said. All interviewees agreed to the summary of the previous 
interview. All of them were now familiar with the longitudinal case-
study and with the researcher.  
The interview questions were semi-structured and open-ended and 
also this time the author followed Lantz’s (1993) recommendation that 
interview questions should be analyzed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. This time the interviewees were asked to answer some of 
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the questions using a five-point Likert scale (appendix 3). The interviews 
were recorded and then transcribed literally. The interviewees were 
promised that the recordings would be treated as confidential which some 
of the participants found highly important. 
This time the analysis of the interviews was done stage by stage and 
the qualitative material was analyzed for themes while the aim of the 
study was clearly kept in the author’s mind. This was an interpretive 
process, in which the data was categorized; core meanings were found 
and grouped so that all discussed issues were noted. This process was 
inspired by Burnard’s (1991, 1996) method of thematic content analysis 
for analysing qualitative interview data in a stage-by-stage process. The 
transcripts were read several times and the researcher worked with 
several categories and sub-categories, which throughout the process were 
collapsed into broader themes/categories. Colour-pencils were used to 
mark the transcripts during the search in order to identify data that could 
be categorized into themes. The colour-coded data were collected 
together under the themes that had arisen. Burnard (1991) shows the need 
to be careful not to cut out strings of words so that the meaning risks 
being lost. With this in mind the author took particular care to ensure that 
the context was maintained as recommended (Burnard, 1991) and kept 
track of which interviewee (i.e. number) the items came from. This was 
important in order to be able to go back to the “right” transcript and get 
the complete text to quote if needed. Another reason for this rigorous handling 
of the materal was that it could be neccessary to re-check if there was any 
uncertainty while the categories/themes were re-considered.   
The answers registered on numerical scales were analysed with SPSS. 
The process is described in detail in order to show that care was taken to 
avoid subjective interpretations.  
 
3.5 Summary 
The longitudinal case-study method (Yin 2003) was chosen for the 
research project. The case-study methods are applicable both for 
organizational studies and for IS research which was one of the main 
reasons for choosing this method (Orlikowski & Barley 2001). 
Longitudinal studies of PMI are scarce (e.g. Alaranta 2008, Cartwright 
& Cooper 1990, Meglio & Risberg 2010, Olie 1994, Wijnhoven et al. 
2006), which was a motivation for using a longitudinal case-study to 
study the DE-merger: i) the case was available, and ii) the researcher 
had access an internal pre-knowledge. 
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Five studies have been carried out (so far) and the procedures of the 
data collection and the analysis are described. Document reading was a 
complement throughout the research which employed both qualitative 
and quantitative reseach in order to triangulate the findings.  Triangulation 
of the findings is important in a single case-study and when the researcher has 
pre-knowledge of the situation. Hence the use of data from different sources is 
recommended (e.g. Kaplan & Duchon 1988, Yin 2003). 
The author’s pre-knowledge and internal access was discussed and 
Gummesson’s (2000) arguments for more reliable research findings when 
the researcher has internal access were presented. Those arguments 
(Gummesson ibid.) were encouraging since there are also contradictory 
opinions about possible bias in cases where the researcher has pre-
knowledge of the case that is being studied (e.g. Weber & Camerer 2003).  
Questions about the validity and reliability of the research findings 
are always important and critical issues. In this case the research was 
based on a single case-study and the resarcher had internal knowledge of 
the situation before the research project started. Hence it is important to 
discuss the possibilities of biased findings, of validity, and of reliability. 
The document reading was an important source for getting an unbiased 
picture of the merger processes. The mix of surveys and interviews in the 
data collection was another step that was taken in order to prevent bias as 
was the researcher’s approach (to invite all and not hand-pick them) to 
the choice of interviewees. The strategy could easily have been 
problematic if more administrators (than 30) had agreed to the interviews.  
The reliability of case-studies builds on documenting the research 
process to allow for further analysis of the data and to test if the same 
findings/conclusions have been reached by other researchers (Yin 2003).  
The internal validity has to be focused to avoid false conclusions; 
triangulation is one way of avoiding this together with an awareness that 
there could be alternative explanations. In the DE-merger research the 
pre-knowledge and internal access to documents combined with 
following on-going discussions in the organizations offered opportunities 
to find explanations. 
External validity is always problematic in a single case-study (e.g. 
Gummesson, 2000). Some authors also find it possible to confirm external 
validity (Bassey 1981; Yin 2003). It is a common misunderstanding that this 
generalization should be applied to other case-studies. Instead the resluts should 
be generalized to theories that could be tested by replication (Yin 2003). In the 
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present case the main objective was to find keys that could facilitate the PMI of 
IS and administrators in a public sector merger.  
 
 
4 Findings  
Eight research papers (table 8) present the findings from the four case-
studies realized between the autumn 2008 and spring 2010 (sections 4.1 – 
4.4). A fifth study was carried out as this thesis was being written in 
order to give an updated account of the situation about two years after the 
DE-merger (section 4.5) including the administrators’ feelings, 
perceptions and opinions about how IS had been handled.  
 
Table 8: The relations between the studies and the research papers. 
Study carried out in: Related research papers: 
October 2008 Paper 1 (Lundqvist 2009) & Paper 2 
(Lundqvist 2010a) 
May 2009 Paper 3 (Lundqvist 2010b) & Paper 4 
(Lundqvist2010c)  
February 2010 Paper 6 (Lundqvist 2011b) & Paper 7 
(Lundqvist 2011c) 
May 2010 Paper 5 (Lundqvist 2011a) & Paper 8 
(Lundqvist 2012) 
November 2011 The Summary 
 
The main findings from the studies will be presented in a summarized 
form and detailed accounts are given on the research papers. Extracts that 
relate to a specific research paper are drawn from those e.g. Interviewee 
x, p. x, Lundqvist 2011a. Material that has not been included in any 
related paper simply refers to the time when the actual study was 
realized, e.g. Interviewee x, May 2010. References that are marked 
Administrator x, November 2011, relate to comments from the fifth 
study, but which have not been published in any research paper (section 
4.5). 
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4.1 The starting point for the case-study - an explorative 
study in 2008  
The explorative study was the starting point for the longitudinal case-
study (cf. fig. 10). The research papers that were generated by the study 
are no. 1 (Lundqvist 2009) and no. 2 (Lundqvist 2010a). 
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Figure 10: The first study and related research papers. 
Changes affecting an organization’s IS often affects the administrators’ 
work as they depend on IS to fulfil their duties.  The study also looked 
into the administrators’ opinions of what was required to be effective and 
if they felt they contributed value to the organization: – their self-valued 
effectiveness and value contribution. The findings provided much 
background information (table 9) that was useful for a fundamental 
understanding of the administrators in Org D and Org E.  
4.1.1 Profile of the respondents 
There were three times more female than male respondents. The vast 
majority was permanently employed, had academic education, and had a 
period of employment that had lasted ten years or more. About a third of 
the participants had changed tasks 3-5 times and almost as many had 
changed their place of work (either office or department) during their 
period of employment. Descriptive characteristics of the respondents are 
summarised in table 9. 
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Table 9: The profile of the respondent group (N=201). (Lundqvist 2009) 
Variables:             Frequency: Organisation D Organisation E Total D + E 
Employed at  
Org D 102             51.0%  
201 100.0 % 
Org E  99                   49.0% 
Gender 
Female 75               73.5% 81                  81.8% 156          77.6 % 
Male 27               26.5% 18                  18.2%   45          22.4 % 
Education  
level 
Vocational 
education 
  0                 0.0%   1                    1.0%     1             0.5 % 
High school 12               11.8%    23                   23.2%   35          17.4 % 
Academic 
courses 
16               15.7% 12                   12.1%   28          13.9 % 
Academic 
degree 
73               71.6% 61                   61.6% 134          66.7 % 
Other   1                 1.0%   2                     2.0%     3             1.5 % 
Age 
21 – 30     7                 6.9%   8                     8.1%   15             7.5 % 
31 – 40   25               24.5% 33                   33.3%   58          28.9 % 
41 – 50   44               43.1% 34                   34.3%   78          38.8 % 
51 – 60   16               15.7% 17                   17.2%   33          16.4 % 
61 – 65     9                 8.8%   7                     7.1%   16             8.0 % 
66 –   1                 1.0%   0                     0.0%     1             0.5 % 
Form of  
employment 
Permanent 88               86.3% 78                   78.8% 166          82.6 % 
Project   5                 4.9% 11                   11.1%   16             8.0 % 
Substitute   9                 8.8% 10                   10.1%   19             9.5 % 
On hourly basis   0                 0.0%   0                     0.0%     0    0.0 % 
 Period of  
employment 
< ½ year   3                 2.9%   5                     5.1%     8             4.0 % 
  ½ –  1 year 16               15.7%   9                     9.1%   25          12.4 % 
 2 –   5 years 23               22.5% 19                   19.2%   42          20.9 % 
 6 – 10 years 26               25.5% 29                   29.3%   55          27.4 % 
> 10 years 34               33.3% 37                   37.4%   71          35.3 % 
Changed tasks 
0 times 18               17.6% 15                   15.2%   33          16.4 % 
1 –   2 times 35               34.3% 31                   31.3%   66          32.8 % 
3 –   5 times 33               32.4% 40                   40.4%   73          36.3 % 
6 – 10 times 12               11.8%   7                     7.1%   19             9.5 % 
> 10 times   4                 3.9%   6                     6.1%   10             5.0 % 
Changed  
place of work  
0 times 42                41.2% 23                   23.2%   65          32.3 % 
1 – 2 times 35                34.3% 36                   36.4%   71          35.3 % 
3 – 5 times 18                17.6% 26                   26.3%   44          21.9 % 
> 5 times   7                  6.9% 14                   14.1%   21          10.4 %  
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4.1.2 Main findings 
The study found that a majority of the respondents (62.7 %) thought that 
the probability of their duties changing after the merger was “Very high” 
or “Rather high”. However, about a third (35.3 %) thought their chances 
of influencing work related changes during and after as being “Very low” 
or “Rather low”. Despite this a majority (56.7 %) had a “Very positive” 
or “Rather positive” attitude towards the merger.  A majority (59.7 %) 
also found the information that was given about the DE-merger to be 
“Very clear” or “Rather clear” (Lundqvist 2009).  
About two-third (69.4) of the respondents stated that they viewed 
their present IS as being “Very good” or “Rather good” (Lundqvist 
2009). Three quarters of the system users (75.7 %) felt that the IS 
facilitated their work. Despite this 21.9 % viewed their IS as inflexible, 
about a quarter (25.3 %) thought that the IS increased productivity, and 
34 % believed their overall IS improved quality. A full third found that 
their IS in general were easy to use (the respondents were often users of 
several systems which was taken into consideration) (Lundqvist 2010a). 
Over a third (37 %) of the users estimated that they used their IS only 
occasionally during their working hours and 15 % that they used their 
overall IS “A great deal of the time”. The remaining users were in 
between these extremes on a seven degree scale. How much time, in 
minutes/hours, the alternatives (on the 7-grade scale) actually represented 
was not further described in the question and was up to the respondents’ 
own judgement. Hence the conclusion that could be drawn from that 
specific question is only the respondents’ own estimates of how much 
they use their IS.  
Some questions asked more specifically about groups of IS: 44 % of 
the users answered that they use the financial system a few times weekly 
and 30 % that they use system F1 (one of several financial systems) daily. 
The personnel administration systems were used “A few times weekly” 
of 37 % and “A few times monthly” of 35 %. Just over a third (35 %) of 
the administrators used their production systems “Daily” and 24 % used 
them “A few times weekly”. A majority (54 %) of the users wanted to 
keep their current IS and further develop them instead of replacing them 
as part of the DE-merger (Lundqvist 2010a).  
A majority (53.3 %) of the respondents considered the system training 
they had been offered as “Very good” or “Rather good” (Lundqvist 
2009). However, 28 % of the administrators had not received any training 
on the IS that they considered to be most crucial (self-valued) for their 
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performance. More than half of those who did not approve of the training 
found it to have been too superficial, and given too early before they 
started to use the system. Of those who were satisfied a majority found it 
positive that training was given close to the system implementation. They 
also considered a trustworthy instructor to have been important for their 
satisfaction (Lundqvist 2010a). A majority were confident of their ability 
to learn how to use new IS (≈ 90%) and of their IS knowledge (≈ 75 %) 
(Lundqvist 2009).  56 % of the IS users found their IS easy to learn 
(Lundqvist 2010a). There was a relatively strong positive correlation 
between the respondents’ views on the opportunities for merger related 
learning and their opinions about the merger (Lundqvist 2009).  
The two key issues required for effectiveness identified by the 
administrators were “I like my job assignment” (82 %) and “I’m allowed 
to take responsibility for my work” (83.5 %). The two issues that were 
marked by the fewest of the respondents are “I only need to register the 
same thing once” (48.2 %) and “I only need to check the same thing 
once” (45.2 %). (Nevertheless, even these alternatives were marked by a 
significant number of the administrators.) The issue of IS dependency 
was the fifth most marked alternative among the ten that were given, a 
fact that holds true for both organizations. Several alternatives could be 
chosen (see appendix in research paper 2, Lundqvist 2010a). 
The analysis showed a significant majority of positive attitudes on 
how useful the administrators believe they are for their organization; 87 
% of the respondents from Org D and 91 % from Org E, marked the 
alternatives “Very often” or “Rather often” in answer to the question if 
they were convinced of their contribution of value to the organization. 
The remaining minority answered “Very seldom”, “Rather seldom” or 
“Neutral” (Lundqvist 2010a). 
A hypothesis test (Field 2009) showed that there were some, however 
small, differences between the administrators’ opinions of the DE-merger 
depending on which organization they were employed at. Furthermore, 
the administrators in Org E (76.8 %) found the information to be clearer 
than those from Org D (43.1 %) (Lundqvist 2009). 
  
4.1.3 Main conclusions from the first study  
A majority of the respondents were confident in their ability to use new 
systems and of their IS knowledge. They were also confident about 
their ability to learn new IS. In the literature (e.g. Davis 1986; Hodgson 
& Aiken 1998; Park et al. 2008; Venkatesh et al 2002) the need for user 
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acceptance of new technology is emphasized because the 
implementation of new IS depends greatly on how the users accept it. 
Hence IS training is an important issue (ibid.); a majority found good 
opportunities for learning new IS skills in the merger, and a majority 
was satisfied with the training they received earlier. However, 28 % had 
not received any training in the system they most depended on. 
Nevertheless, the findings showed administrators had good self-
confidence in IS skills and their ability to learn to handle new IS.  
A majority wanted to keep their IS and to further develop it; they did 
not want to replace it. Most of the systems were considered easy to learn 
and facilitated the administrators’ work. However, approximately a 
quarter of the respondents felt they increased productivity and only about 
a third thought that they improved quality. The respondents were positive 
to changes due to the merger and this could be related to the opportunities 
of developing the IS. The findings show that the administrators needed IS 
that worked well and contributed to their effectiveness, confirming the 
results often found in the literature of organizational dependency on IS 
(e.g. Andersen 1994; Langefors 1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009).  
However, in retrospect the fifth place was possibly not so prominent 
but the alternatives that were available for the respondents were less well-
formulated in that they measured different categories of values. The 
alternatives that were the most highly ranked (i.e. important) concerned 
the work climate/atmosphere and others like efficient IS had more to do 
with the technical features and work routines. The administrators’ 
opinions of what they regarded as most important in order to be effective 
highlights the need for acknowledging the human factors in mergers. 
However, there are warnings in the literature (e.g. Bashein & Markus 
1994; Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Ko et al. 2009; McKiernan & Merali 1995; 
Shrivastava 2007; Sirkin et al. 2005) against being too focused on human 
issues at the expence of “harder” issues which could effectively put an 
end to the changes or at least aggravate the PMI if it (the hard side) is 
ignored.  
The respondents expected changes that were likely to have an impact 
on their work situation but perceived that their influence on the changes 
would be small. Nevertheless, a majority was positive to the DE-merger. 
Frommer (2001) found the prevailing expectations about a merger have 
an impact on both the attitudes and the commitment to a merger, making 
positive expectations promising for the PMI. Nevertheless, the hypothesis 
testing showed that there were some differences in opinion about the 
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merger depending on which organization the respondents were employed 
in (Lundqvist 2009). Frommer’s (ibid.) theory could also be a problem if 
the expectations are not fulfilled in the merger. Also Bashein and Markus 
(1994) point out the problems of unrealistic expectations. 
The respondents from Org E were more satisfied with the information 
about the DE-merger than those from Org D. A lot of advice in the 
literature deals with the need to communicate the change message in a 
proper way (e.g. Bashein & Markus 1994; Gall 1991; Hallier 2000; Ketz 
de Vries & Balazs 1997; van Knippenberg et al. 2006; Lewis et al. 2010; 
Mishra 1990; Napier et al. 1989; Schweiger & Denisi 1991; Schweiger & 
Weber 1989; Shrivastava 2007; Smith 2005): by varying the modes of 
communication, informing even if there is nothing new to tell, not 
withholding informataion even if it is unfavourable for the employees and 
acknowledging those who are negative about the changes. 
The findings showed that the respondents believed that they 
contributed value to their organizations. Employees that are sure of their 
working abilities and skill levels are usually more inclined to trust their 
leaders than those who are less satisfied with their own contribution to 
the organization (cf. Podsakoff et al. 1996). 
4.2 The second study – carried out in May 2009 
The study was realized in May 2009 (cf. fig. 11) and the related 
research papers are no. 3 (Lundqvist 2010b) and no. 4 (Lundqvist 
2010c). Thirty administrators were interviewed, after they had agreed to 
the researcher’s request during the first survey; none of those who 
accepted the interview invitation was omitted. The interviewees could 
choose where the interviews were carried out, but a majority preferred 
their ordinary office. They were promised confidentiality, and therefore 
referred to by numbers that do not refer to their post, place of work, or 
their competence. Furthermore, the recordings were deleted after 
trancription by the researcher. 
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Figure 11: The second study and related research papers. 
4.2.1 Profile of the interviewees 
There were 38 % female and 62 % male interviewees from Org D and 
71 % female and 29 % male from Org E. More than half (54 %) of the 
participants from Org D and from Org E (64 %) were between 41 - 60 
years. The vast majority (Org D=77 % and Org E=94 %) worked with 
production systems or with a combination of IS where production 
systems were included: the financial systems, the personal 
administration and the HR (human resources) systems and other 
administrative IS that handle student-related issues, e.g. registration, 
monitoring/entering study results, certificates, making reservations and 
booking premises/classrooms.   
 
4.2.2 Main findings 
The overall findings show that the administrators were very positive to 
the information that was given about the merger; 83.3 % were satisfied 
in many respects.  The information was given through various channels, 
such as web-sites, e-mails, newletters and physical meetings (with top 
management representatives present) and given shortly after decisions 
were made. There was also information about postponed/delayed 
decisions. 
Nevertheless about a third (36.6 %) lacked individual information 
about what would happen to them after the merger. They might have to 
leave their job, change their place of work and leave their colleagues. 
They could also be forced to replace their IS and change their ingrained 
routines. Some interviewees were concerned about the physical distance 
between the two campuses and were worried about being able to 
continuously meet the students’, teachers’ and researchers’ needs and 
demands. Another worry was the prospect of less challenging tasks 
(degradation) and not having the time to carry out the necessary changes. 
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Some were worried that managers in charge of IS and technical decisions 
did not have the proper qualifications to decide on important and 
complicated issues. The main reason was that those in charge were often 
neither IS- nor IT professionals. These combined factors could have 
given the administrators cause for concern, but a majority (56.6 %) was 
positive and enthusiastic about the merger and were not worried (76.6 %) 
about it. A clear majority (76.6 %) believed that they would be able to 
influence their work situation after the DE-merger (Lundqvist 2010b).  
Half of the interviewees talked about the fact that the management 
had not yet been appointed and they considered that to be the reason why 
there was no information about many administrators’ jobs and positions. 
They also saw it as a reason for postponed and delayed decisions about 
what would happen to the IS (Lundqvist 2010b).  
The administrators were satisfied with their IS as 83.3 % considered 
them to be supportive even if some problems like inflexibility and 
difficulties to learn and to manage were mentioned (Lunqvist 2010b). 
Half of the administrators were not sure about whether there would be 
any system training or not; 23.3 % knew that they would be trained and 
16.6 % did not think they would need it because they expected to use the 
same IS as before the merger (Lundqvist 2010c).  
The findings showed that the administrators’ competencies had been 
utilized at least to some degree in the merger; only 20 % expressed that 
their competencies had not been used and 16.6 % had no opinion or did 
not say anything about it. Participation in merger projects was promoted 
and this was seen as a good way to use one’s knowledge. The 
interviewees were asked if they found the merger to be a good time for 
carrying out changes: 
 
“Yes, because you have a totally different authority for 
carrying out changes and also a greater understanding. 
Besides, if this is dealt with it is a better foundation for the 
new organization – that is totally clear. But it is very 
important to realize it in due time! Trying to do much in a 
short time could lead to a catastrophe.” (Interviewee 30, May 
2009)  
 
The administrators often participated in merger projects beside their 
ordinary duties and were positive to carrying out changes in the merger 
processes: 
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”It is a convenient time to take the opportunity of carrying 
out changes [author’s comment: changes of IS]. Absolutely, a 
good opportunity of doing so and that goes for the 
organization too” (Interviewee 1, May 2009) 
This finding conflicted with what is often mentioned in the literature 
(e.g. Abrahamsson 2000) about resitance to change, as a clear majority 
(93.3 %) was positive  and open-minded to reengineering duties, 
routines and processes.  
4.2.3 Main conclusions from the second study  
This follow-up study confirmed the findings from the first, explorative 
study that a clear majority was positive to the merger and looked 
forward to it and that the communication was, in general, good. 
However, important information was missing about positions, tasks, 
and location after the merger  and it was uncertain if  there would be 
any training on new IS or not. It is often recommended that information 
should be extensive in a merger process, rather more than necessary, 
because there can hardly be too much information in a merger (e.g. 
Applebaum et al. 2000a, 2000b; Bashein & Markus 1994; Caudron 
1996; Ford & Ford 2009; Institute for Government 2010; Marks & 
Cutcliffe 1988). Nevertheless, the lack of individual information did not 
cause any negative feeling on the part of the administrators.The 
information strategy mainly confirmed the advice in the literature 
(ibid.) which might have helped the administrators overlook the lack of 
individual information. 
The administrators felt that their competencies and knowledge were 
acknowledged, a factor that is often stressed in the literature to prevent 
employee resistance to changes/mergers (e.g. Drucker 2008; Empson 
2000; Ford & Ford 2009; Shrivastava 2007; Zmud & Cox 1979). 
Allowing and facilitating employee participation in the change processes 
is recommended (ibid.). Inviting the personnel to participate in the 
merger/change processes is a way of making use of their knowledge and 
facilitating participation.  
The fact that both top management and other managers were not 
appointed on time caused some worry among the administrators and they 
thought that this was the reason that some decisions were delayed. In the 
literature it is often emphasized that the managers who are to be in charge 
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after the merger should participate throughout the merger processes, from 
the pre-merger planning to the PMI. There are several reasons for this: to 
reduce uncertainty and disagreement between the personnel and the 
managers (Bashein & Markus 1994) and to make sure that the managers 
can participate in the IS strategizing, in the decision making and in the 
trust building in order to facilitate a successful PMI (e.g. Empson 2000; 
Epstein 2005; Erkama 2010; Lewis et al. 2010; Schweiger & Goulet 
2000; Shrivastava 2007).  
The administrators were positive to reengineering initiatives of their 
duties. The human perspective of BPR is important not least as a 
counterbalance to the technical decisions (Bashein & Markus 1994; 
Cooper & Markus 1995; Drucker 2008; Grey & Mitev 1995; Harmon 
2007; Harrington et al. 1997; Mishra & Spreitzer 1998; Ranganathan & 
Dhaliwal 2001; Senge 1995; Vakola & Rezgui 2000). 
The administrators were satisfied with their IS that they regarded as 
supportive. Administrators usually depend on their IS (e.g. Andersen 
1994; Hoffer et al. 2002; Langefors 1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009) to 
carry out their tasks as the organizations in turn depend on the 
administrators to carry out their duties (Katz 1974; Simon 1971). 
4.3 The third study - carried out in February 2010 
Research papers no. 6 and no. 7 relate to the third study realized in 
February 2010. Figure 12 shows the research process. The 
questionnaire was sent to those who had participated in the last survey 
(in 2008) and had remained in the new organization. More 
administrators had now left the organization; thus, 281 administrators 
had the opportunity to answer the questionnaire. 
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Figure 12: The third study and related research papers. 
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4.3.1 Profile of the respondents 
The total response rate is 64 % (Org D 60 % and Org E 69 %). A 
majority (78 %) of the participants are female (Org D = 75.5 %; Org E 
= 82.4 %) and 31 % are younger than 41 years (Org D = 28.7 %; Org E 
= 33 %). Before the merger 52.5 % of the respondents were employed 
at Org D and 47.5 % at Org E.  
4.3.2 Main findings 
Shortly after the DE-merger the findings showed that a majority (58 %) 
of the respondents wished for further organizational development, both 
of the routines and the IS, and they thought that those who were in 
charge of the merger should have better exploited the opportunities for 
further development:  
 
“It is important that the IS supports and optimizes the 
business. Before the IS is changed it is important to figure out 
how the work should be done, to investigate the routines and 
the procedures. I think that there has been too little time for 
new thoughts.” (Commentator 32, February 2010)  
 
A minority, 15 %, considered that the management did what was 
necessary to carry out changes in the DE-merger. However, 40 % 
believed that the changes in routine that were actually realized had 
impacted negatively on their work situation whilst the realized IS 
changes were considered by 27 % to have had a negative impact on 
their work situation.  Some examples of how new IS had influenced the 
work situation negatively are: problems with user accounts and getting 
access to some IS away from the ordinary workplace/office; the “old” 
systems were used instead of looking for new solutions and a lack of 
support/manuals for some applications. The need for a lot more 
travelling negatively impacted the work situaion and new IS (hard to 
distinguish from routines per se) take time to master. There is often also 
a lack of consensus on the best practices/routines to implement in the 
new university (when other and different routines have been used 
before the merger).  
There were no differences depending on gender (Mann-Whitney U-
test) or age (Kruskal-Wallis test) in the opinions about how IS and 
routine changes influenced the work. However, the Mann-Whitney U-test 
showed differences depending on the former employer (r = - 0,22; 
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mdn=3); in any case the influence was found to be small (below .3) 
(Lundqvist 2011b). 
The IS were considered to be satisfactorily supportive by a majority 
(57 %). A majority had experienced, “Totally” or “Partly”, changed IS(78 
%) and routines (79 %). Of those who had not been exposed to changes 
26 % wished for routine changes and 19 % for IS changes (Lundqvist 
2011b). 
There was still some uncertainty about opportunities for user training; 
39 % of those who had changes in their routines did not know if they 
would receive training or not, and 38 % had neither recedived training 
nor would they get any. The corresponding figures for IS changes were 
29 % that did not know about whether they would be offered training or 
not, and 27 % that neither had nor would have training because of IS 
changes. Regardless of these findings there was no specific demand for 
training (Lundqvist 2011c).  
The findings indicate that the administrators still considered their 
knowledge as utilized and that they contributed value to the organization 
(89 %), “Mostly” or “Always”, and that they worked effectively (72 %), 
“Mostly” or “Always” (Lundqvist 2011c). 
4.3.3 Main conclusions from the third study  
A majority believed they created value and were effective even after the 
DE-merger was realized. Participation and opportunities for being 
effective are important reasons for involving employees in a merger 
(e.g. Drucker 2008). It is also important that managers work together 
with their employees in order to find good solutions for how to deal 
with change  (e.g. Cooper & Markus 1995).  
There was still uncertainty about training but the study did not find 
that it was particularly expected either. The administrators showed high 
self-confidence regarding their IS-skills and their ability to carry out their 
tasks and they were also confident of their ability to learn new IS (section 
4.3, Lundqvist 2009). Expectations could have an impact on mergers and 
PMI (Frommer 2001), and positive expectations could turn to negative if 
not fulfilled. After the DE-merger the respondents were disappointed that 
there was less organizational development than expected. 
The changes to routines and IS that were actually carried out were 
considered by some to have had a negative influence on the work 
situation; the routine changes more than the IS changes. This discontent 
could be connected to the fact that there were high expectations that the 
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merger would lead to organizational development and change. The 
administrators did not perceive the reengineering attempts that were made 
satisfying since they had expected more significant changes. Common 
wisdom and findings from earlier research (e.g. Abrahamsson 2000; 
Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Cartwrights & Cooper 1995; Empson 2000; 
Gash & Orlikowski 1991; Herron et al. 1999; Kotter & Schlesinger 2008; 
Lawrence 1969; Schweiger et al 1987; Smith 2005; Washingon & Hacker 
2005) were challenged since the administrators did not show resistance to 
change. There is advice in the literature (e.g. Ford & Ford 2009; Nyberg 
& Mueller 2009; Lewis et al. 2010) about the importance of looking 
positively at naysayers; their objections could be relevant.  
The findings indicated that the administrators could make use of their 
knowledge in University DE as was also the case before in Org D and 
Org E. The opportunity to make use of one’s knowledge and skills is 
often a facilitator for coping with changes (e.g. Ford & Ford 2009; 
Ruggles 1998; Shrivastava 2007). 
4.4 The fourth study – carried out in May 2010 
The research papers 5 and 8 relates to the fourth study, realized in 
spring 2010 (cf. fig. 13). The same group of administrators, who were 
interview in May 2009, were contacted for a new interview to which 
they had agreed a year previously; only one person could not participate 
in the second round. As before, the administrators could choose the 
location for the interview and they were promised confidentiality. The 
same numbers were used as in the last interview; the interviewees’ 
identities were hidden and the recordings were deleted as before. 
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Figure 13: The fourth study and related research papers.  
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4.4.1 The profile of the interviewees 
There were 55 % female and 45 % male administrators among the 
interviewees. Before the DE-merger 55 % of the interviewees were 
employed in Org E and 45 % in Org D. 62 % belonged to either one of 
the age groups 41 – 50 years and 51 – 60 years. 72 % said that they 
retained the same duties, nevertheless, 86 % had new routines and 80 % 
had got updated or replaced IS.  A majority, 86 %, had not changed 
their place of work after the merger was carried out. 
4.4.2 Main findings 
After the DE-merger the administrators experienced a more complex 
work situation, and 75.8 % of the respondents found it harder to tell if 
they created value or not. There appeared to be different views about 
how routines should be carried out in University DE and some thought 
that it was problematic to discuss with the “other” side because:   
 
“It is hard for two parties to agree on mutual routines when 
they do not speak the same language in the first 
place“(Interviewee 13, p. 93, Lundqvist 2011a).  
 
There were opinions about the lack of continuity regarding 
management of the IS/IT-department: 
 
“I am not sure whether the reason is that the IS-manager is 
not going to be operative until the autumn or the fact that the 
appointments of the managers have not accompanied the 
merger process. I mean it is rather late and I know that the 
proposal [authors comment: for the new IT-manager] has 
been ready for some time now but then the second top 
manager should be appointed first in order to have his/her say 
about it and should for example meet that person and so on... 
The person that was suggested for the job could not leave 
his/her position immediately and had also a planned leave 
from work after that - so it will take eight months before the 
manager finally is working.” (Interviewee 22, May 2010) 
 
There was some misunderstanding concerning how the IS were 
chosen for the new University (e.g. section 1.3). Some criticized 
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the fact that the “other side’s” IS were applied more often and 
found it to be unfair that their IS were not favoured: 
 
“Org E demanded us to adapt to all their IS. Our systems 
were better! It is sleepless nights!” (Interviewee 5, p. 96, 
Lundqvist 2011a) 
 
However, there were a couple of interviewees with knowledge of 
the reality behind the choice of IS-solutions – as the example below 
shows: 
 
“I actually know how they think at the IT-department and if 
there is an IS that is working well – or let us say that they 
have two systems that are working well, they have to agree 
on using one of them. They do not take in new IS if there 
already are IS that are working well – just because of the time 
constraints.” (Interviewee 22, May 2010).  
 
The choices of IS for the University DE were based on the following 
criteria: i) if the IS was used in both the former organizations the 
implementation (if they differed) that worked best was chosen and ii) if 
different IS were applied the system that was chosen should be working 
well and provide the best opportunities for scalability. 
There were opinions about lowered effectiveness after the merger. The 
distance between the campuses as well as more problems than expected 
with the use of e-meeting tools were often mentioned as reasons: 
 
”Well, then we should apply video conference facilities – 
because if we did, that would solve all the problems – I 
wish....we sat down in a conference room and the others sat at 
their meeting table, tight together, while we sat more 
outspread. There was only one loudspeaker available so we 
could hear what they said but they did not hear us because 
there was no mobile microphone available so we had to move 
around.” (Interviewee 5, May 2010); 
”I do not think the systems are so difficult but the e-meeting 
program was actually more difficult to learn – but we got 
proper training though - provided by an external part. It was 
good, but after that I have not come any closer to actually 
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using it. It was the intention that it should be used for 
communication with Org E /.../ But when I want to start using 
it – I am ready to do so! /.../ However, the technology is not 
always that good and here we have experienced that the 
sound is fluctuating and when it happens we think that the 
problems are related to the ‘other’ side.” (Interviewee 8, May 
2010);  
“The technology could fail and then the ‘other’ side is 
irritated and the situation becomes stressful.” (Interviewee 19, 
May 2010);   
“We need some training on the web meeting systems - or a 
better manual should be available in the e-meeting room. We 
use them often for our departmental meetings and before we 
could not show pictures but now we can - if we only knew 
how. /.../ Perhaps a clearer manual would be enough to 
inform about news in the e-meeting room.” (Interviewee 2, 
May 2010) 
Despite the criticism, there were also (a few) opinions about the e-
meeting facilities to enable co-operation:  
 
“The e-meeting tools – they work very well. We use mostly 
Adobe Connect and we have furnished some premises so it is 
possible to use the system together in a group or we could 
also use the program from home and it is very good to have 
the opportunity to choose.” (Interviewee 7, May 2010) 
It was also often mentioned that travelling between the two campuses 
was both time-consuming and tiresome. Hence it was even more 
problematic that the e-meeting tools were not as easy to use as they had 
expected. Furthermore, many found it important to meet in person – and 
not only by e-meeting facilities.  
More fragmentation of the workday, was experienced by nearly half of 
the interviewees (48 %), but 24 % experienced less fragmentation.  A 
main problem regarding the fragmentation seemed to be a lot of 
interruptions during the work day (mostly related to the merger). As 
two of the interviewees expressed it: 
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 “If I should be able to accomplish what I really should be 
doing then I have to go home and work from there.” 
(Interviewee 23, p. 94, Lundqvist 2011a); 
 
“Generally there is more fragmentation now because of the 
two locations – otherwise you could meet in the staff-room 
and work things out during coffee-breaks.” (Interviewee 18, 
p. 94, 2011a) 
 
Lowered productivity was experienced by about half of the respondents 
(52 %). This was often attributed to new routines and IS. In some cases 
communication problems were mentioned as a reason: 
 
Personal chemistry and the fact that we worked at different 
sites but in the same departments made it difficult to do 
precisely the same things and we worked in differing ways, 
had different routines – even if the duties were basically the 
same /.../ it was almost too delicate a subject” (Interviewee 
16, p. 96, Lundqvist 2011a). 
 
The new routines and IS were not fully implemented and even though 
the administrators had carried out practically the same duties they had 
applied different routines in many cases. Because there were more 
colleagues to take into account it was perceived more troublesome to 
carry out changes and to reach consensus on various matters:  
 
“There are more departments to take into consideration – 
routine changes take more time because there are more 
employees involved.” (Interviewee 1, p. 95, Lundqvist 
2011a); 
 
“There are very different ways of working in Org D and in 
Org E – so, if I suggest something that Org E has done before 
it is not appreciated by those from Org D and vice versa... 
and I do not believe that is has anything to do with the 
suggestions per se.” (Interviewee 6, May 2010)  
The administrators had very positive expectations about the merger and 
the organizational changes that they expected (section 4.1, 4.2). After the 
merger those expectations were often not fulfilled: 
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“Well, this modern organization... – actually, it is not that 
very modern nor is the management style modern – in fact, 
quite the opposite – it is rather dated. I feel disappointed 
because it did not turn out to be that modern organization – it 
was more of a package with the intention of appearing to be 
modern.” (Interviewee 26, p. 71, Lundqvist 2012) 
 
The administrators participated in several merger-related projects before 
the merger. Hence it was not appreciated that ongoing IS-projects were 
stopped after the merger without any explanation (when the new top 
management was appointed):  
 
“We had a situation where we had a plan and provided that it 
had been carried out things would have been in order. /.../ 
During the autumn (and we started over a year ago) we 
worked with a proposal for a new structure. No decisions 
were taken but the former managers found it to be very good. 
We worked together, Org D and Org E, and had a tangible 
proposal but we have not heard anything since the merger – it 
is just gone and nothing else has been proposed instead.” 
(Interviewee 22, p. 71, Lundqvist 2012) 
 
A majority (69.2 %) of those who experienced routine changes 
considered them to be more time-consuming. IS changes were estimated 
by 46.2 % to consume more time. A new routine could be more time 
consuming as colleagues would have to check each other’s work more 
often. It was sometimes difficult for the interviewees to distinguish 
between IS and routines since they are intertwined, but it was obvious 
that the interviewees had tried hard to do so. The new routines were seen 
as causing more errors than the IS changes, even if the IS changes also 
caused more errors than before (Lundqvist 2011a). In any case there were 
hopeful comments about being able to manage the changes: 
 
“Initially there are more faults because the routines are not 
fully established yet – I am still at the stage where I have only 
carried out new things once.” (Interviewee 3, p. 97, Lundqvist 2011a) 
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Five months after the DE-merger some administrators were still not sure of their 
duties nor did they understand where the new organization was heading:  
 
“There will be changes but when? I do not know, there will 
be studies – I believe that these events take place high over 
one’s head.” (Interviewee 26, p. 71, Lundqvist 2012) 
 
There were also worries that some questions would not be handled at all: 
“... it is not so much duplication of work as things falling by the wayside” 
(Interviewee 13, p. 96, Lundqvist 2011a). Some interviewees found it 
unfair that the “other side’s” IS had been chosen instead of their own, 
which they considered to be more convenient and better. The new top 
management that took over after the DE-merger was found to apply a 
more firm and directive management style which reinforced hierarchy 
and power structures.  
 
“The power has been kicked up a level in terms of decisions. 
A departmental manager cannot always decide, instead the 
question has to be moved to a higher manager and sometimes 
even to the top manager – and this concerns issues that earlier 
were decided by the departmental manager.” (Interviewee 7, 
p. 71. Lundqvist 2012); 
 
“Before the merger the top managers were closer and there 
was always a channel, through which it was possible, to get 
in contact with the top manager. This feels different now.” 
(Interviewee 17, p. 71-72, Lundqvist 2012) 
Some administrators expressed that they received less appreciation 
from the top management after the merger:  
“... aah, those are the small administrators they are not worth 
anything and we can decide whatever we find suitable 
regarding them. I think it is so sad because many 
administrators have academic education – it is not just 
anyone who can be an administrator /.../ Then I feel I am 
disregarded by the top managers but not by the manager in 
my own department.” (Interviewee 9, p. 71, Lundqvist 2012); 
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“It is obvious that the hierarchy has increased which is not 
what I had expected. Hence, I believe that much competence 
is lost since they are rushing off without listening to those 
who work with certain tasks, which I find peculiar. I am 
sometimes very sceptical.” (Interviewee 20, p. 70, Lundqvist 2012);  
“… there is no democracy any longer and it has been worse 
with the new management – there have been so many things 
and I thought it should be exciting but then I realized – well, 
that is not what is going to happen … (Interviewee 1, May 2010) 
The trust in management (especially the new top management) was 
fading and there was a great deal of rumour spreading in the newly 
established organization:   
 
“The personnel do not support the new management – I have 
heard from the central administration that this is the truth.” 
(Interviewee 9, p. 72, Lundqvist 2012)  
 
There were opinions about the late appointment of managers and of the 
problems that this had caused to the merger processes. A manager who 
resigned after the merger talked about the problems of postponed 
decisions due to the late appointment of managers for the new 
organization:  
  
“The problem during the autumn was that there was one 
organization with managers in charge of the merger that took 
some decisions – but those that would be responsible for the 
new organization later on – they were not available then. It 
was like just one organization taking some overall decisions. 
/.../ It was the late appointments of the new managers in 
general and that made it difficult because there has to be 
people in charge with responsibilities./.../ Issues and 
decisions were lost. The new management were needed in 
their positions in the autumn and I felt that the situation was 
completely different by the time the new managers were in 
their positions.” (Interviewee 25, p. 72, Lundqvist 2012)  
 
The findings pointed to a great awareness among the administrators 
about the consequences of late management appointments: 
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“Well, I did not think that getting new top management 
would influence, but it did. /.../ an organization carries its 
history and sometimes there seems to be very little 
understanding of that and that makes it hard for us who work 
at the grassroots. I actually believe so.” (Interviewee 17, p. 
72, Lundqvist 2012) 
A changed communication strategy did not seem to be appreciated by the 
interviewees. A clear majority (79.3 %) considered that the information 
content had changed to what they considered as more concrete (many 
decisions were taken and communicated when the new managers had 
been appointed) and less visionary (more practical instead). 31 % thought 
that the there were fewer communication channels and 58.6 % believed 
that the amount of information had decreased. 62 % believed that the 
sender of the information had changed and become more anonymous 
after the merger. The administrators still lacked information about issues 
that were important to them in their duties. However, the quantitative 
analysis that was carried out did not tell whether the changes were good 
or bad though the qualitative analysis did: 
 
“There is a more anonymous sender from the central unit for 
information /.../ It feels like there is a hidden agenda, maybe 
some are getting to know things now that they do not tell. 
Before we were spoiled – there is much we do not know 
now.” (Interviewee 17, p. 100, Lundqvist 2011a);  
 
“The doubts that are abundant in the organization have not 
been taken care of /.../ the disappointment is revealed in the 
informal information channels.” (Interviewee 19, p. 98, 
Lundqvist 2011a); 
“There is less in a way. Maybe more or less unconsciously 
but I think that they believed that it was less important to 
inform us when the merger was carried out. Practically that 
was what happened and now about a month ago they started 
to provide more information again. They realized that it is 
needed.” (Interviewee 30, p. 99, Lundqvist 2011a); 
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“New channels have not been communicated – a blind faith 
that people would search for information?” (Interviewee 29, 
p. 99, Lundqvist 2011a) 
However, the changed sender could also be perceived as a step towards 
more openness:  
 
“Now the information is sent out in a more integrated form – 
before you did not know who was responsible for it.” 
(Interviewee 9, p. 100, Lundqvist 2011a)  
 
The amount was often regarded as less after the merger but some said 
that it seemed to be turning towards more information again.  
 
“Before, we had weekly meetings but they died out.” 
(Interviewee 16, p. 99, Lundqvist 2011a) 
There were some questions that were not analyzed until now (at the 
writing of the thesis) and therefore not discussed in the research papers 
no. 5 and no. 8 (appendix 3) The interviewees were asked if they had 
suggested changes for the DE-merger – which a majority (79.3 % ) had 
done. Those who had made change proposals (23 of the interviewees) 
were asked if they considered that their ideas were utilized (scale 
question); their opinions are shown in figure 14.  
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Figure 14: Opinions about how change proposals were used (N=23; 
internal fall offs=4).  
There were two questions about whether changes of IS and routines were 
needed before and after the DE-merger was carried out: i) As far as you 
remember – did you think that changes of IS and routines were needed 
before the merger?   ii) Now, after the merger – do you think that 
changes of IS and routines still are needed? As figure 15 shows, a 
minority thought changes were not needed before the DE-merger was 
carried out (3 out of 29 could not tell; N=26).  
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Figure 15: Opinions on whether or not changes were needed before the 
merger (N=26). 
Figure 16 shows that after the merger was carried out the interviewees 
still found it necessary to change IS and routines (2 out of 29 did not 
know; N=27).  
 
7
8 8
0
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
5 - Completely 4 3 2 1 - Not at all
Co
un
ts
 o
f i
nt
er
vi
ew
ee
s
Are changes needed after the merger?
 
Figure 16: Opinions on whether or not changes were needed after the 
merger (N=27). 
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The fourth study also revealed a need for further planning: 
 
 “Now there has to be more long-term planning and one has 
to consider that there are a lot more people involved. 
Sometimes this fails.” (Interviewee 13, p. 71, Lundqvist 
2012) 
About half of the interviewees (54.3 %) found that they had to take 
responsibility for their learning and training on new or updated IS (and 
routines). About two thirds of the interviewees (68.6 %) said that 
colleagues teach and train each other to master new IS and 48.6 % helped 
each other to use new routines. 
 
“Well, that is how we do things because we check with each 
other. I think that those from Org E are more in to checking 
with the colleagues in Org D than the other way around /.../ I 
believe that those in Org D have another kind of self-esteem 
and self-confidence than we. But they are helping us out to 
the fullest.” (Interviewee 24, May 2010); 
 “That is so to a very high degree and I do not know 
everybody in Org D like I do here in Org E and am not sure 
about who is responsible for what issues. That is how it is 
like now in this organization – you do not know who handles 
what, but you are trying to help each other and search for 
someone you think may know.” (Interviewee 22, May 2010); 
”That is how it is, even if you do not have the time for it you 
might have to sit down with a colleague when a question 
comes up, because some parts of the system you do not use as 
often as others and then you have to ask others about these 
parts. Of course we teach each other and mostly I am the one 
that helps others when there are questions about the systems.” 
(Interviewee 1, May 2010) 
4.4.3 Main conclusions from the fourth study  
An organization’s multi-site location could be an obstacle for successful 
PMI (e.g. Giacomazzi et al. 1997). Travelling takes time and is 
tiresome, especially in times when there is a lot to do, as in PMI 
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processes and this is often mentioned during interviews after the DE-
merger (Lundqvist 2011 a).  
The findings show that it is not recommended to change successful 
communication strategies in the PMI phases – especially not if the 
employees perceive the new strategies as less open, less honest, and more 
anonymous. It could also be problematic to change or remove channels 
and cut the amount of information right after a merger, even if there were 
some findings (16.6 %) of information overload before the DE-merger 
(Lundqvist 2010b).  It was also unpopular that informal meetings were 
discontinued after the merger (Lundqvist 2011a). To inform extensively 
(i.e. openly and honestly) is often recommended in the literature as an 
effective means of helping employees to overcome uncertainty and 
anxiety in mergers or other organizational changes (e.g. Applebaum et al. 
2000a, 2000b; Institute for Government 2010; Tarplett 2009). 
The findings from the DE-merger indicate that well-managed pre-
merger phases do not guarantee successful PMI. The pre-merger studies 
showed positive opinions about the expected changes and the merger; the 
post-merger studies showed less satisfied administrators (Lundqvist 2009, 
2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). The workload is often raised while a 
merger is ongoing (e.g. Bashein & Markus 1994; Empson 2000b; Epstein 
2004; Grey & Mitev 1995) and during the DE-merger the administrators 
usually participated in at least one merger project beside their ordinary 
duties. In the literature it is recommended to work full-time (and not part-
time) with the merger projects (e.g. Epstein 2004). It is problematic when 
positive pre-merger expectations do not end up in positive PMI processes. 
The importance of maintaining positive employee expectations in the 
PMI phases is emphasized by the findings (Lundqvist 2011a).  
In University DE the management style was perceived to be more 
authorative and the hierachy was percieved to have grown compared with 
Org D and Org E. Some interviewees also stated that the power to make 
decisions was moved to a higher level than before. In the previous 
organizations the departmental managers had more power to decide than 
after the merger. (Lundqvist 2012) According to earlier research (e.g. 
Bringselius 2008, 2010a, 2010b) public sector personnel are often used to 
being involved in planning and decision making and therefore it is 
difficult to reduce their participation in the PMI processes as this may 
increase vertical resistance (between managers and their subordinates).  
Bringselius (2010a) found that the trust in managers deceased after a 
merger (between the Swedish National Audit Office and the Swedish 
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Social Insurance Agency) when the employees’ participation in decision 
making was reduced. 
Uncertainties could easily cause rumours (Mishra 1990) and a loss of 
trust (e.g. Volery & Mensik 1998; Whitener et al. 1998). Rumours were 
also spread in the DE- merger; some interviewees were not satisfied with 
the fact that “their” (former) IS was not chosen for the new organization 
and suspected that decisions were based on a wish to be fair to both 
campuses. However, this was not true (according to internal 
documentation and knowledge) at least not regarding which of the IS 
should be implemented in the new university. The findings indicate a loss 
of trust in the new management after the DE-merger was realized leading 
to an increase in rumour spreading (Lundqvist 2012). The findings show 
a greater feeling of uncertainty because the administrators did not feel 
that they were listened to or acknowledged for their competence, as had 
been the case before the DE-merger (Lundqvist 2012). In a merger 
rumours may originate from within the organization (as the example 
above) but also from outside (DiFonzo & Bordia 2000), even though 
there was no clear example of the latter in the study. Nevertheless, 
rumours had been spread by the media throughout the process and it was 
sometimes been difficult to distinguish between what was based on 
organizational grapevine (that can be partly true) (e.g. Mishra 1990), 
harmful rumours (DiFonzo & Bordia 2000; van Iterson & Clegg 2008) or 
what was based on fact. 
It takes time to establish new routines and new IS. The interviewees 
experienced reduced effectiveness, increased fragmentation of the 
working day and reduced productivity (Lundqvist 2011a). Tetenbaum 
(1999) warns that productivity drops are likely to occur in mergers where 
too much focus and time are invested in the merger processes. That is 
why fast transitions are recommended (e.g. Saarimaa & Tukiainen 2010; 
Tetenbaum 1999). In the DE-merger the transistion phase could not be 
considered as fast. Two years after the merger there were still some 
ongoing discussions about routines and IS, for example the IS strategy 
had not yet been decided.  
The interviewees stated that the training and learning of new IS and 
routines were mainly achieved with help of colleagues. Galliers (2011) 
points out the importance of knowledge sharing, knowledge creation and 
of knowledge brokering in the IS stragegizing processes. Venkatesh et al. 
(2002) consider training as a way of helping users accept new IS which 
are often connected to new routines. Thus, the peer-training that took 
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place should not be seen as a good practice; organized training 
opportunities should be offered too. 
There was also a conviction that changes of both IS and routines were 
needed as much after the DE-merger as before (cf. fig. 15, 16). DeLone 
and McLean’s (1992, 2003) IS-success model investigates the user 
satisfaction with IS as one of the dependent variables that measure IS-
success. The fact that the administrators still considered changes to be 
necessary is interesting. Document reading highlighted the fact that there 
were no IS-strategies in either of the previous organizations. After the 
merger (during autumn 2010) a directive from the top manager requested 
that an IS-strategy should be developed. The importance of attending to 
IS-strategy issues early in a merger process is often mentioned in the 
literature as one of the high impact factors on the PMI success and when 
it is not done it can seriously endanger the PMI (e.g. Alaranta 2008; 
Alaranta & Henningsson 2008; Apnovich 2002; Epstein 2005; 
Giacomazzi et al. 1997; McKiernan & Merali 1995; Mehta & Hirschheim 
2007; Galliers 2011; Shrivastava 2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). 
A clear majority (79.3 %) said that they had proposed changes during 
the merger and many of them found that their suggestions had been 
implemented (cf. fig, 14). There is thus much to gain from collecting, 
acknowledging and implementing proposals from the administrators. 
First, the administrators were allowed to participate and to use their 
knowledge, as recommended in the literature (e.g. Ford & Ford 2009; 
Shrivastava 2007; Zmud & Cox 1979). Secondly, the knowledge sharing 
that is so important in a merger could be facilitated because tacit 
knowledge, which usually is difficult to get hold of, is made visible in the 
proposals for routines/procedures (e.g. Cooper & Markus 1995; Dixon 
1999; Drucker 2008; Mishra & Spreitzer 1998; Senge 1995; Sveiby 1996; 
Yoo et al. 2007) Mergers can easily hinder knowledge sharing and this 
may lead to knowledge gaps in the new organization (e.g. Alaranta & 
Martela 2010; Ruggles 1998).  
It is recommended that managers are accessubke throughout a merger 
in order to support their staff (e.g. Bringselius 2008; Lewis et al 2010; 
Mishra & Spreitzer 1998) and to pursue the questions that they will have 
to deal with after the merger (Erkama 2010; Shrivastava 2007). This was 
not the case in the DE-merger because of the late appointments of 
managers which in turn led to postponed decisions (Lundqvist 2012). 
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4.5 The fifth study – recent findings from November 
2011 
The fifth study was carried out in order to get an update about two years 
after the DE-merger (cf. fig. 17). The same group of administrators as 
in the two previous surveys was contacted – that is to say those who 
still remained in the new organization. The figures showing response 
rate and fall-offs are rather stable (cf. subsection 3.4.2.3) even if fewer 
administrators participated. The questionnaire was relatively short since 
the reason was mainly to get a snap-shot of IS-related issues (with 
importance for the PMI) to compare with prior findings. The questions 
are available in appendix 4. 
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Figure 17: Shows the fifth empirical study’s place in the research 
process.  
4.5.1 Profile of the respondents 
There were 79.5 % female (Org D = 41.1 %; Org E = 38.4 %) and  20.5 
% male (Org D = 11.9 %; Org E = 8,6 %) among the interviewees. 
Before the DE-merger  47 % was employed in Org E and 53 % in Org 
D.  
4.5.2 Main findings 
A clear majority (75.3 %) was satisfied with the IS they were dependent 
on to carry out their duties; they regarded them as working “Rather 
well” (58.3 %) or “Very well” (17.2 %). There were no significant 
differences depending on employer (p = .44) or gender (p=.36) as 
regards opinions about IS. The probability values were not less than or 
equal to .05. in either of the cases (Mann-Whitney U-tests were 
employed for the testing). 
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The respondents were asked how they felt IS-issues had been dealt 
with in the merger processes. There were no significant differences 
depending on employer (p = .30) or gender (p = .09) in the opinions about 
how IS-questions had been treated because the p-values were over .05 
(according to Mann-Whitney U-tests). Figure 18 shows the results on 
how IS-issues were handled in the DE-merger. The more negative (45 %) 
alternatives were more often chosen than the positive (≈16%); 39 % had 
no opinion. 
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Figure 18: The positive opinions are those that were less often chosen. 
One of the questions (no. 5) asked about their work situation after the 
merger (cf. fig. 19). 
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Figure 19: Counts of respondents who agreed with the statements. The 
negative opinions were more often chosen. 
Of those who had answered the question about the work situation 26 % 
were previously employed in Org E and 74 % in Org D.  
In total 22.5 % of the respondents left their comments in a final and 
open question (appendix 4). There was only one comment that was 
entirely positive; mostly the comments were negative (cf. table 10) and 
some raised both positive and negative issues. The neutral comments 
concerned the need to replace the curent IS or that the respondent had 
changed his/her place of work.  
 
Table 10: Dispersion of the comments. 
 Pos Neg Pos and Neg Neutral 
Org D 1 16 5 3
Org E 0 6 2 1
 
The positive and negative comments (Org D=5, Org E=2) could on the 
one hand praise the IT-department for doing a good job and at the same 
time describe a work situation that had become harder to cope with due 
to some politically sensitive situation between former Org D and Org E. 
Some IS could be described as working well and a few as working 
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badly. Another issue can be called the fairness perspective: if one 
campus got their previous routine or IS implemented then the other 
campus shoud have theirs the next time. However, this was never a 
principle for the choice of IS in the DE-merger (cf. subsections 2.1.6, 
4.4.3).  
As table 11 shows, the administrators, who had answered that their IS 
were working “Rather well” or “Very well”, had most of the negative 
comments. 
The IS were apparently not the primary subject for the administrators’ 
discontent with their work situation in University DE. 
 
Table 11: Administrator opinions about IS vs. orientation of open 
comments. 
 
 
The negative comments were also about the new leadership style and 
management, reduced flexibility and routines that did not work as 
expected:  
 
“The managers are always on their way – hard to get in 
contact with...” (Commentator 11, November 2011).  
 
“Invisible top manager, bad management” (Commentator 22, 
November 2011). 
4.5.3 Main conclusions from the fifth study  
The fifth study showed that a majority (75.3 %) was satisfied with how 
their IS worked – which is even higher than the findings from 2008 
(section 4.1; Lundqvist 2009). Even though the administrators were not 
satisfied with their work situation (cf. fig. 19; tab. 11) they do not 
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blame the IS. There were more negative comments on how the IS was 
handled than the other way around; for example there were comments 
on how IS issues had been postponed, been unclear and been pushed 
back by issues of higher priority (cf. fig. 18).  
It is often recommended in the literature that the IS-related issues 
should be dealt with early in a merger (e.g. Alaranta 2008; Alaranta & 
Henningsson 2008; Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Epstein 2005; Giacomazzi 
et al. 1997; McKiernan & Merali 1995; Mehta & Hirschheim 2007; 
Wijnhoven et al. 2006). The lack of IS-strategies in the former 
organizations made those questions even more critical. According to 
McKiernan and Merali (1995) an unsuccessful formulation of IS 
strategies could destroy the opportunity if building an effective and 
competitive new organization. The IS should be included in the merger 
planning in order to succeed with the PMI (e.g. Robbins & Stylianou 
1999; Shrivastava 2007; Stylianou et al. 1996).   Both the findings from 
the fifth study and document reading indicate that IS-questions had been 
marginalized in the merger. Furthermore, the IS issues were postponed 
because of the late appointment of the managers (Lundqvist 2012), which 
is contradictory to the recommendations in the literature (e.g. Erkama 
2010; Shrivastava 2007).  
As mentined above the study showed more negative than positive 
views of the work situation in the new organization than positive (cf. fig. 
19). However, there were no statistically significant differences 
depending on gender or former employer. The administrators started out 
with positive expectations of the DE-merger and of the changes that it 
would bring (cf. Lundqvist 2009, 2010b, 2010c). They were disappointed 
that the opportunities for organizational development had not been fully 
exploited in the merger (cf. Lundqvist 2011a, 2011b). Frommer (2001) 
warns about the consequences of positive expectations that are not 
fulfilled, because they could negatively influence opinoins and 
committment to mergers and PMI.  
Delayed decision making in the merger and the PMI phases slowed 
down the speed of the integration and implementation of IS. Mehta and 
Hirschheims’ (2007) case-studies show that the mergers between 
Amazon & Nile, Mekong & Indus and of Seine & Lena suffered from 
late planning and decision making about IS-alignment, which was not 
actually dealt with until the post-merger phase. However, those three 
mergers were successful from a strict Wall Street perspective; 
representing a short-term measure of merger successs. Regarding the IS 
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several issues were not resolved: IS integration decisions were not based 
on a real desire to realize them, the IS analysis process was not prioritized 
(section 1.2.5).  
IT-planning is a facilitator for building partnerships in a merger as the 
study at the New Baxter shows (Main & Short 1989). The merger 
between Hp and Compaq (de Camara & Renjen 2004) is an example of a 
merger success built on two key factors: i) detailed integration plans that 
were formulated and agreed on early in the pre-merger phase, and ii) 
active participation of senior management in the change processes and 
throughout the merger. Furthermore, the integration plans were carried 
out to the letter, which was one factor behind the success. The top 
management structure was also discussed and decided before the merger 
was carried out (ibid.).  
It is recommended that merger transisions are carried out as quickly 
as possible in order to prevent productivity drops (e.g. Tetenbaum 1999). 
The study of the merger between Boeing and McDonnel Douglas showed 
a less successful merger than expected. This was caused by the prolonged 
merger processes that received most attention at the expense of daily 
business issues (ibid.) In the DE-merger the IS-strategy had not yet been 
decided 26 months after the DE-merger was carried out and this hindered 
the planning of IS development, maintenence and user training, In 
addition, it was difficult to decide who should pay since there was no 
clear ownership structure.  
4.6 Summary – partial answers to the research 
questions  
The case-studies provide partial answers to the research questions; the 
findings complement the preliminary answers (section 2.4) from the 
theory chapter thus confirming many of the preliminary findings.  
 
RQ1: Should strategic management of information systems be a decisive 
factor in a public sector merger? 
Strategic management of IS should be decisive because: 
 The IS issues need to be dealt with early in a merger process in 
order carry out systems analysis of the new organization’s 
requirements and needs. A majority of the respondents found 
changes of IS (and routines) to be necessary after the merger was 
carried out even if there had already been many changes (section 
4.4).  
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 If the IS issues are not handled early it is likely that they will not 
be prioritized during the merger. The IS issues were not 
prioritized throughout the DE-merger and the PMI (sections 4.4, 
4.5). 
 The administrators depend on efficient IS to carry out their duties. 
This supports the view that strategic management of IS should be 
decisive in a public sector merger (section 4.1). 
 Without strategic management of IS, such decisions are often 
postponed and timely information cannot be given to those 
concerned. The administrators lacked information about what 
would happen to their IS after the merger; in some cases even in 
the PMI phase (sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
 IS management should deal with user training issues as part of an 
IS-strategy. The administrators lacked information about training 
opportunities after IS changes (sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
 Management issues (e.g. strategic IS issues) should be dealt with 
early in a merger. The management situation was complex and 
there were comments on IS-decisions that had been delayed or 
postponed because of substitute managers and late appointment of 
managers (sections 4.4, 4.5). 
 
RQ2: How can administrator participation facilitate post-merger 
integration? 
 They are well informed about the processes that are necessary for 
the fulfilment of the organization’s tasks as well as of their own 
duties (section 4.1, 4.2, 4.4).  
 They depend on efficient IS to carry out their duties; and therefore 
they are well aware of how the organization’s IS should be 
changed/replaced  (section 4.1) 
 They are competent in handling their IS. The administrators stated 
that they had no fear of learning new IS and are skilled in using 
their IS (sections 4.1). 
 Their (often tacit) knowledge and skills are helpful for both the 
pre-merger planning and the post-merger implementation. The 
administrators taught each other to use new IS and contributed to 
development of new routines (section 4.4). 
 
RQ3: How can management facilitate a public sector merger? 
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 By applying efficient communication strategies. The 
administrators were satisfied with the information they received 
about the merger even though individual information was missing 
(sections 4.1, 4.2). Changes after the merger were less popular 
and gave rise to rumours (section 4.4).  
 By providing opportunities to participate in the merger and PMI 
processes. The administrators felt that they participated in the DE-
merger both before and after, even if there was more 
dissatisfaction with the work situation in University DE (sections 
4.2, 4.3, 4.4).   
 By exploiting the opportunities for organizational development 
during a merger. The administrators stated that they were 
disappointed because the management in charge of the merger did 
not fully exploit the opportunities for development (sections 4.3, 
4.4). 
 By understanding that administrators do not necessarily resist 
change.  The administrators looked forward to the merger with 
high expectations and enthusiasm, and did not fear or resist the 
approaching changes in the DE-merger (sections 4.1, 4.2).  
 By being prepared for political/power struggles about IS and 
routines in the PMI. There were different opinions in the two 
merging organizations about which IS should be implemented in 
the new organization and there were opinions about an increased 
degree of hierarchy (section 4.4).  
 By motivating the administrators to share knowledge (even tacit) 
and to provide training opportunities. The administrators stated 
that colleagues mainly taught each other to handle new routines 
and IS (section 4.4); they were uncertain about whether 
formalized training should take place or not (sections 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3).  
 By appointing managers, for the new organization, early in the 
merger process so they can participate actively in the change 
management (e.g. trust building) and IS-strategizing. Many IS 
issues and decisions were postponed or delayed (section 4.4, 4.5). 
There was a loss of trust in the new management after the DE-
merger (section 4.4). 
 
RQ4: What factors of importance influence the post-merger integration in 
a public sector merger?  
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These are important factors that could influence the PMI in a public 
sector merger: 
 Acceptance of new technology and efficient diffusion (i.e. 
dissemination) of innovations because mergers can stimulate the 
use of new technical solutions. The administrators are well-
educated, sure of their knowledge and IS-skills and believe that 
they can learn to handle new IS (section 4.1).  
 Efficient (well-working) IS, that support the administrators’ 
needs. The fifth study shows that the administrators’ satisfaction 
with their IS was even higher than was found during the 
explorative study in 2008 (sections 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
 Clear information and well managed communication would 
prevent rumours and resistance to change. High satisfaction with 
the merger information and how it was communicated before the 
DE-merger; afterwards the satisfaction level deteriorated after 
changed communication strategy (sections 4.1; 4.2; 4.4).  
 How the changes are carried out and implemented. The IS 
changes influenced the work situation less negatively than the 
routine changes (section 4.3), and the administrators experienced 
a greater fragmentation of the working day, reduced flexibility, 
effectiveness and productivity after the DE-merger (section 4.4).  
 Prioritization of IS related issues (in order not to negatively 
influence the PMI). In the DE-merger the IS issues were 
postponed, delayed, and information about what would happen to 
the IS after the DE-merger was unclear (sections 4.2; 4.3).  
 Reengineering initiatives should be carefully considered in 
mergers and PMI. The administrators were open-minded towards 
changes in their duties, i.e. of IS and routines (sections 4.2, 4.3, 
4.4). After the DE-merger the administrators still found as much 
need for changes as before (section 4.4).  
 Training should be planned and acted upon individually assessed 
needs and adapted to relevant knowledge and skills. The 
administrators experienced uncertainty about training because of 
IS and routine changes (sections 4.2; 4.3) In the DE-merger the 
administrators had to rely on colleagues or on their own learning 
initiatives (section 4.4).  
 A less hierarchical organization could promote administrators’ 
convictions of value contribution and effectiveness. The 
administrators believed that they contributed value and worked 
137 
 
effectively though tere was less conviction about both after the 
DE-merger (sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). The latter is largely 
related to increased hierarchy and changed decision-making 
strategies (section 4.4).  
 Leadership style has an impact on PMI. After the DE-merger a 
more authoritarian leadership style was experienced by the 
administrators, and some administrators showed frustration and 
resistance towards the new management style, which they felt 
disregarded their competences and skills (section 4.4). 
 Active administrator participation in mergers and PMI processes 
could prevent resistance to change and promote positive 
expectations.  The studies did not show any resistance to change 
that needed to be dealt with and looked forward to the merger 
with high levels of confidence and expectations (sections 4.1, 
4.2). 
 Trust is violated when efficient communication and employee 
participation is not applied. After the DE-merger the findings 
point to a loss of trust in management. This is shown in opinions 
that management were less willing to communicate, had become 
more hierarchical and showed less regard for the administrators’ 
competence and skill (sections 4.4, 4.5).  
 Knowledge sharing among colleagues is helpful in an 
organizational change. The administrators stated that colleagues 
usually taught each other how to manage new IS and routines. 
This knowledge sharing took place between colleagues that before 
the DE-merger were employed by “the other” former organization 
(sections 4.4, 4.5).  
 Geographical distance is problematic in a merger. The 
administrators stated that tiresome  and time-consuming travelling 
was necessary in order to co-operate and meet with colleagues 
from “the other” location (sections 4.2, 4.4). 
 The findings show that appointment of new leaders should be 
carried out early in a public sector merger (or in any merger) so 
that those who will lead after the merger will be involved in and 
take responsibility for the decisions that concern the PMI. In the 
DE-merger the new top managers like many other managers were 
appointed very late in the process (sections 4.3, 4.4); some of the 
consequences were: 
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o Ongoing projects, e.g. IS projects, were stopped (section 
4.4).  
o Implementation of new routines and IS were delayed 
(section 4.3, 4.4) 
o Trust in management deteriorated (section 4.4). 
o Insecurity about the new organization and the new 
management caused rumours and gossip (section 4.4). 
o Decisions that were taken before the new leaders came 
were annulled if they did not support the new managerial 
intentions and decisions (section 4.4). 
o Leaders that managed the merger processes were reluctant 
to make major decisions if they did not believe that they 
would have a managerial position after the DE-merger 
(section 4.4). 
 
 
 
5 Discussion  
The findings from the five empirical studies (chapter 4 and part II) and 
the document reading will be discussed, mainly within the frame of this 
thesis’s introduction and theory chapters.  
In the literature some determinants of merger success are suggested 
(e.g. Apnovich 2002; Calipha et al. 2010; Epstein 2005). It was never an 
objective for this thesis to evaluate the success of the DE-merger per se.  
Quotations that are marked Administrator x, November 2011, relate 
to comments in the fifth study, which has not been published in any 
research paper.  
5.1 A challenging merger even without resistance to 
change 
The fact that the DE-merger was of a horizontal/lateral type, and between 
relative equals did not prevent a show of strength between the two former 
organizations, e.g. there were opinions among the administrators that 
their former routines and information systems were better than the merger 
partner’s. They also believed that their new colleagues from “the other 
side” thought likewise about their former practices and there were 
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suspicions of unfair distribution of key positions between the two 
campuses of University DE (Lundqvist 2012). 
The DE-merger was voluntary and politically promoted, which was 
interpreted by some as if the change was inevitable. It had become a more 
or less an unspoken rule in Swedish higher education that smaller entities 
should merge in order to be more effective, more competitive and to 
facilitate growth potential.  Even voluntary mergers of equals could be 
more or less willingly realized and one participant could see iteself as the 
victim of the acquirer (Locke 2007). Hence, the administrators’ 
enthusiasm for the DE-merger should not be taken for granted (sections 
4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 2010c). A shared vision and mutual goals could 
minimize reluctance towards a merger even if motives behind the merger 
could vary between the units involved (Harman & Harman 2003; 
Shrivastava 2007). 
Mergers in the public sector could be financially motivated as in the 
Finnish municipal mergers (Saarimaa & Tukiainen 2010) and in a merger 
between two Swedish hospitals (Choi and Brommels 2009). Financial 
motives for mergers should be carefully put into practice, especially in 
higher education where attitudes to such are unpredictable (Pritchard 
1993). In the DE-merger cost-saving as merger motivation was not 
highlighted, on the contrary financial aspects were rather down-played.   
After the DE-merger there were opinions about the outcome of the 
merger process indicating more formal handling of procedures than 
before, even if the DE-merger did not result in a giant new organization 
(section 4.4) that Harari (1998) warns against. During a PMI there may 
be struggles between the personnel because of conflicts of interest (cf. 
Olie 1994). Sometimes the administrators in the DE-merger put words to 
their fear of sub-optimization because of decisions based on a demand for 
fairness between the two campuses. The need to find a compromise 
solution that had not been implemented in either of the former 
organizations was stressed (Lundqvist 2011a). 
The hypothesis tests in the explorative study showed that there were 
some differences of opinion about the merger depending on which 
organization the respondents were employed in (section 4.1; Lundqvist 
2009).  The third study also showed differences between administrators 
from the former Org D and Org E. However, these differences were 
considered to be statistically small and concerned how IS and routine 
changes influenced the work situation (section 4.3; Lundqvist 2011b). In 
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the fifth study there were no statistical differences depending on gender 
or former employer (section 4.5).  
5.2 IS-strategizing was neither prioritized nor proactive 
in the DE-merger 
The usefulness of IS is often expressed in terms of the support they give 
to the users. This is a statement that few would question and Langefors 
(1973) emphasized the importance of IS to support the object systems. 
Information systems should be valued in light of their importance, their 
usefulness to the organization and how they support the business 
activities and processes by providing feedback and control (O’Brien & 
Marakas, 2009; Skyttner 2001). In our case this includes giving support 
to the administrators, so that they can be effective and able to contribute 
value to the organization.  
The administrators’ opinions about their IS before the merger 
provided important input for comparison with their opinions afterwards in 
a search for manifestations of negative sentiment about the merger and/or 
the IS (which could be a scapegoat for other issues). This was not the 
case in the DE-merger though. The findings from the studies (2008-2011) 
showed that a majority of the administrators were satisfied with their IS 
and that they considered efficient IS to be an important factor for their 
effectiveness (sections 4.1-4.5), thus confirming the organizational 
dependency on IS (e.g. Andersen 1994; Hoffer et al. 2002; Langefors 
1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009). The 2011 study showed that a clear 
majority were satisfied with their IS which they considered to work well 
(75.3 %). In fact they were more satisfied with their IS than with the way 
IS issues had been handled in the merger (subsection 4.5). Nevertheless, 
they experienced problems with the new IS: 
 
“I spend too much time battling with systems that work 
against me – not with me.” (Administrator 2, November 
2011); 
 
 “System X is still not user friendly. We still run local solutions.” 
(Administrator 20, November 2011);  
 
“Systems should not be implemented before they are tested and 
proven to really work.” (Administrator 12, November 2011)   
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In mergers and PMI the need to acknowledge the various aspects of IS 
(i.e. IS strategizing) are more prominent than otherwise (e.g Bergvall 
&Welander 1996; Davenport 2000; DeLone & McLean 2003; Galliers 
2009, Markus 2011; Rogers 2003). The difficulties connected with the 
radical implementation and integration of University DE’s IS should not 
have been so different regardless of whether it was a public or private 
sector merger. To avoid problems it is important that IS is part of the 
merger process (e.g. Davenport 2000) and change management should be 
part of an organizational IS strategy (Galliers 2011, p. 338). As there 
were no accepted IS-strategies in the former organizations this was easier 
said than done. 
 
 “It entails extra work when the systems are not integrated 
with each other.” (Administrator 25, November 2011)  
 
The integration of IS is in the literature often named as a key to 
successful PMI (e.g. Apnovich 2002; Alaranta & Henningsson 2008; 
McKiernan & Merali 1995). Integration should be started before the 
merger is realized and issues concerning the PMI must be acknowledged 
already in the pre-merger phases (Shrivastava 2007). Nearly two years 
had passed since the DE-merger when the fifth study revealed that the 
integration had not yet been completed: 
 
“I really wish that we will proceed towards a system and an 
IT-based tool that will ‘talk’ to the databases we use. Today 
too much administration is carried out manually.”  
(Administrator 1, November 2011) 
 
Because an organization’s IS need to be carefully considered and 
designed for their ability to work smoothly with other IS (e.g. Langefors 
1995; O’Brien & Marakas 2009), the question about how IS should be 
dealt with in a merger is crucial. A system analysis requires that those 
who participate in the development understand the objectives the IS 
should meet (e.g. Andersen 1994; Hoffer et al. 2002; Langefors 1973; 
1995).  
One of the most critical issues to solve in a merger is which IS 
infrastructure to choose (Alaranta & Viljanen 2004). In the DE-merger 
there were administrator opinions about fairness between the two campus 
sites as a ground for the choice of IS solutions (Lundqvist 2012). This 
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suspicion turned out to be ungrounded, but obviously the criteria for the 
IS choices were not clearly communicated (subsections 2.1.6; 4.4.3).  The 
DE-merger lacked a properly realized systems analysis; there were no 
decisions about IS and in addition to the lack of IS-strategies there was no 
manager for the IS-department who could pursue the IS-specific issues. 
Findings from the second round of interviews (May 2010) showed that 
there had been some IS-projects during the pre-merger phases (section 
4.2). They had involved a lot of people before the DE-merger, but were 
afterwards found to have disappeared from the agenda (section 4.4). 
In a merger the important IS issues must compete for attention with 
many other important questions. Findings from the second study of the 
DE-merger showed that the administrators were unsure of what would 
happen to their IS in the merger and whether there would be training or 
not if new systems were introduced (section 4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2010b, 
2010c). The differences between the routines and IS of the two former 
organizations, and the problems that this caused were obvious in 
University DE (Lundqvist 2011a). The argument that IT does not really 
matter any longer, since it has become a commodity (Carr 2004), is not 
applicable in the DE-merger. The 2011 study showed that there were 
system integration problems which negatively influenced the 
effectiveness. To understand how the organization’s IS work and how 
they are integrated is especially important as the new organization has 
two campuses.  
 
“Not understanding how the different systems ‘speak to each 
other’, e.g. system X, Y and Z (reworded not to reveal the 
respondent by his/her IS) means that a lot of time must be 
spent in order to solve where a possible error has occurred.” 
(Administrator 24, November 2011) 
 
In University DE the IS-strategizing work started about a year after the 
merger was carried out and the suggestion from the IS strategy board had 
still not been decided on. Wijnhoven et al. (2006) show problems with 
the formation of an IT policy when there are groups in different locations. 
It is not proven that the two locations for University DE’s campuses have 
had any influence on the delayed IS strategizing in University DE. 
Unsuccessful IS strategizing can heavily damage an organization’s 
competitiveness (e.g. McKiernan & Merali 1995). The lack of IS strategy 
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in University DE could make it difficult to know who was responsible for 
the IS and lead to insufficient information:  
 
“The information from those who are responsible for the IS 
has often been insufficient and the service level has not 
always been good and this is because of scarce resources that 
are assigned to those services - compared to what is actually 
needed.”  (Administrator 24, November 2011) 
  
As Galliers (2011) argues an important part of IS strategizing should be 
proactive. The University DE aimed at being proactive in order to fulfil 
the merger objectives. Nevertheless, the IS-strategizing work could not 
have been prioritized since it has taken so long to develop an IS-strategy 
for the new university. Hence the management of IS has not been 
proactive in the DE-merger.   
Strategizing and integration of IS are crucial parts of a public sector 
organization’s merger – both before (pre-merger) and after (post-merger) 
the merger is realized (e.g. Galliers 2011; Markus 2011).  A public sector 
organization needs to maintain its duties to the public.  
5.3 The importance of adopting new IS in a PMI 
Matching technology with human needs (Langefors 1977) is fundamental 
for successful IS. User opinions about the usefulness of IS and the 
simplicity of using them (e.g. Davis 1989, Davis et al. 1989) are core 
subjects when discussing new technology and innovations. In a merger 
the employees’ willingness to accept and adopt new technology and 
sometimes even innovations, are of immediate interest.  In our case these 
issues are connected to the administrators’ worries about changes 
introduced by the merger and the risk of them being made redundant. 
Another aspect of the problem is that administrators who are not given 
formal training from the employer still have to learn to master new 
technology, and then usefulness and ease of use will be key to the 
process.  
The discussion about usefulness and ease of use could be applied to 
the administrators’ willingness (or not) to use e-meeting tools. In the DE-
merger and in the University DE the need to use e-meeting tools became 
obvious because of the distance between campus sites. Context-related 
factors such as location, user mobility, physical and social context will 
influence the acceptance of technology as well as the diffusion of 
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innovations (Bouwman et al. 2012).  In the DE-merger, a need for more 
meetings emerged, mainly because more people needed to coordinate 
their work. The distances made travelling time-consuming, tiresome and 
expensive. Hence, the use of e-meeting facilities was required by the 
circumstances.  Rogers (2003) found that relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability are important 
factors for technology adoption. In the case of the e-meeting tools the 
relative advantage was easy to find since it should be compared to 
travelling between former Org D and Org E. The compatibility in terms 
of the consistency with existing values, past experience and the needs of 
the adopters are also applicable to the DE-merger. The needs for 
implementing time-saving equipment were obvious. The administrators 
were convinced that they were skilled at using their present IS and not 
afraid of learning new systems. However, the complexity that some 
experienced of the e-meeting tools turned out to be a challenge that 
needed to be mastered in order to maintain the administrators’ 
effectiveness (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a).   
E-meeting tools are facilitators for distance meetings and substitutes 
for extensive travelling, and had been used before by some 
administrators, but for many it was a novel approach. In the DE- merger a 
shift to new video conference software was carried out (from Marratech 
to Adobe Connect). The second round of interviews, carried out about 
five months after the DE-merger, showed that some found the e-meeting 
tools more complicated than expected, and that it was harder to use the e-
meeting tools than they had been told (section 4.4). This points to the 
(still) relevant issues emphasized by Langefors (1977); the need to 
involve users in the choice of IS as different people interpret information 
differently according to time, pre-knowledge and individual frame of 
reference. Apparently, not all administrators had the same knowledge 
about the e-meeting tools.  Davidson (1991) found that mergers could 
trigger innovation because a new situation needs new solutions (like the 
e-meeting tools).  
Both TRA (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) and TAM (e.g. Davis 1986, 
1989) deal with the motives behind people’s actions and investigate the 
beliefs that make them accept, adopt and actually use new technology. 
The motivation for these models is mainly the opportunity to predict 
behaviour. As regards the e-meeting tools, there had been opportunities 
for training but it is not clear whether the administrators attended those 
training seminars (Lundqvist 2009). Despite this, many interviewees 
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(May 2010) stated that it was more difficult to use the e-meeting tools 
than they had expected (section 4.4) even if some administrators found 
them to work well after all (section 4.4). According to Venkatesh et al. 
(2002) user training, which the employer should offer, is crucial for 
promoting usage of a new IS. In the DE-merger there were uncertainties 
about IS training (e.g. section 4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c).  
In a merger new technology and new IS need to be adopted and used 
to be successful (e.g. DeLone & McLean 1992). The theories about 
technology acceptance and diffusion of innovations are relevant and 
important to consider in those cases, as the example of the use of e-
meeting tools in the DE-merger indicates.  
5.4 Administrator opinions before and after the DE-
merger 
The soft (human) issues in a merger are in the literature emphasized as 
crucial to acknowledge; people need to be listened to and allowed to 
participate (e.g. Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Blake & Mouton 1984; 
Epstein 2004; Ford and Ford 2009; Lewis et al. 2010; Marks & Cutcliffe 
1988; Michelman 2007). Since resistance was not a problem in the DE-
merger there must be other factors that could facilitate the PMI. In other 
words there are more keys to search for. From the administrators’ 
perspective the IS issues are important because they depend on efficient 
IS. 
Some attitudes to merger related issues differed in the studies before 
and after the merger and some attitudes remained: i) openness for 
reengineering, ii) willingness to knowledge sharing, iii) opinions about 
training, and iv) about their own high competence in mastering the IS. 
5.4.1 More negative opinions about the work situation 
afterwards 
The starting point for the merger was positive as the administrators hardly 
showed any resistance at all to the merger (Lundqvist, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c), which is unusual (Abrahamsson 2000; Empson 2000; 
Gash & Orlikowski 1991; Herron et al. 1999; Kotter & Schlesinger 2008; 
Lawrence 1969; Schweiger et al. 1987; Smith 2005; Washington & 
Hacker 2005). A majority of the administrators have throughout the 
merger process been convinced that their achievements contributed value 
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to their organization and that they were effective in carrying out their 
duties (Lundqvist 2009, 2011a). Insecurity and postponed information 
about the future are likely to cause a productivity drop (Tetenbaum 
1999). Findings from the fourth study show that the administrators 
experienced a decrease in productivity and higher fragmentation of their 
working day after the DE-merger (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a). This 
could be caused by new routines and the ongoing reorganization, but was 
still a productivity drop. 
The administrators had positive expectations about their abilities to 
cope with the new situation (routines and IS) (section 2.1, 2.2; Lundqvist 
2009, 2010b, 2010c). About five months after the University DE was 
established the administrators’ satisfaction with the merger had declined; 
some administrators were still not sure of their position, and they found 
the organizational hierarchy to have become more obvious (section 4.4, 
Lundqvist 2011a, 2012). How well the expectations are fulfilled (or not) 
is important for the attitudes and reactions to a merger and to the 
integration afterwards, not only to the PMI but also to the new 
organization (Frommer 2001). The most recent study (November 2011) 
showed that the administrators expressed more negative than positive 
experiences of their work situation than positive (cf. fig. 19, section 4.5), 
which confirms Frommer’s (2001) arguments that unfullfilled 
expectations reduce merger success. Also the findings from the third 
study pointed to some disappointment about less development having 
taken place than expected (section 4.3; Lundqvist 2011b). In the DE-
merger many issues that concerned the administrators’ situation and the 
ISs were postponed and this could have influenced the initially positive 
merger attitudes to become more negative and turned enthusiasm to 
disillusion (section 4.5).  
5.4.2 The new communication strategy after the DE-merger 
was not appreciated by the administrators 
In organizational change, a merger or a BPR initiative, good 
communication is shown to be important for both preventing and 
countering resistance to change, and for motivating the employees 
(Bashein & Markus 1994; Caudron 1996; Gall 1991; Hallier 2000; 
Harmon 2007; Ketz de Vries & Balazs 1997; Napier et al. 1989; 
Schweiger et al. 1987; Schweiger & Weber 1989; Schweiger & Denisi 
1991; Shrivastava 2007; Smith 2005). It is especially risky to withhold 
information (Mishra 1990) that could easily lead to uncertainty and a 
147 
 
loss of trust. The longitudinal study found that the respondents 
appreciated the communication better before the merger and less 
afterwards (section 4.1, 4.2, 4.4; Lundqvist 2009, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 
2012).  
One risk with information that is perceived to be insufficient is that it 
could trigger gossip and rumours (e.g. Mishra 1990). In the literature it is 
recommended that management should continuously provide information 
(e.g. Napier et al. 1989) and that good communication should be 
facilitated between the management and their subordinates (Bringselius 
2010b). As the merger was realized there was a change of management 
that changed the so far successful merger process on the human side. As 
Marks and Cutcliffe (1988) argue, loyalty could be affected if the 
individuals do not understand how they will be affected by a merger. The 
administrators in the DE-merger found the communication strategy after 
the DE-merger to have changed towards both less and more unclear 
information (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a).  
In the literature there are recommendations that highlight the need for 
managers to listen to those who are against a change as well as to those 
that are supportive Michelman 2007; Ford et al. 2008). Before the DE-
merger was carried out there were several meetings to which all 
employees were invited. The top managers (or at least representatives 
from the top management) and members of the organization committee 
attended and employees could discuss directly with top managers and 
those who were responsible for the merger processes. It was not known in 
advance who would attend those meetings and the managers had to be 
prepared for both positive and negative opinions and had to be open to 
the discussion of all kinds of subjects regarding the DE-merger.  This was 
an appreciated approach (section 4.2; Lundqvist 2010b, 2010c, 2012).  
After the DE-merger the physical meetings stopped and were missed by 
the administrators. Some administrators said that these meetings were on 
their way back before the summer of 2010 since they had been misses by 
many (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a). 
The case-study also confirmed the importance of information about 
delayed decisions (e.g. Schweiger and Weber 1989). Before the DE-
merger even negative information, such as delays, was communicated. 
Afterwards this strategy was changed (sections 4.2, 4.4; Lundqvist 2010b, 
2012).  
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5.4.3 Opinions about training and competences were 
rather stable before and after – still high self-confidence 
Employees should take responsibility for learning the skills they need to 
carry out their duties properly and to participate in lifelong learning to 
keep up with the demands of their work (Crowther 2004; Drucker 
1998). The administrators in the case-study were well educated and sure 
of their knowledge (section 4.1; Lundqvist 2009), which could be a 
reason for them not fearing the approaching changes and the prospect of 
having to master new IS.  
Training is found to be one of the factors that could prevent resistance 
to change (e.g. Hoffer et al. 2002; Zmud & Cox 1979) though this was 
not a problem in the DE-merger. The findings from the studies before and 
after the merger showed that administrators did not find IS training to be 
crucial and this conflicts with earlier results about a need for training 
when new IS are implemented (e.g. Mathieson 1991; Sveiby & Simons 
2002; Venkatesh et al. 2002). After the DE-merger the administrators did 
not explicitly ask for training opportunities even when they were not sure 
whether they whould get any or not (subsection 4.3, 4.4; Lundqvist 
2011b, 2011c). The administrators’ confidence in their skills and their 
competence could have been helpful in this case. 
The administrators’ competence is an important factor for achieving a 
successful merger and PMI (e.g. Marks and Mirvis 1992). The 
administrators in the DE-merger expressed that although they took 
responsibility (54.3 %) for learning to master new IS mostly (68.6 %) 
relied on colleagues to show them how IS changes should be mastered 
(section 4.4).   Knowledge sharing is important in a merger and is further 
discussed below.       
5.4.4 Openness to knowledge sharing both before and after 
the DE-merger 
In a merger jobs are at risk or job descriptions can be altered in an 
undesired way. Employees could be forced to change their place of work 
and their present duties (e.g. Bradt 2008; Empson 2000a); in the literature 
it was also found that employees could be afraid of being made redundant 
after a merger and whould therefore be reluctant to share tacit knowledge. 
Many of the administrators in the DE-merger lacked individual 
information about their situation in University DE until right before the 
merger was carried out. Some administrators even lacked individual 
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information shortly after the merger (because decisions were not made on 
their duties or their employment). This lack of information could have 
influenced their willingness to share knowledge, but findings from the 
studies did not point at all in that direction (e.g. section 4.5; Lundqvist 
2010b, 2011c).  
In post-merger integrations (PMI) a knowledge gap is often noticed 
which could be a reason for failure (e.g. Alaranta & Martela 2010). 
Szulanski (1996) argues that development of learning capacities between 
organizational units has to be monitored and led so that employees work 
according to best practice and communicate it as quickly and as well as 
possible. In the DE-merger the administrators had carried out the same 
tasks at both locations but had not necessarily applied the same routines 
and had in some cases not used the same IS (e.g. sections 4.1, 4.4; 
Lundqvist 2009, 2011a). Therefore there was a need for synchronizing 
the previous routines and the administrators had to share tacit knowledge 
with their colleagues.  
Knowledge management systems (KMS) are often surronded by 
mistrust because of the risk of being exploited by others that give nothing 
in return (Hislop 2005; Tissen et al. 1998).  Knowledge is often distrusted 
in a KMS if the knowledge provider is not known and is shared more 
willingly if the individuals are connected in a network were their 
reputation increases as a result of their knowledge sharing (Alavi & 
Leidner 2001; McLure Wasko & Faraj 2005). This was not an obvious 
problem in the DE-merger as the administrators often taught each other 
(section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011c).  
The administrators in the DE-merger stated that they were invited to 
participate and to use their knowledge (section 4.2; Lundqvist 2010b, 
2011c) which could have been a facilitator for knowledge sharing.  
Otherwise there is often a discontinuity of knowledge sharing after a 
merger and this must be dealt with as soon as possible (Alaranta and 
Martela 2010; Ruggles 1998; Yoo et al. 2007). Attitudes to participation 
are further outlined below. 
5.4.5 Higher participation in the BPR processes before the 
DE-merger 
The consequences of the ongoing merger made way for reengineering 
and redesign of University DE’s administrative processes. It is often 
stated in the literature that successful change management allows the 
employees to participate in the change processes that will affect them 
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(e.g. Empson 2000; Ford & Ford 2009; Zmud & Cox 1979). Those 
recommendations were also confirmed in the DE-merger case. Taking 
part in DE-merger projects (often concerning the redesign of processes) 
served as a means of involving the administrators actively in the change 
processes. Besides, their competences were needed because of their 
initiated knowledge about the organizations’ processes and of handling 
their IS (c.f. section 4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
Before the DE-merger was actually carried out there were numerous of 
merger related projects. Some of these stopped when University DE was 
established (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2012). After the merger there were 
more negative opinions about the merger and the new organization which 
were caused by interrupted projects, changed communication and less 
participation in the change processes (sections 4.3, 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a). 
If the administrators are involved in the merger related processes the fear 
of negative consequences can be countered (e.g. Bringselius 2010b, 
Shrivastava 2007).  
The studies carried out before the DE-merger showed an openness to 
reengineering and IS changes (subsection 4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 
2010a, 2010c). After the merger the administrators still wished for further 
changes and considered that changes were needed as much as before the 
merger (cf. fig. 15, 16, section 4.4). Technology is often proposed as a 
means for carrying out successful reengineering but it must support 
critical processes and actual business challenges (e.g. Ascari et al. 1995; 
Hammer 2003; Hammer & Champy 2003; Harrington et al. 1997; Ko et 
al. 2009; Kovacic 2004; Trkman 2010; Wiloch 1994). However, 
technology can take more space than it should at the expense of human 
issues (e.g. Bashein & Markus 1994; Cooper & Markus 1995; Drucker 
2008; Ranganathan & Dhaliwal 2001; Senge 1995; Vakola & Rezgui 
2000). Technology is sometimes proposed as a means of preventing 
resistance to change due to groupware technology (e.g. Marjanovic 
2000). In any case, the administrators did not resist the changes (section 
4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 2010c). 
Furthermore, the University DE administrators (79.3 %) had put 
forward many proposals and suggestions that they found were 
implemented (cf. fig. 14). After the DE-merger a majority (58 %) was 
disappointed that there were fewer changes and development activities 
than they had expected and wanted (sections 4.3, 4.4; Lundqvist 2011a, 
2011b).  Even if a majority wanted more changes they also experienced 
problems because of the changes that were made (sections 4.4, 4.5; 
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Lundqvist 2011a). Changes in routines influenced the work situation 
more negatively than the IS changes (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2011b). 
Comments from the 2011 study show that the change processes were still 
ongoing and this could be both good and bad. IS maintenance builds on 
ongoing analysis, development activities, and IS strategizing should 
therefore be a continuous process (e.g. Bergvall & Welander 1996; 
Galliers 2011).  
As Bashein and Markus (1994) argue it is negative for the 
organization and the reengineering activities if the sponsor leaves his/her 
job during the change, as was the case in the DE-merger (cf. fig. 1, 
section 1.3). Management of mergers is an important and delicate topic 
that will be discussed further in the next section. 
5.5 Late appointment of managers hindered trust-
building, planning, IS-strategizing and decision-making  
Because PMI is known to fail in most of the cases (50 – 80 %) the 
failure risks need to be acknowledged and acted upon (e.g. Alaranta 
2008; Alaranta & Martela 2010). Managerial involvement in a merger is 
proposed in the literature to be an important factor for merger success 
(e.g. Calipha et al. 2010; Xun 2009). Some argue that good top 
management is the most important success factor for mergers (e.g. 
Pritchard 1993). Our findings point to the fact that managers were more 
accessible before the University DE was established and there was a more 
flexible climate in terms of how the top management should and could be 
approached (section 4.4, Lundqvist 2012).  
Management of organizational change requires that managers pay 
close attention to employee reactions and opinions, and monitor the 
course of events carefully (e.g. Michelman 2007). If the managers apply a 
proactive approach to possible negative employee reactions these could 
be effectively prevented (e.g. Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; Bradt 2008; 
Empson 2000; Hoffer et al. 2002; Lewis et al. 2010; Schweiger et al. 
1987; Zmud & Cox 1979). Our longitudinal case-study showed that the 
recommendations for preventing resistance to change had been followed 
to a large extent before the merger was carried out but to a lesser extent 
afterwards (sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5; Lundqvist 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c, 2011a, 2012). A possible reason was the new top management and 
its new leadership style which made them less accessible than before 
(Lundqvist 2012). Nevertheless, some argue that human issues are 
sometimes more monitored than the technological issues in a merger and 
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that IT integration is the key to successful PMI (e.g. Apnovich 2002; 
McKiernan & Merali 1995; Sirkin et al. 2005). Our findings support the 
fact that soft issues have been sufficiently provided for in the pre-merger 
phases of the DE-merger since the administrators were satisfied with the 
communication and opportunities to participate in the merger processes 
(sections 4.1, 4.2; Lundqvist 2009, 2010b).  
Trust in management is said to be an important factor for preventing 
and avoiding resistance to change (e.g. Bringselilus 2010a; Caudron 
1996; Cullen et al 2000; Podsakoff et al. 1996). The DE-merger is an 
example of how declining trust in the new management can negatively 
influence previously positive attitudes.  Judged by the findings from the 
fourth study (May 2010) the effects of the late appointment of the new 
top management were a basis for mistrust and even for mismanagement 
(section 4.4; Lundqvist 2012).  
Managers need to take the first move in establishing trust (Whitener 
et al. 1998), and our findings from spring 2010 indicate that the new 
management was not successful in building a trustful relationship with 
the administrators (sections 4.4, 4.5; Lundqvist 2012). Some of the 
interviewees discussed a lack of understanding and appreciation from the 
top management; some spoke about a lack of respect and depreciation of 
their knowledge and competences; some found the mechanisms of control 
to have increased and hierarchical management to have become more 
apparent (section 4.4; Lundqvist 2012). The communication was 
considered less satisfactory after the DE-merger was carried out with 
more rumours and speculation as a consequence (section 4.4; Lundqvist 
2012). 
Gossip and rumours affect how management is measured during a 
change process, and are known to be means for people to deal with issues 
that are undesired and uncomfortable (DiFonzo & Bordia 2000; Harman 
& Harman 2003; Kurland & Pelled 2000; Mishra 1990; Noon & 
Delbridge 1993). Interviews carried out after the DE-merger showed both 
rumours and gossip that were negative towards the new management. The 
top managers seemed in some cases to have become scapegoats for issues 
that had not been resolved as the administrators had expected or wanted. 
The blame is more often put on other objects, such as information 
systems, since doing so is more harmless than levelling criticism against 
the management. Whether or not the new management really was to 
blame is not further discussed here (the fact that they were appointed late 
was not their fault, cf. fig 1, section 1.3). However, trust is a means of 
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preventing resistance to change and before the merger the administrators 
trusted the former top managers (who later resigned).  
Organizational gossip can influence inter-organizational power 
relations (van Iterson & Clegg 2008), and the relations before the merger 
between the former organizations could have influenced the power 
relations in University DE. The initial finding from the 2008 study that 
the administrators from Org E were more positive to the merger could be 
such an example, because Org D was by some regarded to have a 
somewhat higher academic status and that Org E had more to gain from 
the DE-merger. However, a contradictory example from the findings is 
that administrators from Org D found Org E’s IS to have been 
implemented more in the new organization than their former IS. The 
latter is also a correct understanding of the real situation; Org E’s IS were 
more often implemented in University DE (sections 1.3, 4.4).  
Decision making is a highly important side of change management. 
After the DE-merger the findings show that important, key decisions 
were not made despite the more authoritative management style (section 
4.4; Lundqvist 2012). Planning that forsees both problems and 
opportunities is a basic requirement for successful PMI and needs 
support from the top management and organizational merger 
management (e.g. Robbins & Stylianou 1999; Stylianou et al. 1996). 
The managerial situation in the DE-merger with many substitutes, very 
late appointment of the new managers and a special organization 
committee for the merger, that would not be part of the new organization, 
was a potential problem for the PMI planning and IS decision making 
(sections 1.3, 4.4, Lundqvist 2011a, 2012). Nevertheless, the 2011 study 
showed that the administrators were mainly satisfied with the IS/IT 
professionals’ achievements and a smoothly working IS/IT-department 
was mentioned: 
 
“I think that the IT-organization has done a good job with the 
merging of Org D and Org E in order to make the transition 
as smooth as possible for the users but I feel that managers of 
a higher level and the top management have not made 
decisions at the right time - which made it difficult for the IT 
department to carry out decisive development actions.” 
(Administrator 26, November 2011) 
The managers must understand the post-merger situation and issues 
concerning the IS alignment need to be solved early (e.g. Alaranta 2008; 
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Mehta & Hirschheim 2007). In the DE-merger this was a problematic 
recommendation to follow because of the management situation. The 
substitutes that were in charge during the merger processes were not able 
to handle the same issues after the merger. This meant that people were 
reluctant to decide about issues they knew others would be responsible 
for later. On the other hand it was problematic for those who were 
appointed to manage the new organisation that they had no official voice 
in the pre-merger process. Decisions made in the pre-merger stages were 
likely to have a strong impact on the administrators of University DE 
since the decisions about IS alignment were not taken as early as 
recommended (ibid.). The fourth study showed that decisions were 
postponed because the new managers had not yet been appointed (section 
4.4; Lundqvist 2012).  
The IS planning and the choice of IS infrastructure are among the 
most important questions to solve in a merger (e.g. Alaranta & Viljanen 
2004; Main & Short 1989). It is recommended to undertake an analysis of 
the new organization instead of just implementing solutions that were 
originally developed for the former organizations (e.g. Apnovich 2002; 
Wijnhoven et al. 2006). Findings from the second study show that there 
had not been enough time for analysis (section 4.2). Our findings about a 
lack of information about the IS, and the confusion after the merger 
because all IS changes were not implemented, showed shortcomings in IS 
decision making (e.g. Lundqvist 2010b, 2011a). The November 2011 
study still shows that important IS decisions had been delayed or 
postponed and that the organization was still suffering from this:  
 
“The IT-department has done a good job with the systems. 
However, the management has not decided yet about ‘a 
certain group of systems’ [reworded by the author to not 
reveal the IS and thereby the administrator] – and today those 
are too many.” (Administrator 32, November 2011); 
 “In the merger process nothing was discussed on a central 
level as regards IT, IT-organization etc. Instead it was said 
straight to the point that the IT-organization would be dealt 
with after the merger. The reason was that they wanted to 
avoid chaos among the whole IT-staff and our IS. All 
services should just work during the time for the merger and 
we worked with various IT-projects and tried to carry out the 
business as usual.”  (Administrator 3, November 2011) 
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Informed decisions early in the process are important for a successful 
PMI and managers making these decisions should be responsible after 
the merger (e.g. Shrivastava 2007). The need for management to 
participate throughout the merger process should therefore be 
acknowledged as well as the need for the managers to understand the 
requirements of the integration (e.g. Alaranta & Viljanen 2004; 
Giacomazzi et al. 1997; McKiernan & Merali 1995; Robbins & 
Stylianou 1999; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). 
Findings from our case-study, the literature review and from prior 
research support the conclusion that managers should participate 
throughout the merger, from the pre-merger to the post-merger 
integration. Moreover, our findings showed that the late appointment of 
top managers made the PMI processes difficult to manage (e.g. section 
4.4; Lundqvist 2012). 
5.6 Limitations with a single case-study 
Administrative processes in public organizations differ from business 
processes in the private sector and public sector mergers differ from 
mergers in the private sector (e.g. Simon 1971; Tarplett 2009). This 
should preferably be kept in mind when valuing the lessons learned from 
this study. To generalize from case-studies is always difficult especially 
if the findings/conclusions are transferred to other circumstances and 
contexts even if there are some authors who have found that this is 
possible under certain circumstances (e.g. Bassey 1981; Yin 2003). 
Regarding this research the context is described and information about 
the field of “business” is provided (even if the real names of the units are 
not revealed) and this enhances the opportunities for other organizations 
(in higher education) to use the findings from this longitudinal case-
study.  
6 Conclusions and lessons learned  
The research questions (RQ:s) 1 – 4 are derived from the research 
objectives (RO:s) (section 1.4) and therefore the RO:s are considered to 
be attained by answering the research questions. Furthermore, RO1: To 
carry out a longitudinal case-study of a merger in the public sector; 
from the pre-merger phases to the PMI and RO3: To study the 
administrators’ opinions about IS and routines before and during the 
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DE-merger and the PMI, are considered to be fulfilled simply by 
carrying out the research project (cf. fig. 20).  
 
RO6
RO2
RO4
RO5
RQ1
RQ2
RQ3
RQ4
RO1 RO3
 
 
Figure 20: Shows how the ROs and the RQs are related. 
Chapter 6 presents answers to the research questions posed initially 
(section 1.4) and summarizes the factors (fig. 21) that constitute “the 
lessons learned”.  
 
6.1 Answers to the first research question 
RQ1: Should strategic management of information systems be a 
decisive factor in a public sector merger? The findings are 
unambiguous; strategic management of IS is an important foundation for 
proper handling of IS related issues, in particular IS-planning, IS-
maintenance and IS decision making. If the strategic management of IS is 
not taken as a decisive factor, the consequences can be significant and 
influence almost every part of the organization. Administrators in public 
sector organizations depend on their IS in order to accomplish their 
duties, and efficient IS are critical for the organizations’, and thereby for 
their administrators’, performance.  Both the planning and the execution 
of the merger and PMI processes would likely suffer if the strategic 
management of IS is not decisive in public sector mergers.  A factor that 
is likely to seriously complicate the strategic management of IS (in the 
new organization) is if the managers in charge of the merger processes 
are not those who are to manage those processes after the merger (cf. fig. 
1, section 1.3).  
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6.2 Answers to the second research question 
RQ2: How can administrator participation facilitate post-merger 
integration? The following bullet points are without any ranking of 
importance.  
 The administrators are the backbone of any public organization 
because of their initiated knowledge (often tacit), which is needed 
in order to carry out changes to the IS and the routines (e.g. 
sections 2.3, 4.1, 4.2).  
 Participation strengthens the administrators’ confidence in their 
contribution of value to their organization (e.g. sections 2.3, 4.1, 
4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 Participation provides the opportunity to use individual 
knowledge and skills (e.g. sections 2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4).  
 Participation in change processes enhances the feeling of not just 
being exposed to changes but actively contributing to them (e.g. 
sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
6.3 Answers to the third research question 
RQ3: How can management facilitate a public sector merger? 
Important means for management to facilitate a public sector merger are 
(sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3; 4.1-4.5) listed below without any ranking of 
importance.  
 Awareness of the fact that it can be more demanding to plan a 
post-merger integration (PMI) than to plan the pre-merger phases 
for both IS and staff. Hence it is important that the top managers 
of a new organization and the IS-managers (as well as other 
managers) are appointed early so that they can actively take part 
in the merger processes as soon as possible. Otherwise they could 
not pursue the most important issues for their field of 
responsibility (sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2,4, 2,5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
 Prioritization of IS issues, for example by implementing an IS 
strategy as soon as possible (sections 2.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) 
 Applying communication strategies that provide plentiful and 
candid information about the merger processes (sections 2.3, 4.1, 
4.2, 4.4). 
 Countering and preventing rumours and speculation among the 
administrators (sections 2.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
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 Facilitating administrators’ participation in the processes 
throughout the merger and the PMI (sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 
4.4). 
 Understanding and acting on the principle that reengineering of 
the processes is likely to be needed in the merger (sections 2.2, 
2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 Understanding and acting on the fact that the administrators in 
public sector mergers are not necessarily against or resistant to 
changes (sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
 Promotion of knowledge sharing among new and old colleagues 
(sections 2.3, 4.4). 
 Being prepared to handle political and power struggles regarding 
IS and routines (sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
6.4 Answers to the fourth research question 
RQ4: What factors of importance influence the post-merger integration 
in a public sector merger?  
The longitudinal case-study has shown some important factors for 
successful PMI in public sector mergers, as listed below (without any 
ranking of importance). 
 Prioritization of IS-related issues. If the IS issues are not highly 
prioritized it is likely that there will be negative consequences for 
the whole PMI and thereby for the new organization (sections 2.1, 
2.2). 
 The administrators, who depend on their IS to support their work 
must be satisfied with their IS (subsection 2.1.10, sections 2.1, 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
 Reengineering of the administrative processes. Even if the 
merged units basically performed the same tasks before the 
merger, these tasks could be carried out differently (sections 2.1, 
2.2, 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 Pre-merger planning of IS-human integration. There are many 
questions that need to be dealt with before the merger is carried 
out, such as training activities, analysis of the IS needs and 
requirements for the new organization (section 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). 
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 High quality information. It is vital to build trust, down-play fear 
of the merger consequences and to ensure that the IS-strategizing 
processes work well (sections 2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 Training opportunities due to changed routines and/or IS must be 
investigated and acted on (sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 Leadership style. A directive leadership style could be sufficient 
in a merger, but it can cause frustration and resistance among the 
staff (in this case, the administrators), (sections 2.3, 4.4).  
 Trust in management, which could be jeopardized if efficient 
communication strategies are changed during the merger and/or 
post-merger phases (sections 2.3, 4.4). 
 Willingness to share knowledge. Knowledge management (KM) 
that inspires colleagues to share their knowledge (sections 2.3, 
4.1, 4.4, 4.5). 
 Participation. Helps the administrators to feel useful and 
convinced that their opinions and efforts count (section 2.2, 2.3, 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
 A multi-site organization will require more time for 
communication, co-operation and travelling and this can cause 
stress (sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5). 
 Early appointment of managers. Delays in appointing top 
management can result in the following: 
o Ongoing processes may be interrupted, e.g. IS projects 
(section 4.4). 
o Implementation of new routines and/or IS may be delayed 
(sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
o Trust in management may be eroded or even vanish 
(sections 2.3, 4.4). 
o Insecurity about the new organization and management 
can cause rumour and gossip (sections 2.3, 4.4, 4.5). 
o New leaders that are externally recruited are usually not 
familiar with the organizational context, e.g. culture and 
history. However, they are generally not influenced by the 
organization’s old problems either (section 2.2, 4.4). 
o Decisions that are taken in the merger process 
immediately before the new leaders take over may be 
overturned (if they are not supported by the new leaders) 
(sections 2.2, 4.4). 
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o The leaders managing the merger process, fully aware of 
that they will be replaced when the merger is completed, 
could be reluctant to decide on matters concerning the new 
organization (sections 2.2, 4.4). 
6.5 Lessons learned and concluding remarks 
The longitudinal case-study has provided a step-by-step understanding of 
the effects of a merger between two universities, i.e. an understanding of 
the processes in which the administrators form their opinions about the 
new organisation and of their opportunities to work and to carry out their 
duties in the new settings. The longitudinal case-study as a research 
method proved to be successful in finding the intertwined processes that 
have been in play during the pre-merger and the post-merger phases. 
These processes were followed all the way from the initial merger 
expectations through enthusiastic openness towards a feeling of 
disillusionment and the dilution of positive opinions and a more sceptical 
view after the merger was carried out.  
Administrators’ opinions of the management throughout the DE-
merger and in the University DE (at least initially) point to 
mismanagement.  The studies did not show any resistance that needed to 
be countered (section 4.1, 4.2). The administrators were i) open-minded 
to reengineering, ii) willing to participate in various merger projects, iii) 
well-educated, and iv) confident of their skills and abilities to learn to 
master new IS (sections 4.2, 2.4). Given the background of the initial 
findings that were almost surprisingly promising it is worth asking the 
question why the post merger atmosphere turned sour. With such a solid 
foundation of highly skilled and motivated administrative staff, what 
happened to change their positive attitudes? Why were the IS-related 
issues not more emphasized in the merger processes than the 
administrators believed them to be? The answers to the research 
questions also explain why the administrators’ opinions became more 
sceptical and why the IS issues were not given more attention. Two 
factors in particular seem to be more influential on the outcome than 
others and also influenced PMI success. The late appointment of managers 
and the lack of IS strategies in the former organizations.  
The answers to RQs 1-4 can be summarized to the following key factors 
for carrying out a successful PMI of both IS and humans (cf, fig. 21).          
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Figure 21: Important factors for successful PMI. 
Figure 21 shows an overall view of the factors that constitute the 
lessons learned from this research. These factors give a theoretical 
contribution to research as hypotheses for future research. The more 
practical contribution builds on the lessons learned and are 
recommended for use as a checklist for mergers in the public sector, 
especially for mergers in higher education. Some questions were put 
forward about why the promising start to the merger was wasted. The 
answers could be found in figure 21 that points out the importance of i) 
decisive strategic management of IS, ii) early involvement of IS, iii) 
early IS-decisions and iv) an early appointment of the management of 
the new organization. It was discovered during the series of studies that 
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formed this thesis that there were no IS strategies in the former 
organizations; 26 months after the merger was carried out there was still 
no IS-strategy for the new organization. The new university 
management was appointed after the merger process. 
 
7 Proposals for future research 
7.1 Follow up after three years in the new organization 
– University DE 
Prior findings and published cases about unsuccessful PMI make it 
important to work towards further facilitation of PMI. Moreover, the 
literature on PMI of IS and humans in public sector mergers is scarce. 
This alone would be ample justification to continue the research that has 
followed the DE-merger since autumn 2008. Other research methods 
could preferably be applied as a complement to the case-study approach; 
for example network theory or action research (as recommended by 
Gummesson 2007) and perhaps TAM (e.g. Davis 1986, 1989) if new IS 
are taken into use. However, the latter depends on whether the 
information about new IS is available in time, before the users are 
presented with the new IS, as it is important to carry out an initial study 
early in the process to compare with later studies. TAM was considered 
for the case-study research when the research project started but at that 
time it was too late for comparative studies.  
7.2 Compare with a similar study in another context 
Mergers in the public sector are likely to increase in the near future, not 
least because of the opportunities for rationalization and financial 
efficiency. In the field of higher education there are political initiatives to 
promote future merger within higher education. The justification is 
mainly to further improve the prospects of reaching research excellence 
and to increase the opportunities for attracting more students and 
research partners. Hence it would be interesting to carry out a similar 
longitudinal case-study among administrators in other higher education 
organizations that are approaching a merger.  
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7.3 Testing of the findings from the longitudinal case-
study 
The findings from the case-study are summarized in the lessons learned 
(section 6.5) and comprehensively presented in figure 21. The factors 
pointed out as facilitators for successful PMI (if they are all considered in 
due time) could be tested and measured in other public sector mergers 
(section 7.2) outside higher education as the findings are likely to be 
applicable for other mergers in the public sector.  
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APPENDIX 1 – Interview guide, spring 2009 
 
Gender: Male or Female? 
 
What organization are you employed in before the merger? Org D or 
Org E? 
 
In order to carry out your duties – which information systems do you 
need? 
Economy systems (only) 
Personal Administration systems (only) 
Production systems (only) 
A combination of: 
Economy systems + Personal Administration systems 
Economy systems + Production systems 
Personal Administration systems + Production systems 
Economy systems + Personal Administration systems + Production 
system 
 
Your age?   
21-30 years 
31-40 years 
41-50 years 
51-60 years 
61-65 years 
66 years or more 
 
Do you know what will happen to your present information 
systems in the merger? 
Will it/they be changed to new ones? 
Will it/they be further developed? 
 
If Yes to the any of the two questions: 
Will you be offered training in new/further developed IS? 
How do you feel about learning new IS due to the merger? 
 
Do you find the merger to be an appropriate opportunity to carry 
out changes to the organizations’ information systems? 
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If Yes: Why? Would you please elaborate your standpoint further? 
If No:  Why not? Would you please elaborate your standpoint further? 
 
What is your opinion on the information you have received about the 
merger so far? 
What do you consider to be most important? 
What is the most positive aspect of the merger information? 
Are there any negative aspects? 
 
Do you think your competence has been utilized in the merger? 
If Yes: In what way – can you elaborate further? 
If No: Can you please describe how you could have contributed to the 
process? Why did not this work? 
 
Do you think you will be able to influence your work situation after 
the merger is carried out? 
With regard to new/updated duties? 
With regard to duties that have not been (or will not be) changed? 
How do you feel about this?  
 
Are you satisfied with the support you get from today’s IS? 
Is this support what you need in order to carry out your tasks? 
If No – Can you please describe the problem further? What would you 
need? 
If Yes – In what way? – How could this be achieved? 
 
Do you think that you received proper support and 
training/education when you started to use the IS? 
 
Please, mention three keywords that describe the merger as you see 
it? 
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APPENDIX 2 – Questionnaire, winter 2010 
The questions from the third study’s questionnaire carried out in the 
winter of 2010. 
Question (Q)1: Before the merger I was employed at: OrgD or OrgE. 
Q2: My gender is: Male or Female. 
Q3: My age is: - 20 years, 21-30 years, 31-40 years, 41-50 years, 51-60 
years, 61-65 years, over 65 years. 
Q4: Do you use a new IS after the merger? Yes, entirely/Yes, partly/ 
I do not know/No. 
If changed IS: 
a) How has the new IS influenced your work? 
Very positively (5)  
Rather positively (4) 
Neutral (3) 
Rather negatively (2) 
Very negatively (1) 
 
b) Have you received or will you receive training because of new 
IS? 
Yes, I have received training  
Yes, I will receive training 
I do not know 
No, I have not received and will not receive training 
 
If unchanged IS: 
c) Do you think that the IS should have been changed? 
Yes, entirely/Yes, partly/ I do not know/No 
 
If no training: 
d) Do you think you need (or needed) training? 
Yes/No/I do not know 
 
Q5: Were your routines changed in the merger? Yes, entirely/Yes, 
partly/ I do not know/No. 
 
If changed routines: 
a) How have the new routines influenced your work? 
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Very positively (5)  
Rather positively (4) 
Neutral (3) 
Rather negatively (2) 
Very negatively (1) 
 
b) Have you received or will you receive training? 
Yes, I have received training  
Yes, I will receive training 
I do not know 
No, I have not received and will not receive training 
 
If unchanged routines: 
c) Do you think that the routines should have been changed? 
Yes, entirely/Yes, partly/ I do not know/No. 
If no training: 
d) Do you think you need (or needed) training? 
Yes/No/I do not know 
 
Q6: Have your merger expectations been fulfilled? 
Yes, just as well as I expected (5) 
Yes, almost as well as I expected (4) 
Neutral (3) 
Not completely as bad as I expected (2) 
Worse than I expected (1) 
 
Q7: Did the management in charge of the merger exploit the  
opportunities for further development? Yes/No/I do not know 
 
Q8: Do you think your work creates value for the organization? 
Always (5)/Mostly (4)/Neutral (3)/Rarely (2)/Never (1) 
 
Q9: Do you think you work in the most effective way? 
Always (5)/Mostly (4)/Neutral (3)/Rarely (2)/Never (1) 
Q10: Are your IS satisfactorily supportive after the merger? 
Always (5)/Mostly (4)/Neutral (3)/Rarely (2)/Never (1) 
 
Comments – anything else you want to say about the IS and/or the 
routines after the merger can be added here (max 320 characters):
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APPENDIX 3 – Interview guide, spring 2010 
The interview guide from the fourth study carried out in the spring 
2010. The questions below were a basis for the interviews; the 
interviewees mostly answered both according to the scales and gave 
“open” answers. In some cases they could not grade the answer and only 
answered openly.  
 
Question 1: Do you work in a new department or in a new working 
group after the merger? Yes/No 
 
Question 2: Are there any new colleagues in your department? 
Yes/No 
   
ROUTINES and TRAINING 
Question 3: Did you have to learn new routines in order to carry out 
your tasks? 
In case of Yes:  
a. What is your opinion of the new routines?  
b. Are the routines new for your colleagues too (i.e. for those who 
have not changed their place of work as you have)? Yes/No 
c. Time spent on new routines?          Much more time (1) 
                                 More time (2)    
                                 No change (3) 
                                 Less time (4) 
                                 Much less time (5)         
d. More or less errors because of new routines?  Much more (1) 
                                                                            More (2) 
                                                                            No change (3)          
                                                                            Less (4) 
                                                                            Much less (5) 
e. More or less duplicate work? Much more (1) 
                                                 More (2) 
                                                 No change (3) 
                                                 Less (4) 
                                                 Much less (5) 
f.  Apart from you, are there more “new” colleagues in your 
department or in your work group?  Yes/No 
g.  Have you received any training because of the new routines? 
Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
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h.  Have your colleagues (as far as you know) received any 
training because of the new routines? Rank on a five-degree 
scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
If no training: 
i.  Will there be any training? Rank on a five-degree scale: 
Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
j.  Do the administrators have to take own responsibility for 
learning new routines? Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely 
(5) – Not at all (1) 
k.  Is training necessary due to new routines? Rank on a five-
degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
                       
INFORMATION SYSTEMS and TRAINING 
Question 4: Did you have to learn new IS in order to carry out your 
tasks? 
In case of Yes: 
a. What is your opinion of the new IS? 
b. Are the IS new for your colleagues too (i.e. for those who have 
not changed their place of work as you have)? Yes/No 
c. Time spent on new IS?                    Much more time (1) 
                                 More time (2)    
                                 No change (3) 
                                 Less time (4) 
                                 Much less time (5)     
d. More or fewer errors because of new IS?        Much more (1) 
                                                                            More (2) 
                                                                            No change (3)          
                                                                            Less (4) 
                                                                            Much less (5) 
e. More or less duplicate work because of new IS? Much more (1) 
                                                                                More (2) 
                                                                                No change (3) 
                                                                                Less (4) 
                                                                                Much less (5) 
f.  Are there any “new” colleagues in your department or in your 
work group?  Yes/No 
g.  Have you received any training because of the new IS? Rank on 
a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
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h.  Have your colleagues (as far as you know) received any 
training because of the new IS? Rank on a five-degree scale: 
Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
If no training: 
i.  Will there be any training? Rank on a five-degree scale: 
Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
j.  Do the administrators have to take own responsibility for 
learning new IS? Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – 
Not at all (1) 
 
k.  Is training necessary due to new IS? Rank on a five-degree scale: 
          Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
 
REENGINEERING 
Question 5: About reengineering initiatives in the DE-merger – 
have you or your colleagues made any proposals/suggestions for 
changes? Yes/No    
 
If Yes:  
How were your proposals received?    Rank on a five-degree scale: 
Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
 
How were your colleagues’ proposals received (as far as you 
know)?    Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
 
Question 6: Did the management in charge of the merger exploit the 
opportunities for further development? Yes/No/I do not know 
 
Question 7: Do you think that development was needed before the 
merger? Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1) 
 
Question 8: Do you think that further development is needed after 
the merger? Rank on a five-degree scale: Completely (5) – Not at all (1)  
 
INFORMATION – how it was perceived before and after the merger 
Question 9: Has the content been changed? Yes/No 
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Question 10: Has the amount been changed? Much increased  
                                                                             Somewhat increased 
                                                                     The same 
                                                                             Somewhat decreased 
                                                                             Much decreased 
Question 11: Have the channels been changed? Yes/No  
 
If Yes: How? 
 
Question 12: Is it the same sender/-s after the merger? Yes/No 
Question 13: Who do you think the sender/-s was/were before the 
merger? 
Question 14: Who do you think the sender/-s is/are after the merger? 
 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Question 15: Do you consider yourself to be effective at work? 
Question 16: Please, specify what you mean by being effective at 
work? 
Question 17: In terms of productivity, do you feel you accomplish 
more or less during a normal workday compared to before the 
merger?  Rank on a five-degree scale how you consider your 
productivity to have become after the merger:  Much higher (5) – Much 
lower (1)                                                                                   
Question 18: About fragmentation of your working day, do you 
think that your new routines and/or your new IS make your 
workday more or less fragmented? Rank on a five-degree scale how 
you consider the fragmentation of a working day after the merger:  Much 
higher (1) – Much lower (5) (reversed scale) 
 
Question 19: How often are you disturbed (during a normal working 
day) by problems about the new organization and/or new 
routines/IS? 
 
Question 20: How frequent are these disruptions? 
 
Question 21: Which are the forms for the disruptions, (e.g. e-mail, 
phone, colleagues who come into your office, unplanned meetings)? 
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CREATION OF VALUE 
Question 22: Do you think your work contributes value to your 
organization? 
 a. How is this measured – by your own judgement or others? 
 b. What do you think yourself? 
 
KEY-WORDS (from the last interview) 
How do you feel about the key-words you formulated the last time 
we met (a year ago)? 
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APPENDIX 4 – Questionnaire, November 2011 
The questions from the fifth study’s questionnaire carried out in 
November 2011. 
Question (Q) 1: Gender? Male/Female 
Q 2: Employment before the merger in: OrgD/OrgE 
Q3: How well do the information systems, that you depend on to 
carry out your duties, work? 
Very well (5) 
Rather well (4) 
Neutral (3) 
Rather badly (2) 
Very badly (1) 
Q4: How do you think that IS issues were handled in the merger? 
They were often in the shadow of other issues 
They were highly prioritized 
They were often postponed 
There has been confusion about the IS 
The IS issues premeated the merger 
I have no opinion 
Q5: If you compare your present work situation with the one before 
the merger, which of the following do you agree with (more than one 
alternative can be marked): 
 
I have improved my skills after the merger 
I get more appreciation for my achievements at work now 
I think that I contribute more value now 
It is easier to understand my own role now 
I have more stimulating tasks now 
I am more often dissatisfied with my work now 
I find it harder to accomplish what is expected now 
I find it harder to understand the work flow now 
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I am more often under stress now 
I do not agree with any of these statements 
Comments: If you want to add something you can do so here (max 600 
characters): 
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